society nor, for that matter, the regime itself. If anything, soldiers' behavior resembled more closely that of workers or even students than "traditional" peasant rebellions. Not unlike workers in factories, large numbers of soldiers were brought together in military barracks that provided novel opportunities for soldiers' activism not available to most peasants outside the army. This lesson was not lost on the revolutionaries who, following 1905, devoted more and more energy to military organizations, a tactical innovation that would acquire considerable importance in the next round of revolutionary upheaval in February 1917.

Bushnell's exhaustive research in Western archives and Soviet published materials highlights the inadequacies of our models of Russian society and politics in the final years of the autocracy and in particular our understanding of the vast majority of its rural subjects. Recent scholarship outside Russian studies has left anthropologists and sociologists far less certain about the unchanging and distinctive qualities of rural society, and Bushnell's study lends further support to their new arguments. Rising literacy rates, rural outmigrations and seasonal labor, greater interactions with the urban market, the post-Reform army itself—all were changing Russian peasant society rapidly. The Revolution quickened the pace of change, altered the terms of political discourse, and schooled the major protagonists in ways that would shape their responses to succeeding developments. In this sense 1905 was indeed the "dress rehearsal" for 1917. The Russia that emerged from the turbulent events of 1905 and 1906 was no longer the Russia of earlier years. Bushnell's compelling narrative should stimulate further discussion and research in these areas.

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This translation of a 1956 Russian work consists of four sections: a review of Stolypin's career; Stolypin's alleged 1911 proposals to reform the central government; selected émigré testimonials about Stolypin; and the texts of the Agrarian Law of November 9, 1906 and of the Western Zemstvo Law of 1911.

Zenkovsky presents the highlights of Stolypin's career—agrarian reform and support for universal primary education; rapport with the zemstvos; appearances in and chief altercations with the Dumas and State Council; assaults from "left" and "right"; assassination in Kiev in 1911. Complex issues are summarized in matter-of-fact, common-sense fashion. Some of Zenkovsky's more important judgments follow Stolypin's use of article 87 during the Western Zemstvo Crisis of 1911 is compared with his use of this clause in the interim between the First and Second Dumas to implement the agrarian laws and in the 1908 dreadnought conflict. All instances brought necessary reforms; and, in addition, the 1911 usage foiled Stolypin's enemies on the right. The June 3 alteration of the electoral law might have strained the bonds of legality but was required to save the institution of the Duma. Stolypin correctly sided against the Duma in the Naval General Staff Crisis of 1909 because, by approving personnel changes the Duma had usurped the tsar's prerogatives. The Kadets were myopic rabblerousers who flirted with revolutionaries and proposed radical measures; October 1917 was their just reward. The Okhrana probably was responsible for Stolypin's assassination. Stolypin might have prevented World War I and subsequent upheaval.

Zenkovsky's impressionistic brushstrokes give the uninitiated reader a correct picture of Stolypin's administration, but there is no chiaroscuro and many
topics are ignored—Stolypin's extensive Finnish policies; dialogues with the Kadets; plans for Kholm Province; unimplemented but extant proposals for reform of the police, local self-government and local administration; statements in the Council of Ministers regarding the Dumas. These last, in particular, illustrate Stolypin's ambivalent attitude toward local self-government and the new parliament. Stolypin's dealings with revolutionaries are confined to the 1906 explosion at his Aptekarskii Island dacha and the Azef affair. Only hints of discord mar Stolypin's relationship with the tsar.

On the whole, Zenkovsky's account appears to have been culled from contemporary newspapers; this is understandable since he was a financial expert in the Kiev zemstvo who witnessed a couple of Stolypin's speeches in the Duma and State Council and conferred with Stolypin only a few times. Nevertheless, there are redeeming features. Zenkovsky's emphasis on Stolypin's interest in foreign affairs and economic issues, such as the development of Siberia and the Amur Railway, redress Geoffrey Hosking's portrayal of Stolypin (The Russian Constitutional Experiment) as almost totally preoccupied with the new parliament, as well as the stubbornly-held popular view that Stolypin's career revolved around the agrarian reforms. Additionally, Zenkovsky's chapter on Stolypin and the zemstvos, although ignoring the 1907 local government proposals and the Sovet po delam mestnogo khoziaistva, offers a vignette of a heretofore unseen Stolypin, fascinated with the details of zemstvo finances. Zenkovsky also emphasizes that the demand for elective zemstvos in the western provinces, with safeguards for Russians, had grass-roots origins.

The controversial section of this book deals with Stolypin's proposal to reform the government, reputedly dictated to Zenkovsky in May, 1911. In reading this excellent 1986 translation by Margaret Patoski, I feel the same as I did about the 1956 Russian version (Pravda o Stolypine) which I used in my 1976 biography (Peter Arkad'evich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Tsarist Russia). I am still skeptical about the authenticity of the project. As I wrote earlier, we have only Zenkovsky's word that this project existed. Although Serge A. Zenkovsky's appendage to this translation refers to "green notebooks" containing the dictation, he never examined the notebooks and they disappeared. There are no other references to this project save a tentative one by Stolypin's son-in-law. There are also contradictions between elements of the 1911 proposals and other proposals, statements, and behavior of Stolypin. Many of the new ministries allegedly proposed in 1911—Labor, Social Security, Nationalities, Local Government, Health—covered sensitive areas to which Stolypin personally attended through his own ministry, Internal Affairs. Would he have divested himself of this much power? In the 1911 proposal provincial zemstvos were to have extensive financial rights—even to provisioning the army; district zemstvos were to manage all schools and supervise land needs; qualifications for zemstvo electors were significantly reduced. In the 1907 local government bill and the 1908 education bill, which Stolypin supported, zemstvo independence was increased vis-à-vis local administrative authorities, but the minister of internal affairs' control over zemstvos was tightened, and ultimate control of proposed volost' zemstvos lay not with provincial zemstvos but Internal Affairs; the minister of education had ultimate control over primary schools; large landowners were given special zemstvo representation to offset uncultured smallholders. The alleged 1911 proposal provided for full rights for Jews; in 1906, 1909, and 1910 Stolypin argued in the Council of Ministers for increasing Jewish educational quotas and rights for Jewish merchants to live in Moscow but there is no evidence of his favoring eradication of all disabilities. Finally, why would Stolypin dictate this project to an "outsider" like Zenkovsky? On the other hand, suggestions in the "Project" for improved transportation and increased power for the chairman of the Council of Ministers were consistent with Stolypin's documented policies.