activity as well as his thorough scrutiny of Hrushevsky’s era. His monograph on Hrushevsky fills an important gap in Western historiography, and as such is recommended to all major academic and public libraries.

Lubomyr R. Wynar


Though a number of works on the Balkan Wars have appeared in the past half century, mostly detailing the diplomacy of both the great powers and the states involved in the conflicts, there is certainly merit in another volume, especially if it brings new material to light or provides a fresh perspective. Such was no doubt the intention of the Program on Society in Change and the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Belgrade which sponsored the conference where most of the papers that appear in this volume were presented. With twenty-eight essays the coverage of this significant era in Balkan history is certainly extensive. But the volume is uneven with regard to the subjects that are treated and the value of the contributions.

The choice of a title for the work seems to owe more to the name of the series of which this volume is a part than with its contents. Though so entitled, the book is not about “East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars,” but the military campaigns, politics, diplomacy and to some extent economics of the wars in the Balkans. Contributions to the work have been grouped into six sections, with that on the "Armed Forces and Military Operations" taking up about a third of the book. Indeed, the divisions are somewhat artificial because the next two sections, "Society, Economy and Diplomacy" and "Aspects of Great Power Involvement," both deal with politics, diplomacy and to some extent economics. The essays vary significantly in length though not necessarily according to the importance of the subject matter. Unfortunately, those contributions that address the broad issues most relevant to the impact of the wars on society are often the shortest in length, numbering no more than half a dozen pages.

Appropriately, an introduction by Béla Király seeks to place the Balkan wars in historical perspective. The wars that dramatically changed the political map of Southeastern Europe are depicted as part of a cycle of liberating struggles going back to the early nineteenth century and the legacy of the French revolutionary era. Most of the contributors agree with this assessment, some adding a Marxist clarification by dubbing them bourgeois nationalist wars against (Ottoman) feudalism. But were the Balkan
Wars perhaps not also part of a new cycle of conflicts that have wracked the world in the twentieth century? In their outcome they may be seen as a harbinger of the wars of narrow political interests, ideology and bitter ethnic hatred that have become all too common in our time.

The wars in the Balkans in 1912 and 1913 were part of the promise and the power of the age of nations and industry on the mighty continent. They belong to the era of so-called "modern warfare" with its mass, citizen armies, led by a professional corps of military officers relying on weapons and men shaped by technology and supported by the economic power of an industrially based society. A number of the essays deal with various aspects of this new era in warfare including operations, organization, strategy and economic infrastructure. Though accounts on all the belligerents are included, some with more than one contribution, there are two notable exceptions to the generally thorough coverage. The operations of the Ottoman armies are treated in four pages, while the section on Greece's military participation is a translation of a selection from an official history produced by the Greek general staff in the early 1930s.

From the plethora of statistics and details on the operations of the various armed forces, a few basic points emerge. If industrialization was slow, uneven and not yet truly a fact among the Balkan countries, one may ask, how were these states able to support these military efforts? The answer seems to lie in a combination of factors: the states had strong enough economies to be able to provide the basic provisions needed by the men in the armies; military supplies and technology were obtained from willing suppliers among the great powers; and when the allied states embarked on a war with the Ottoman empire, they did so with the calculation that the conflict would be swift and decisive, thus minimizing the burden on their societies. Moreover, it is clear that military issues were subordinated to political interests in the diplomacy and fighting that took place. The role of strong political personalities such as Pasic, Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Venizelos is noted, though more extensive coverage of the personal factor would have been illuminating. These men and their military establishments had a clear idea of what their primary interest was by the dual nature of the military plans that they crafted. They agreed to cooperate with one another and conduct war against the Ottoman Turks in order to defeat the main obstacle to their ambition for territorial expansion. But, the second and more basic desire of each Balkan state was to protect and secure its nationalist aims against neighboring rivals. After securing the first goal, the Balkan states promoted further disruption in the region by pursuing their second goal.

In the early twentieth century it was easy to castigate the Balkans as the "powder keg of Europe," but the conditions that made it so were many and not just local in origin. The great powers competitively pursued their political and economic interests in the region as they had done for decades. But the diplomatic realignment that took place in the first decade of the twenti-