context and discusses the relationship between the essays. Of particular use to the non-specialist is a glossary of the specialized terms employed throughout the book.

The articles are varied in both detail and approach. Basil Dmytryshyn's chapter on the administration of the colony from 1581-1700 is a general, though solid overview of the subject and provides much needed background. Though he includes no footnotes, there is a general bibliography. David N. Collins relies on recent Soviet scholarship to investigate Muscovite colonial policy and to dispel both the traditional view that the latter was one of military subjugation and the more recent, but equally incorrect position that the Russians managed to avoid the unpleasant side of colonialism altogether. J. L. Black's contribution is a short discussion of the many expeditions, scientific and otherwise, undertaken in the effort to understand this vast territory, particularly the Second Kamchatka (or Great Northern) Expedition of 1733-44. Somewhat related is the chapter on Russia in colonial America by James R. Gibson, a peripheral, though fascinating period in Russian colonial history. Of particular relevance is the presentation by James Forsyth of the complexity of the native question in Siberia. Unfortunately, Forsyth's admirable attempt to provide an overview of the subject may still pose difficulties for those unfamiliar with the geography and ethnography of the region. Perhaps of greatest interest to many will be the chapter on "Russia's Wild East": exile, vagrancy and crime in nineteenth century Siberia" by Alan Wood. The anecdotal, yet graphic accounts included should quickly dispel any romantic illusions readers may have held about the nature of the exile system, often thought of primarily in terms of the many revolutionaries sent to this cold prison. Soviet scholar Leonid M. Goriushkin's study of migration, settlement and the rural economy of Siberia from 1861-1914, with particular emphasis on the mutual benefits to both Siberia and European Russia of the new arrivals, should prove of interest to specialists. Finally, John Channon's discussion of revolution and civil war, 1917-21, though relying in large part on the research of other Western scholars, does provide an important means of comparison for the often neglected study of revolution and civil war in the provinces.

This collection would have benefitted greatly from the inclusion of works on cultural and intellectual history; as Alan Wood concludes, these and many other important issues must wait for a future volume. Given the paucity of scholarship by Western historians in this field, the contributors are to be commended for their efforts to redress this neglect.

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On 27 April 1682 (Old Style), the frail, twenty-year-old Tsar Fedor Alekseevich died after a reign of six years. He was survived by his feeble, fifteen-year-old brother Ivan, three paternal aunts and six adult sisters—all spinsters, a thirty-year-old step-mother Natalia Naryshkina, two young
half-sisters, and a robust nine-year-old half-brother—the future Peter the Great. A hastily convened quasi-zemski sobor under Patriarch Joachim selected Peter to succeed Fedor, but enraged streltsy invaded the Kremlin palaces and lynched two of their colonels, two diaks, two Naryshkins, and five other boyars in three days. Before the political dust had settled, there were two crowned Tsars—Ivan V and Peter I, the streltsy and their leading Old Believer adherents were brought to heel, and two ambitious Khovanskiis, who had manipulated the insurgents, were beheaded.

All of this seems like normal Muscovite crisis politics—mob violence, boyar factionalism, and a sprinkling of executions interrupting periods of brutal stability—except for one thing. The Romanov, who boldly emerged from the Kremlin to mediate and to stabilize the Russian polity for the next seven years at the top of a troika of "sovereigns," was Ivan V's third oldest sister, the twenty-seven-year-old Sophia. Her background, advent to power, exercise of authority, policies, achievements, fall, and subsequent life are the subjects of Professor Hughes's new monograph.

Hughes's task is recognizably not easy. At the end of thorough source criticism that separates fact from fancy, myth, and sensationalism, one can say a great deal about late seventeenth-century Russia, but very little about Sophia. For example, her early biography is really a study of the public life of the ruling family, the most important sources being the published Dvortsouve razriady and Zabelin's classic Domashnyi byt' russikh tsarits. Some anecdotes are illuminating and fascinating. For example, in 1672, the tsarevna attended a day-long theatrical spectacle, "Ahasuersus and Esther," but since women of this station were still secluded, they had to observe through holes in an enclosed pavilion. However, Sophia's childhood training, her activities during Fedor's reign, and whether she, a tsarevna, actually obtained a formal, Western-influenced education from Simeon Polotskii or someone else remain within the realm of conjecture.

Hughes's account of the events of 1682-89 is solid, but similarly elusive concerning Sophia's actual role in the government, except for her decisive actions in 1682, her position as the ostensible de facto chief of state, her guidance of Ivan V, her participation in inquisitorial proceedings, and her readiness to confront insubordination with an "Off with his head." As Hughes notes, there were few administrative or economic initiatives on the home front under Sophia and no significant results.

In the diplomatic sphere, playing off the Turks against the Poles and leveraging the transfer of the Metropolitanate of Kiev from Constantinople to Moscow in late 1685 represented brilliant diplomatic footwork. But whose policy was it? This move and the subsequent 1686 treaty with Poland that secured the gains of 1667 and mandated the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 were at least partially the handiwork of the chief minister, Vasilii Golitsyn. As for Sophia, the evidence Hughes presents, including two letters to Golitsyn while he was on his second Crimean expedition, indicates warmth as well as shared power between the two. In his absence she tried to coordinate foreign and military policy and keep the funds to the soldiers flowing.

Did Sofia and Golitsyn really rule Russia? Insecurely at best. They wished to legitimize her sovereign position, and this, as Hughes shows, was the key to their downfall. When they orchestrated questionable victory