which Lenin established the Bolshevik Party. Similarly, Zaichnevskii's call, in Young Russia (1862) for the execution of the tsar and his "party" may have served as the stimulus for Lenin's and Sverdlov's decision to execute Nicholas II and his family in 1918 as an indispensable step toward the triumph of the revolution.

In general, LeBlanc's portrayal of Bolshevik history remains within the confines of the Bolshevik/Menshevik orbit, underplaying the sometimes vital role played by the rival Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR's). A case in point is the December Armed Uprising in Moscow in 1905, on which LeBlanc cites Zinov'ev's assertion that "the leading organizational role in it (the rising) belonged to the Bolsheviks and their committee..." citing Zinov'ev's History of the Bolshevik Party: A Popular Outline (London, 1973), p. 126.

In fact, however, a number of actions crucial to the uprising and its background were carried out by SR's, notably the assassination in February 1905 of Grand Duke Sergei, uncle to the tsar and Governor General of Moscow; the political leadership by SR's of the textile workers in the Presnia district where the uprising had its center; the bombing of police headquarters in Moscow by an SR terrorist, Vladimir Zenzinov; and the organization and leadership of the armed detachments (druzhiny) by an SR-Maximalist known under the revolutionary pseudonym "Medved." Without these actions neither the Bolsheviks not the Mensheviks could have made the uprising "an important part of Bolshevism's legacy, a vital component of its growth as a revolutionary organization" (p. 124).

The point is that the history of Bolshevism is more complex than might appear from LeBlanc's portrayal. Whether that will make his book less successful as a guide to action (e.g., in Nicaragua, a focal point of LeBlanc's interest), only time will tell.

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The fact that this work is a revised doctoral dissertation is not unusual or significant. However, the fact that the dissertation was written nearly thirty years ago (Sorbonne, 1963) does give pause. More important, in its present form the work is devoid of any notation and has no index or bibliography. The author does briefly acknowledge the archival resources (Austrian, British, French, German and American) that he consulted.

These factors severely limit the book's value as a scholarly resource, but they do not render it valueless. Given the dearth of objective material on the subject, the present volume, which strives for a balanced and honest presentation, is a useful addition. John F. N. Bradley certainly is qualified to address the topic. He has authored works on the Russian civil war, Allied intervention, and others dealing with Czech history and politics. His father was a veteran of the Legion's struggles. It is unfortunate, however, that he chose to present his work in this form.
Bradley examines the development, campaigns and travails of the Czechoslovak (or Czecho-Slovak) Legion from its inception in 1914 to the departure of the last legionnaire from Vladivostok in late 1920. At 156 pages the study is not exhaustive and in many places quite sketchy. There is little attention given to the Legion's military exploits as opposed to political (internal and external) and diplomatic matters. A simple map would have been useful as would some diagrams outlining the unit's organizational evolution. However, anyone basically familiar with Russian geography and the civil war should have little difficulty following movements and events.

The book is divided into six untitled chapters. The first three Bradley devotes to an examination of the origin and development of the Legion up to the Bolshevik seizure of power and the resulting Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March, 1918). He does a good job of untangling the complex knot of political and personal factions that coalesced in the Legion. He also presents some interesting background on the Czech national movement, particularly its Russian branch. He debunks the notion that the Legion was part of a pan-slav plot between Czech separatists and tsarist Russia, an idea that obsessed Habsburg officials. Bradley notes, for instance, that many Russian Czechs saw the formation of the Legion (originally, the Druzhina) as a means to avoid internment as enemy aliens. In addition many were reluctant to accept the destruction of the Dual Monarchy as a desirable goal. He also disputes the idea that the Legion sparked mass desertions from the Czech and Slovak units of the Habsburg army. In fact through 1916 these groups were notably under-represented among deserters and prisoners on the eastern front.

Czech uncertainty was exacerbated by the contradictory policies of the tsarist Russians, who never envisioned the Legion as anything but a token force. Moreover, the tsarists were blindly hostile to the most influential Czech leader, Thomas Masaryk, whom they regarded as an "English agent."

The creation of a significant Czechoslovak force only occurred after the fall of the monarchy. Although problems remained with the literal Provisional Government, it did permit the recruitment of POWs and allowed Masaryk in the country. Bradley credits Masaryk with instilling in the Legion a single-minded pursuit of national independence. This was the glue that held it together in the difficult years to come.

The final chapters follow the Legion on its slow, confused exodus across Russia and Siberia amidst the maelstrom of the Russian civil war. Regarding the Legion's "mutiny" against the Soviet regime in May 1918, Bradley suggests that the break was not inevitable and was the result of mutual frustration and confusion rather than the Entente plot envisioned by Soviet and Czech communist writers. He emphasizes that most legionnaires, officers and men (proto-fascist Rudolf Gajda the major exception), had no political quarrel with the Bolsheviks but saw Soviet policies as obstructing their departure from Russia.

The same factors determined Czech relations with Admiral A. V. Kolchak's White regime; in January 1919 not a single Czech soldier accepted Kolchak's offer to remain at the front rather than depart for