radicals, they too had placed their faith in Communism, and it was especially ironic that it should have been the Communists themselves who mobilized traditional anti-Semitic sentiment for the purpose of ridding the country of its last remaining Jews.

This is a worthy and well-intentioned book. It is careful to note the dangers of over-estimating the inherent radicalism or millenarianism of the Jewish tradition — most Jews were not radicals, just as most radicals were not Jews. It is also careful, perhaps in the end too careful, in its treatment of the prejudice and inadequacies of all parties in the sad story of Polish-Jewish relations. Schatz does not fully engage the issue of anti-Semitism as a motive in Jewish sympathy for Marxist solutions; nor is he very forthcoming on another theme — that of Jewish myopia on the subject of Polish national sentiment. Here, I feel, he misses a chance to discuss the inability of even the most perceptive of Jewish Communist intellectuals in recent years to fully understand the ironies of their own experience.

Unfortunately, despite its best efforts, this book is vitiated by its style and method. The author, who has conducted dozens of interviews with survivors of this history, sticks resolutely to a dry, abstract and highly formalized sort of sociological terminology. This is a story of deep human interest, yet Schatz never once speaks of the personal experience of his protagonists, who are hardly ever mentioned by name. They are referred to as "the peers," their story is presented almost as a case study in pathological social mobility, and their motives reduced to a textbook case of social theorizing: "Becoming a Communist, then, was a process of typical, but not predetermined, actions and responses, conditioned and limited by characteristic structural circumstances within which specific contingencies could occur." (p. 69) Well, yes, I suppose it was. But is that how Professor Schatz would like us to remember it?

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Few peoples on earth differ more than the British and the Poles. The difference in outlook and mentality seems to make the pragmatic and cold British and the sensitive and moralizing Poles improbable allies. Little wonder that Britain and Poland failed to develop particularly close relations prior to 1939. In spite of that in March 1939, London astonished the world by offering guarantees to Poland. Then, following the Nazi aggression against Poland in September of that year, Britain and France declared war against Germany. London recognized the Polish government-in-exile between 1939 and 1945, and, after the fall of France in June 1940, a very cordial period in Polish-British relations developed. Yet this honeymoon in Polish-British relations only lasted until the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941. Subsequently, London began to favor closer relations with Moscow. Ideological differences meant little to London at a time when the very survival of the British Empire was at
stake. Poland’s situation, on the other hand, was different. Warsaw had not one but two enemies between 1939 and 1945. Stalin attacked Poland seventeen days after Hitler. Moscow seized extensive Polish territories, brutally persecuted Polish citizens, and massacred some 15,000 Polish officers taken as prisoners of war in September 1939.

In spite of the fact that Poland turned into a liability for London after 1941, a total break in Polish-British relations was out of the question. Having sacrificed Poland’s territorial integrity and participated in imposing an alien government on its once faithful ally, Britain had to accept the consequences of the post-1945 reality in East Central Europe. As a result of the war, occupation, and the establishment of Moscow-dominated governments in that part of Europe, many East Europeans could not, or did not wish to, return home. Polish refugees alone represented several hundred thousand people. Consequently, the large Polish community in Britain after 1939 increased considerably after 1945, contrary to British hopes. The formation of the Polish community in Britain in 1939-50 is the topic of the above study.

The volume under review was sponsored by the M. B. Grabowski Fund, and is the initial publication of the large Polish Migration Report. The Formation of the Polish Community in Britain is the joint work of three scholars. Norman Davies wrote part one (65 pages) on the growth of the Polish community in Britain, 1939-50; Jan Ciechanowski contributed part two (124 pages) on the policies of the Polish government-in-exile, 1939-50; and finally, Keith Sword completed part three (244 pages) on the resettlement of Poles in Britain in 1945-50. The study is based on extensive archival and other research (e.g., interviews) conducted in several countries. The authors have examined the available manuscript and printed sources, including contemporary press and periodicals. The study contains numerous appendices, maps, illustrations, tables, diagrams, a bibliography and index.

The authors deal with a multitude of problems relating to World War II and its consequences in general, and for Poland and Britain in particular. They describe how millions of people were deliberately or accidentally displaced. The three scholars examine in depth Britain during the most deadly conflict in her history. They also speak about the numerous governments in exile, whose officials lived both in Britain and in various parts of the British Empire. The authors discuss high diplomacy, as well as the many problems that the ordinary displaced person had to face in an alien, and sometimes unfriendly environment. The three scholars tell the British and the Polish side of the story, examining the aims and aspirations of both in the midst of the changing fortunes of the war. They speak about the gradual shift of opinion in Britain from one of warmth and sympathy toward the Polish government and population in exile to one of growing coolness, indifference and even hostility. The authors indicate how public opinion reflected the attitude of the British government. When the relations with the Poles were warm, so were those of the strictly censored media and the people at large. Finally, the three scholars show how Britain was coping with the realities of post-1945, accepting, though unwillingly, the thousands of Poles who refused to, or could not, return to a Soviet-dominated Poland, trying to do the best under the existing circumstances.