proceeding much too slowly in light of conditions within the Soviet Union. This augurs well for possible future development of workable confederal relations among at least some of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Further, it was a positive sign that federalism finds most of its support in rehabilitative elements among locally-oriented Communists since the CPSU had always been the very embodiment of nonfederalist centralism.

The author frequently quotes Mikhail Gorbachev but seems to have trouble making sense of the statements he dutifully reports. The Soviet leader's remarks prior to the short-lived coup aimed at removing him from power are frequently contradictory and the author seems at times to accept, but at other times to doubt, the genuineness of Gorbachev's early federalism reform proposals. On the one hand, Gorbachev said "it [was] better for the center to overdo the concessions to national groups than underdo them" (p. 37), but on the other hand the author believes that Gorbachev's real thinking about federalism at the time he wrote revealed much more of a decided taste for central government sovereignty. However, momentous events, including the coup of which he himself was the target, forced a clarification in his thinking.

Despite the qualifications expressed in this essay, Kux's monograph is a strong one, the more so because of the intelligent debate it is likely to stimulate among both Soviet scholars and students of federalism generally. It deserves to be studied intensively by both groups. Further, the Kux volume provides an excellent background source for interested persons generally to understand current developments related to the construction of a vastly different union of republics than the author confronted in the relatively brief period of time since this book was published.

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Among Soviet specialists, it is well known that since the revolution the USSR has been characterized by two distinct and seemingly contradictory realities: the Soviet bureaucracy is vast, highly centralized and very inefficient; and those who seek to govern that bureaucracy have sought to eliminate those inefficiencies by various and often violent means. Several models have been proffered that seek to explain, in part at least, those realities. But the totalitarian and convergence models, to name two of the best known, have failed to withstand the test of time and our expanding knowledge of the system. One reason for this is that no one has ever systematically analyzed the debates within the USSR over precisely what administrative strategies and managerial systems would best eliminate the bureaucracy's inefficiencies without challenging the basis of its existence.

Beissinger seeks to do just that, and for this reason alone his work would be a welcome addition to the literature. But Beissinger's study does
more than fill a glaring gap in our knowledge. His study of the nature and evolution of the debates over scientific management and the reasons why bureaucratic efficiency has been an elusive goal is a rich, nuanced one that leaves the reader with a deeper and more realistic understanding of the system itself. By choosing to examine the repeated efforts to introduce scientific management from the revolution to the late 1980s, Beissinger offers us a unique window through which to examine Soviet politics and to comprehend the dramatic shifts in various leaders’ approaches to the vexing problem of how to make the bureaucracy an instrument of policy implementation and political control.

Beissinger argues that “excessive bureaucratization has imparted a significant degree of instability to Soviet political and administrative processes” (p. 6) and that in an effort to overcome this instability and bureaucratic rigidity, Soviet leaders have pursued several “broad administrative strategies”—fostering “limited decentralization ... while employing a mixture of administrative controls and economic incentives,” “the use of managerial techniques and managerial professionalism,” mass mobilization, “the propagation of social norms aimed at raising productivity,” “greater centralization,” and the “use of coercion.” (pp. 9-10)

Conveying how these strategies are enacted and pursued over seventy years is a formidable task, and Beissinger does so clearly and convincingly. The book’s first two chapters are devoted to exploring the “mutual attraction between Bolshevism and Scientific Management,” which for the Bolsheviks, like Weber, was “the essence of modern bureaucracy.” (p. 5), and to providing a detailed and engaging discussion of intense political debates over the best strategy for achieving, and the best venue for administering, scientific managerial practices. Beissinger’s discussion of Aleksei Gastev’s views on scientific management and the changing fortunes of his Central Institute of Labor as well as that of his major rival, Pavel Kerzhentsev, the leader of the Time League movement, illuminate clearly the debates over how to introduce new conceptions of time, engender socialist discipline, and introduce scientific management. Save for the fact that the debates over the scientific organization of labor and scientific management are often not as sharply delineated as they should be, this section provides the best and most thorough treatment of the debates over these issues during the 1920s.

In chapters 3 and 4, Beissinger presents a most provocative and generally convincing argument that the driving force of Stalinism in the late 1920s and 1930s was anti-bureaucratism. The broad outlines of this argument will be familiar to those who have read the works of revisionist historians of the Stalin era. After correctly noting that “there was no more hated figure in Stalin’s third revolution that the recalcitrant bureaucrat,” Beissinger presents an intriguing interpretation of the debates surrounding the “two approaches to the struggle against bureaucratism ... one based on mobilization and discipline, the other on managerial technique” (p. 111) and of how that debate ended in the maelstrom of violence and repression that engulfed many in the Party and state bureaucracy, and virtually all of the advocates of scientific management. Whether the latter group of victims constituted a designated target of repression remains to be proven, but Beissinger’s argument that coercion became the means by