from Peter Almquist, who delves into the workings of the Soviet military-industrial complex in some detail. Again, while his account is too brief, Almquist makes good use of almost entirely unexploited Soviet sources on research and design. (Recent writings by Thane Gustafson have been one of the few exceptions.) Moreover, Almquist does quite well at tying the wartime experience to later Soviet planning.

Likewise, Notra Trulock tackles directly the question of the actual military influence of World War II on the Soviet style of war. Like Rumer and Almquist, Trulock has shed light on previously neglected Soviet sources—in this case, the works of Soviet historian M. M. Kir'ian. In a rather brief space, Trulock manages to sketch out an evolution between Soviet experiences at the front and the eventual changes in Soviet strategy (including creation of the TVD, or theater-level, structures) of the present. His chapter is flawed only by the fact that it seems to end a bit abruptly, in the midst of an interesting section of analysis.

Overall, despite its ambitious project, Contemporary Soviet Military Affairs is more a set of research notes on topics of interest rather than a sustained treatment of the impact of World War II. Indeed, with seven authors sharing only some 170 pages, a certain amount of superficiality was unavoidable; still, the book could have been better orchestrated in terms of both depth of research and breadth of subject material; Rice's chapter, for example, is sparsely sourced, while Almquist's is extensively annotated. In the end, the volume is more useful as a springboard for further research than as an in-depth discussion of the wartime experience. For the scholar already acquainted with these issues, there will be some items of interest, but the volume will be more valuable to the beginning student of Soviet military affairs or military history, for whom Contemporary Soviet Military Affairs (and Adelman's introduction in particular) may serve as a useful primer and research guide.

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The Gorbachev generation, those entering their adult lives while Mikhail Sergeevich was rising to the top of the Kremlin hierarchy, grew up with television. In this book, Ellen Mickiewicz shows how Soviet television grew up with them.

The author, one of the world's leading authorities on mass communications in the USSR, brings a wealth of information to this study: personal interviews with media professionals in the United States and the Soviet Union, extensive coverage of the Soviet press and scholarly literature on mass communications, and a panel study of Soviet television that compares program content during three months of the Chernenko period with programming during a similar period under Gorbachev. Moreover, this book's richness of detail on the organization of the various mass media in
the USSR, on the technical handicaps that they have faced and the advances they have achieved in this field, on the size and socio-demographic aspects of the viewing audience, and so forth, recommend it as an indispensable handbook for anyone interested in mass communications in the USSR. For those who have not recently had the pleasure of watching Soviet TV, Mickiewicz's descriptions of documentaries, game shows and episodes from public affairs programs such as "Twelfth Floor" will prove interesting, informative, and, often, insightful.

The central thesis of the book is that the mission of Soviet mass communications to "change the ethical and moral outlook of the population" (p. 27) remains, but the means by which it would accomplish this feat have undergone a profound change. This change has been occasioned, above all, by the Western penetration of Soviet society and the ensuing loss of control on the part of Soviet officials over the information available to the public. Not only have foreign broadcasts been beaming in reports of events in the USSR that the authorities have wished to be kept secret from the public; but, in those instances where the Soviet media have also offered accounts of events reported in foreign broadcasts, surveys have indicated that large sections of the Soviet audience have been lending greater credibility to the foreign versions.

Faced, then, with an end to their monopoly on information and declining effectiveness of their own mass media to shape public perceptions, the Soviet leadership instituted perestroika in its mass communications industry. The main dimensions of the policy were: "preemption," that is, getting domestic stories out before they were carried by foreign broadcasters; technical improvements that package news reporting more engagingly and persuasively; and credibility, purchased at the price of telling more of the truth and allowing for the expression of alternative viewpoints on the same events. The easing in of this new policy has been masterfully recounted by Mickiewicz, who, in the case of East-West relations, has described how initially another perspective, that of the American government, was introduced into public affairs programs by Soviet surrogates, followed by officials from the Reagan administration appearing on Soviet TV and speaking for themselves and, finally, by contending Soviet viewpoints expressed by Soviet officials, specialists and journalists.

The shortcomings evident in this study are in certain respects traceable to the fact that it, a study of transition, was written before that transition had run its course. In other regards, they appear to be the by-products of the longstanding conservatism and skepticism in North American Sovietology that has become rather painfully apparent of late as we find ourselves having as much difficulty in parting with our dogmas as the Soviets seem to be experiencing in parting with theirs. Three problems in the book might be mentioned against the backdrop of these conditions.

First, some characterizations had become dated while, or even before, the book was at press. Into this category fall assertions that the Soviet mass media are still restricted by the straightjacket of official Marxism-Leninism that forbids "plural (competing, equally valid) approaches" (p. 28) and the fallback position that when criticism does appear in the Soviet mass media, it is "limited to local rather than national problems, and [to] questions of implementation rather than fundamental policy" (p. 59).