history hot on the heels of the Age of Chernenko. The book chiefly records
the author's observations of the work of several Moscow attorneys.

In the preface, the author characterizes his glimpse of the Soviet legal
system as "unprecedented," his assignment in Moscow as "compelling" (p.
vii), and this final product of his efforts as aimed at "both specialist and
the general reader" (p. ix). I think it is fair to say, however, that the pre-
face oversells the book. Yet the book is striking insofar as it appears to
have been conceived and written with exuberant faith in a Soviet miracle
but published as the Soviet Union was disintegrating and sent out for re-
view after the "vigorous and impatient Kremlin leader intent on change"
p. vii) had been buried in the rubble.

A segment account of a criminal case against one Anatolii Ivanovich
Borzov, a drunken candidate member of the Communist Party, provides
the thin thread that holds the book together. The author takes the reader
through Borzov's pretrial, trial, appeal, retrial, and termination of prose-
cution. These segments of the story are interspersed with the remaining
three chapters which incorporate descriptive material and opinion on the
Moscow bar, the courts and the administration of criminal law. The "spe-
cialist" would probably notice that such matters had been previously,
though not in the form of reportage on current events, described and com-
mented on time and again by both Westerners and knowledgeable and
sober insiders (e.g., Kaminskaya, Luryi, Nezanskyy).

The book is dedicated to those "who nurtured and encouraged [the au-
thor's] love of things Russian" (p. x), and deservedly so. It is, in a manner
of speaking, a love story for the "general reader" to whom reliability of
sources (e.g., research placement in a legal consultation bureau that "had
previously received the delegations of visiting foreign attorneys," p. viii),
an occasional hyperbole (e.g., "avuncular . . . country's premier advocate —
Vladimir Ilych Lenin, doctor of juridical sciences," p. 61), or dubious
treatment of crime statistics (e.g., "the Soviet crime problem [1,798,523
criminal acts registered nationwide in 1987] does not match that of the
United States, where an estimated 34.7 million people were victimized
during 1988," p. 81; my emphasis) might not matter all that much.
Furthermore, it could be said in justification that anyone who chose to put
himself in the middle of a "justice system . . . caught up in the whirlwind of
Gorbachev's reforms" (p. viii) ran the risk of having his vision partially ob-
scured by a whirlwind of humbug, so that not all things could be ade-
quately considered.

Zigurds L. Zile

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Gerhard Wettig. Changes in Soviet Policy Towards the West. Boulder &
$48.00.

This book, by a well known German commentator on Soviet and East
European affairs, was completed in the early summer of 1990. Like every-
thing written about the Soviet Union prior to August 1991 it has been
overtaken by events. But this is likely to be the fate of anything currently
being published on East-West relations and on the future security structure of Europe. We live in times when we must all fall back on the recent past in order to speculate about how the present will unfold into the future. And at least Wettig knew when his book went to press that Germany was to be reunited; that the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe had taken place; that the Warsaw Pact was in process of dissolution; and that the future of Gorbachev and, indeed, the future of the Soviet Union were in question. Thus this study of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev is a timely one, and it may be read as a useful guide through the European security maze in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse. Wettig's study is of more than antiquarian interest.

The author belongs to the school which emphasizes just how much the dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev were driven by the depth of the domestic crisis in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, by the beginning of 1986, was describing the Soviet Union as being in a "pre-crisis" situation, by which he meant a revolutionary crisis. He recognized publicly that Soviet defense and foreign policy were outreaching Soviet resources and that the leadership was losing control of the bureaucracy and the economy. Yet Wettig also demonstrates on the basis of his analysis of Soviet sources just how difficult it was for the leadership under Gorbachev to implement the implications of the "new thinking" that was the outcome of this recognition.

It is worth noting how long Gorbachev and Schevardnadze in their public declarations stuck to traditional Soviet analyses of the inherently adversarial relationship of socialism and imperialism and just how long they stuck to traditional Soviet strategic objectives in Europe. Whether through the Soviet Union's arms control objectives, its policy towards the Federal Republic, or in its concept of a "common European home" as the future basis of European security, there remained the underlying theme of detaching the United States militarily from Europe and of weakening NATO politically and militarily. To a great extent this may be explained by the political need to carry along the more conservative forces in the Party and Soviet military, but the resulting pragmatism was characterized by a lack of any coherent long-term vision that, arguably, led to Gorbachev's ultimate failure to protect long-established Soviet interests in Europe.

On the other hand, it must be said that without Gorbachev's policies the reunification of Germany and the opportunity for full national self-determination in Eastern Europe would not have occurred. In this respect, according to Wettig's account, 1987 was the watershed year. This is the year which saw "peaceful coexistence" between states with different social systems being abandoned as the basis of Soviet foreign policy. The new conception involved recognition of "global interdependence" and the "economization" of Soviet foreign policy. It is the year that concluded with the signature of the INF Treaty, which, although a good deal from the narrow perspective of Soviet military objectives in Europe, marked in retrospect the abandonment of larger Soviet strategic goals and confirmed the fact that the Soviet Union was on the strategic defensive.

From 1987 onwards, events within the Soviet sphere increasingly moved out of control and culminated in the *annis mirabilis* of 1990. By