mutual advantage in developing economic cooperation as the best way to help developing countries to overcome their economic backwardness.

In his paper, Helmut Faulwetter, Professor of Economics at the Institute for the Economy of Developing Countries at the Hochschule für Oekonomie in East Berlin, criticizes the alleged weaknesses of the capitalist world economic system which, he argues, functions on the basis of its inherent laws. These later inevitably create frictions and rebelliousness in the developing countries. The socialist countries, on the other hand, have steadfastly supported the demands made by these countries in the United Nations and its various organizations, including the call for a New International Economic Order. Such sentiments repeated at length have a strangely hollow sound in 1990; they are just another part of the historical detritus that the events of 1989 have left behind them.

A much more realistic and jargon-free analysis is provided by those contributors, such as Brigitte H. Schulz and Andre Gunder Frank, who point to the notable gap between rhetoric and performance in communist commitment to the developing world. Thus, in 1981 only 6 percent of all funds available to the Third World at concessional terms came from the East and even that was skewed preponderantly to the industrial sector (79 percent) and only 5.2 percent toward agriculture, thus contributing to the economic imbalance that has been a feature of such development as has taken place.

If the changes in Eastern Europe of 1989 had not taken place, this book in most of its chapters would have constituted a valuable critique of Soviet bloc performance vis-à-vis the developing world. As it stands, it still remains a useful analysis of a much misunderstood area of aid policy and of an historical trend in the world economy that the foundering economies of Eastern Europe could not help observing despite the ideology of their rhetoric.

It is interesting to note that the leaders of the developing world can also read the election returns. According to a New York Times report, in contrast with the 1975 special session of the U.N. General Assembly convened to discuss developmental problems of the Third World, the opening of the 1990 session on April 23 was singularly devoid of the usual speeches attacking the Western developed countries. Instead the call was for a transition from "societies that overemphasize centralism and state paternalism" to those where "individual initiative becomes the driving force of modernization and change."

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Assessing changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev is somewhat akin to predicting the trajectory of a balloon as its air is being let out.
Contributors to these two volumes were witness to the initiation of deflation, but their chapters were written before the balloon careened through its erratic course and gradually descended earthward. Nevertheless, considerable insight and erudition may be found within these comprehensive collections, and the editors must be commended for their ability to cope with time-warped perceptions of the red balloon's dramatic flight.

The studies in these books represent a time-capsule of American scholarship during the early phase of Gorbachev's rule and are instructive for their delineation of trends already evident in Soviet policy toward the Third World. In fact, the authors represent the elite of the U.S. intellectual establishment, and their evaluations are indicative of mainstream academic and government thinking during that period. Many contributors to the Saivetz book are CIA or former CIA analysts, and all the authors in both volumes are American or American-based. The historiographic framework is indeed narrow as no Soviet or Third World viewpoints are included, nor are the perceptions of revisionists critical of American actions or of ultra-conservatives skeptical that Gorbachev is changing Soviet policy essentially rather than cosmetically.

However, the authors of these studies are surely not Cold Warrior ideologues of Americanism but calm, thoughtful and scholarly assessors. They are basically concerned about Soviet state power rather than communism as a movement, and their conceptual context is one of superpower rivalry rather than the struggle between competing belief systems. Soviet policy is viewed as reactive rather than the manifestation of an expansionist design.

The Kolodziej-Kanet collection brings together papers presented at a 1986 conference at the University of Illinois, but, on the whole, they have been updated very well. The chapters in the Saivetz book are somewhat out of synch as some contributors, such as Henry Bradsher on Afghanistan, discuss fairly recent events but others, such as S. Neil MacFarlane on national liberation movements, omit analysis of the Gorbachev era. Kolodziej and Kanet are more comprehensive in their regional coverage, but the smaller Saivetz volume includes useful studies of Soviet military and economic aid programs and Soviet perspectives on national liberation movements. Both books are of excellent quality, although some of the Kolodziej-Kanet chapters fall short of the generally high standards. The editors of these volumes should be commended for maintaining a consistent format throughout their contributed chapters, a difficult task in edited collections, and for their own illuminating introductions and conclusions. The chapter authors find common cause by stressing actual policy implementation rather than formulations or "new thinking," and one is struck by how much the China factor has receded in importance in the eyes of American analysts of Soviet foreign policy. Assessment of "new thinking" is left to the editors and is capably handled by Kanet and Saivetz in their concluding chapters. The two books are actually so similar in style and tone that Kanet wrote the introduction to Saivetz' s collection as well as an introduction and conclusion to his own volume.

Soviet Third World policy is presented in both books as having evolved from a series of successes in the seventies to a long progression of setbacks in the eighties. Domestic problems have led Moscow to reduce its attention