conflict is concluded is seen as greatly affecting the atmosphere of international relations, particularly the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. Overall, Falk recognizes the primary of politics over military force in resolving internal conflicts and, in the discrediting of interventionary diplomacy in the Third World, the enhanced role of regional actors and the United Nations.

J. L. Richardson's concluding chapter reiterates what has been repeated throughout the book: that the business of war in Afghanistan could continue even without Soviet troops as a result of the failure (or impossibility) in Geneva to agree on transitional political arrangements. Self-determination is thus likely to be realized only through protracted violence. Although problems of reconstruction are noted briefly by Richardson, how they are affected by the terms of the Soviet withdrawal and Moscow's probable post-war role warrant more extensive treatment than found in this volume.

The book holds a special place in the literature on the Afghan war because, drawing on so many authors who are not scholars of Afghanistan per se, it is able to use their area expertise to analyze the wider implications of the Soviet withdrawal. In so doing the writers have shown how the pullout is at the same time symptomatic of and responsible for developments on a regional and global scale.

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The number of pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World increased dramatically between 1959 and 1979, with Moscow gaining allies in key regions of the world and signing Friendship and Cooperation Treaties with thirteen states, including Ethiopia and Somalia on the Horn of Africa. Extensive arms supply relationships enabled the Soviets to enhance their Third World presence, and thousands of military advisers served in many regions—including the Horn—as an integral part of Third World military infrastructures. The Soviets experienced the greatest expansion of their position in the 1970s, when pro-Soviet regimes came to power in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, and the U.S. suffered setbacks in Vietnam and Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan added to the perception that the "correlation of forces" in the Third World had shifted in Moscow's favor—as the Soviets were then claiming.

Patman's book is the first serious attempt to describe and analyze Moscow's policies on the Horn, particularly the dramatic shift in the mid-1970s from close ties with Somalia to even closer ties with Ethiopia, including intervention in the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-78 to ensure the defeat of a former client. The book provides a useful historical background of Soviet policy in the region and concentrates on several aspects of Moscow's behavior: its pursuit of strategic military objectives (particularly access to bases and facilities) and its political objectives of making the pro-
cess toward "socialist orientation" irreversible through the establishment of vanguard parties with strong Soviet backing. Ethiopia became the testing ground for the success of this concept.

Patman effectively traces the alliances that Moscow tried to build first in Somalia, then Ethiopia, and records the risks it was willing to take in backing the Ethiopian revolution. The Soviets displayed unusual patience during this period, using military and economic assistance to build positions of influence and encouraging a military regime in Addis Ababa to establish an ideological working-class party to strengthen the rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The book traces the uneasy relations between Soviet political and military leaders and Mengistu during this period as well as Moscow's use of the Soviet bloc—particularly Cuba and East Germany—to achieve its objectives. Soviet and Cuban military intervention, of course, enabled Mengistu to survive the challenge in the Ogaden in 1977 and 1978 without negotiating a political settlement.

Patman corroborates the conventional wisdom that Moscow switched from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977 to acquire facilities in Ethiopia's excellent ports on the Red Sea and gain a position in a large and potentially rich country strategically located in northeast Africa. He effectively uses a rich variety of Soviet sources to trace the importance of the Soviet political model in the Third World and the need to establish a political infrastructure to bolster a military regime. He also documents institutional differences in the Soviet Union, particularly the Soviet naval opposition to the loss of access in Somalia and the rivalry between General Secretary Brezhnev and President Podgorny, which included differences over domestic and external Soviet policies. Patman's approach on these political and tactical issues is generally sophisticated and should prove useful to scholars and advanced students of Soviet policy in the Third World.

Unfortunately, the author's grasp of larger international security issues, particularly the place of the Horn in Soviet regional strategy, is less astute. Patman believes that Moscow was trying to establish a Pax Sovietica on the Horn of Africa, but the Soviet use of Cuban surrogates and the limits on economic and military assistance suggest that Brezhnev's designs were less grand. There is no evidence to support the view that Moscow's military presence in Ethiopia "caused shudders among the NATO military and in the capitals of Arab states," and Patman's use of Soviet sources in this regard is a methodological weakness that marks the book in other areas as well. Citing Boris Ponomarev, the former chief of the International Department of the Central Committee, for the view that Moscow had arranged a "growing alliance of forces of national liberation and world socialism" on the Horn of Africa is comparable to asking a barber if you need a haircut. And it is unlikely that Moscow's problems in Ethiopia and Somalia led to a reexamination of Soviet policy in the Third World; it is more likely that Soviet problems in Afghanistan, which led to the withdrawal announcement in 1988, were responsible for the reassessment and the decision to resolve conflicts in southern Africa, Central America, and Southeastern Asia. He also gives too much credit to the Reagan Doctrine for the Soviet decision to disengage from Ethiopia in view of the fact that the Eritrean insurgency did not receive assistance from the United States because of its Marxist-Leninist orientation.