questions regarding the purpose of his study. It would have been helpful had he reviewed and answered them in a concluding chapter.

Despite its shortcomings, *We Rise and Fall* provides an invaluable introduction to a heretofore neglected aspect of American ethnic history which scholars in particular should find helpful. While the life of Russian-Jewish immigrants in America has been documented, their love-hate relationship with Russia as exemplified by their use of the Russian language has not. Nor has there been much recent scholarly interest in those ethnic Russians who emigrated to the United States prior to the First World War. This is Karlowich’s major contribution to the field.

Those interested in tracing the history of radical thought among East European immigrant groups will also find this study fascinating. The definitive study of American ethnic involvement in the growth of socialism and the birth of the American Communist Party has yet to be written. Karlowich provides the first step toward that end.

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The numerous accounts of individual heroism that appear in this book attest to the willingness of Czechoslovak soldiers and airmen to fight during World War II. They also make for colorful and entertaining reading, as do the biographical sketches that appear at the end of the work. At times, however, the heroic tales of individual bravery and comradeship in arms border on caricature, recalling as they do the memory not of World War II but of World War I and the nostalgic passing of an old, aristocratic order and its unwritten code of military behavior. Still, these reservations notwithstanding, the work does document a Czechoslovak fighting presence during the Second World War; and it does succeed in dispelling many of the negative attitudes associated with the traditional image of the good soldier Schweik. It also bears faithful testimony to the ways in which these patriotic individuals believed that they were fighting for Czechoslovak independence and for Czechoslovakia’s right to participate in the peace process at the end of the war. What still remains unresolved, however, is the extent to which these individual experiences reflect the actual participation of a larger number of Czechoslovaks in the military struggle.

On yet another level the work portrays in a most convincing fashion the legacy of the Munich Agreement. Phrases such as “the ill-fated Munich Agreement which robbed the country of its border defenses,” and references to Munich as a “major national disaster” (p. 110) or as “the brutal... agreement imposed on my country” (p. 255) appear throughout the book. Such statements are, of course, understandable given the way in which the Czechoslovak state was so cavalierly treated during the Munich conference. And this
particular part of the story has long been well known and thoroughly analyzed. What is less widely known and understood, however, is the extent to which these attitudes, which can broadly be described as “The Munich syndrome,” clearly influenced the thinking of many Czechs and Slovaks including the contributors to this book. Repeated references to the Czechoslovaks’ willingness to fight, to their need for adequate military supplies, to their fear of once again being abandoned in an hour of military need stand as a stark reminder of the Czechoslovaks’ intense feelings of bitterness and resentment towards the Munich Agreement. It is also understandable that these attitudes would carry over and color the views of those Czechs and Slovaks who fought alongside the British and the French during World War II.

Still, there were differences of opinion concerning the conduct of France and Great Britain during the war. For example, one contributor notes how British self-confidence had been a powerful agent in strengthening Czech morale. (p. 128) And the words of another contributor, a Czech pilot, reinforce this impression, when he describes how he became “easily persuaded that our Allies were noble and victorious knights,” after listening to a BBC broadcast. (pp. 152-53) These remarks contrast vividly with those depicting resentment and what bordered in some instances on moral disapproval of the wartime conduct of the French. One contributor highlights the different perceptions, when he writes that “contrary to the situation in France there was no defeatism in this country [Britain]” (p. 84) while another records how his unit had been ill-equipped, used and abandoned “On the French Front.” (pp. 53ff) And yet another soldier observes how in the midst of a German attack he and his comrades were “suddenly overrun by helpless, frightened Frenchmen.” (p. 206) Clearly, the Czechoslovak collective memory of Munich cast a shadow both during and after World War II.

On the other front, i.e. Czechoslovakia’s eastern front, the major issue for the Czechoslovak Government in Exile involved the Soviet Union’s role in dictating the military and political outcome of the war. Nearly all of the contributors acknowledge that the struggle was by no means simply military, but that it also embraced larger political and ideological issues. These contributors also emphasize the decisive role of Soviet political officers and Commissars in imposing a political settlement favorable to Moscow’s interests. Moreover, the issue of Soviet control over those areas that had been “liberated” by the Red Army extended beyond the ideological question to include the territorial disposition of Ruthenia and its transfer to the Soviet Union. Again, the inescapable fact of military power dictated the outcome. And one can not help but draw an analogy, even if only on a much smaller scale, with the Munich settlement. Of course, Czechoslovak charges of Soviet treachery and duplicitous conduct did little to reverse the outcome of the political and territorial settlement. What did occur, however, was an internal debate over the issue of Czechoslovak complicity and the controversial role played by General Ludvik Svoboda in the negotiations. In some respects the discussion of this subject parallels that of General Pétain’s role during WWII. However, in the Czechoslovak case that problem is further compounded by