foreign trade, and a detailed, painstaking, yet lucid and absorbing comparison between the Soviet and French plans, complete the volume. Dr. Zauberman's summaries and analyses of the mathematical concepts and methods, and of the widely ranging debates around them, is of a very high order, and probably the only such account in the English language. For the interested student the book is an invaluable guide to the new developments in Soviet economic thought.

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There are several reasons why the Soviet partisan experience in World War II deserves particularly serious attention. For one thing, it constituted the most dramatic series of events in the careers of ever so many of the present-day Soviet leaders. Even those who did not then have a connection with the partisan operations were certainly observing them with the most intense interest. Leading Soviet citizens of today must then have absorbed something of the earnest dedication to a perilous but meritorious cause which characterized that period. We can properly compare this conditioning factor with the way that the difficult, even desperate, conspiratorial revolutionary struggles in Russia prior to 1917 shaped the outlook of the Stalin-era leadership groups of Russia.

Also, the “wars of national liberation” in recent years frequently are guerrilla-type warfare by partisans, with much of the fighting being done by persons recruited locally in the countryside. The format of war carried on by rural comrades against the urban centers was long ago—in the 1920’s—adopted by China’s Mao Tse-tung. Mao’s hsien (county) units were quite similar to the raion units of the Soviet partisans. Mao’s right-hand man today, Marshal Lin Piao, has said in his address, “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War,” that the new global struggle must be likewise a campaign of the rural world against the urban world (i.e., the industrialized, capitalist nations). Thus, these new Asian campaigners surely look back with interest and approval at the crucial events of late 1943. By that time, the Armstrong text tells us (p. 45), the Russian partisan force had lost in combat much of its Red Army contingent, which included many persons from the cities. In their place mostly peasants were recruited.

Certainly the Soviet efforts of 1941-1945 can scarcely be equalled in scope. There was fighting of similar character at times during the Civil War of 1918-1921 and during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, but this World War II guerrilla struggle covered vast stretches of the U.S.S.R. in Europe, from the Leningrad area to the shores of the Black Sea and even into the Caucasus. The partisans operated many hundreds of miles behind the German front lines. The number of men involved and the duration of the action find their equal only in the Chinese civil war—and even there the character of the struggle was quite different. In duration, admittedly, the Malaysian guerrilla war of 1948-1960, and the Vietnamese war, exceed the Soviet resistance. The Vietnamese effort also excels in the intensivity, or rate of involvement of the citizenry in the partisan operations. Nevertheless, those Asian protagonists must have received important guidance from the experience of the Soviets.

To illustrate this last point, the Armstrong study is often informative about the financial aspect of the partisan program. In a positive sense, the collection of taxes or equivalent resources was a frequent matter of concern. Where
feasible, partisan work should be made self-supporting. On the negative side, the inhabitants must be deterred from making contributions to the hostile power. Many measures were taken to penalize obedience to “the other government.” In Vietnam, very similarly, the resistance organization has included very active “finance sections” on all levels ever since the guerrilla war against the French began.

To give another example, there is much material here about efforts against active collaborators with the other side. Propaganda against them is described, and also raids and punishments have an important place. This too is echoed in Vietnam.

The text notes certain special guerrilla situations which likewise can be better understood (or predicted) through reference to the Soviet experience. One of these is the phase in which the weapons of a guerrilla force are built up to the point where they equal the arms of the anti-guerrillas. There have been phases of the Vietnam war when this was true, for personal weapons at least. The AK-47 automatic weapon developed by the U.S.S.R. was equal or superior to the M-16 adopted by the U.S. forces, and it was far better than the outmoded M-1 rifle to which the anti-Communist elements were confined for so long.

Another special situation which this text cites is the future contingency of “broken-back warfare,” that is, the conflicts which could follow after the general destruction and breakdown wrought by a large-scale nuclear war. Dreadful though it is to contemplate, we probably should admit the validity of the author’s point: the Soviet partisans, in their leaner period, learned to improvise and to operate with the most meager resources. The lessons of this too, as related in Armstrong’s book, could be helpful some day.

The reader might now ask what uses can be made of this book in assigning readings to students. Professors will find Chapter One (pages 3-72), with its analysis of the partisans and the Soviet system, very worthwhile for students in courses on modern Russia, twentieth-century history, or totalitarianism. More advanced, specialized study of World War II, guerrilla warfare, or national liberation movements would naturally benefit by use of this volume. The Appendix, consisting of documents on the partisans (pp. 651-753), shows how interesting and colorful well-selected documents can be. The assignment of readings among these would serve to communicate the vital, human side of affairs—lost so often in texts and scholarly books. The diaries, interrogation reports, and orders issued in local units, tell us quite vividly how these people lived and felt. Also, biographic sketches done by intelligence specialists regarding leaders among their opponents give us really candid personal descriptions.

As to the general scholarly qualities of this book, there is a high level of accuracy, despite the problems of rather intricate citations from Russian and German official reports—both replete with potentially mystifying gobbledygook. A “Glossary and Key to Abbreviation” (pp. 757-769) helps considerably to guide the reader through the puzzling terms. Mechanical errors seldom occur; there are misspellings in a footnote on page 5, and occasional omissions of an “r” from guerrilla or anti-guerrilla. The most important form of accuracy or reliability here is based upon the commendably thorough checking of German reports against Russian reports (which the Germans often had captured), to confirm or clarify one side in the light of what the other side said.

This in turn brings up the voluminous nature of the source materials and the costly nature of this research. The major part of it was done in a U.S. Air Force War Documentation Project called Project Alexander. One wonders somewhat despairingly how any truly non-Governmental group could have produced this work. Consider the barriers to access, the security classifications, and the manpower required. We can be glad that fine scholars like John A. Armstrong and Alexander Dallin were assigned to this project. Even the application of a