other) in marketing produce would help one understand self-selection of migrants to North America and their adaptation to a strikingly different economic environment. The impact of such factors on the later Mennonite settlers is detailed; but similar treatment of adherents of traditional religions (Lutheran and Catholic) and the impact of "revivalist" sects on economic aims and adaptations would have been desirable.

The desiderata indicated in the two preceding paragraphs are worth listing precisely because the overall attainment of this symposium volume is extraordinarily high and because we can anticipate much more publication by its authors. As it is, the Dahlmann-Tuchtenhagen work provides the best compact introduction to the Volga German ethnic group as well as a highly useful reference for broader questions.

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Poland's former eastern borderlands, known as Kresy in Polish, have been the source of prolonged controversy between Poland, Russia, and the emerging local (Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian) nationalisms. Daniel Beauvois's study deals with the region taken from Poland-Lithuania in 1793-95, and known since 1667 as the right-bank Ukraine, or, after 1795, as western Russia, or iugozapadnyi krai (southwest region). Its territory amounted to 164,866.7 square kilometers, was composed of three provinces (Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia), administered by three governors, and headed by a governor-general in Kiev.

By 1897, the population of southwest Russia amounted to 9,560,000 people, including 6,000,000 Ukrainians; over 300,000 former Polish nobles arbitrarily reduced in status, and living chiefly as tenants on private and state lands; 1,000,000 Jews; and a small number of Polish and Russian large estate owners. German and Czech settlers were brought in, numbering some 200,000 individuals by 1914.

Western Russia was overpopulated and backward. Ninety percent of its population was rural. Political power in the southwest region was located in St. Petersburg. However, the Polish landed nobility retained much economic influence, which it increasingly had to share with the Russian large estate owners, who were favored by the Imperial government. The 7,000 or so Russian and Polish large estate owners possessed altogether 6,500,000 desiatins of land, and the 6,000,000 Ukrainians owned only 4,010,000 desiatins of land.

Beauvois holds the chair of Polish studies at Charles de Gaulle University (previously, Lille III) and directs its Centre d'Etudes de la Culture Polonaise. An expert on the former Polish borderlands comfortable in Polish, Russian, and some other languages of the area, Beauvois does not have any sentimental attachment to the region under examination. He considers the Polish scholarship on the former eastern borderlands poor, biased, and based on myths rather than reality. The myths are particularly prevalent, in his opinion, in Polish literature (both prose and poetry), and in memoirs.

La Bataille de la terre en Ukraine is Beauvois's final book in his trilogy on the former Polish borderlands. He started in 1977, with his two-volume Lumière et Société en Europe de l'Est. L'Université de Vilna et les écoles polonaises de l'Empire Russe (1803-1832); and the second study came out in French in 1965, in Polish, in 1987, and four years later in English as The No-
ble the Serf and the Revisor: The Polish Nobility between Tsarist Imperialism and the Ukrainian Masses (1831-1863).

Although he received better treatment in Soviet archives than most scholars, Beauvois was prevented from examining all the pertinent records relating to his topic. The inauguration of glasnost’ and perestroika and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR both facilitated and enhanced his research. The study under review is based chiefly on non-published records found in the archives of Kiev, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw, Kraków, Wroclaw, and Paris. The author also used printed sources, published and manuscript recollections, as well as secondary works.

Beauvois deals with the policy of the Imperial government and its local representatives, with native Ukrainians, and above all, with local Poles and their interethnic relations. He also speaks about the changing Russian goals toward its Polish and Ukrainian subjects. The successes, shortcomings, and failures of Russian objectives are examined against the background of the country's changing domestic and international conditions from 1863 to 1914. The author also devotes much attention to the plight of the 300,000 former Polish landless nobles, an unwanted group discriminated against or treated with cold indifference. The central point of this study, however, is the evolution from a feudal to a capitalist approach to land. Land was an extremely precious and coveted commodity in an overcrowded countryside where there were limited opportunities for moving to urban areas.

Beauvois argues that a war of enormous significance was being waged in western Russia between 1863 and 1914. It was pursued on numerous fronts. The situation in the southwest region was complex. The Russians ruled but some 20,000 of over 300,000 ethnic Poles owned much of the land while an overwhelming majority of the land-hungry Ukrainian peasants barely lived at a subsistence level, and the former Polish nobles fared even worse. The Polish rising of 1863-64 resulted in Russian political and economic reprisals, as well as discrimination against the Polish educational system and Roman Catholicism. The Russo-Polish struggle benefited the local Ukrainian peasantry, increasingly alienated from the Polish landlords. Yet, as the author points out, the tsarist government never pursued its anti-Polish policy to its logical conclusion. The regime wanted to preserve the existing social order. This resulted in half-way measures and inconsistency. Any alliance between St. Petersburg and the Ukrainian peasantry was of a temporary nature. The regime feared the nascent Ukrainian nationalism. Therefore, once Polish political aspirations were defeated, the collusion between the authorities and the Polish landed nobility resumed.

In a passionate way, the author frequently blames the Polish elite and the Russian authorities for the misery prevailing in western Russia. His sympathy goes to the oppressed, with special compassion for the Ukrainians. To Beauvois, the conflicting Polish-Russian claims for the region were but two imperialism. He considers the situation in the right-bank Ukraine as colonial. In his opinion, neither the Polish upper classes nor the Russians really cared for those at the bottom of the social ladder.

As Beauvois points out, members of the Polish elite (a total of 20,000 on 3,386 large estates, owning 3,080,000 desiatins by 1898) enjoyed enormous power and influence. They were deeply, almost religiously, attached to their estates, and strongly believed in their national duty to preserve these outposts of Western civilization and Roman Catholicism.

Discriminated against in many ways, subjected to various contributions imposed by the Imperial government, living in eternal fear of confiscation, and legally prevented from purchasing...