of debating the existence of a past Soviet threat. Instead our focus should now be on "how the United States dealt with the Soviet threat" (p. 252) and to what extent America's stance led to the eventual collapse of the Soviet state.

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Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation. Edited by George Ginsberg, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Oles M. Smolansky. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. xii, 342 pp. $65.00 cloth; $21.95 paper.

This wide ranging study is the product of a conference at the university of Pennsylvania on February 18-19, 1993 that sought to analyze a range of critical issues in the relationship between Russia and the United States. The authors are American and Russian academics, many in the latter case with diplomatic and policy making experience under the former Soviet regime.

One of the noteworthy topics is a discussion of the domestic determinants of Russian foreign policy, difficult to do in the past. Among other major issues covered are the control of nuclear weapons and common policies on crime prevention and drug addiction. In most cases American academic presentations are followed by a Russian commentary.

Victor Israelyan argues that Russia cannot return to confrontation with America because it only has nuclear weapons and use of them would be suicidal. Treating the United States as the enemy, a return to the Cold War, would be "adventurism." But while the two countries have common values, common interests, and agreements on the one hand, there are disturbances, contradictions, and divergences on the other.

Russian foreign minister Kozyrev has said that the Russians and Americans share concerns over regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the upsurge of aggressive nationalism, organized crime, and demographic, environmental, and other global problems. But Russian public opinion is playing a more active role than in the past. The Russian government may not approve of some of its manifestations but cannot ignore it. Moderate and pro-American Russians will insist that any Russian government must promote Russian interests and not blindly follow the American lead.

The domestic section begins with a discussion by Barry on the embryonic Russian constitutional court and growth of legal institutions. The court has tended to lean to the center, the Moscow executive, and has refused to deal with "political questions" like the outlawing of the Communist Party. Barry notes that in America the political question issue has been present in Supreme Court confrontations with presidents Jackson and Lincoln. Barry asks us not to expect too much when there is no tradition of legal independence nor a political constituency to provide support, but he is cautiously optimistic about the future.

Petrov presents a typology of Russian conservative thought and political novenents. He does not assume a uniform revanchist-imperialist position but argues that many want a re birth of Russian spirituality, Russia as a "cultural avatar" for its neighbors but isolationist. Even those who want a greater accretion of state power (whatever their domestic rhetoric) realize that in the present economic climate there is little in a practical sense that Russia can accomplish in territorial expansion. As long as Marxist-Leninist tendencies are isolated, the political process in time will temper the more extreme views of some.
Writing before the Russian invasion of Chechnia, Osborne discusses the balance in Russian federalism between democracy, self-determination, coherence, and stability. While there are some parts of the Russian federation that advocate succession, the choice, Osborne argues, is not between a new, aggrandizing center or fissiparous breaking apart of Russia but a functional union based on economic and transportation imperatives combined with greater regional autonomy.

Nina Belyaeva argues in her commentary that Barry's essay on Russian constitutionalism is somewhat beside the point. Instead, Americans should give advice on how to build a consensus for representative institutions. She chides Petrov who she insists should categorize less and bring his analysis into the argument at an earlier stage instead of waiting until the conclusion. She also implicitly agrees with Kozyrev that a patriotically minded majority might provide more stability than a devoted but unpopular small pro-American minority that slavishly follows American models. She also defends Russia's right to defend itself against challenges within the Federation. She marvels at Russia's ability to press as far as it has in a democratic direction and attributes this to the fact that Russia's institutions do not behave "rationally" (they are too weak to be authoritarian in implementation).

In the functional section Ginsburgs delineates changing Russian attitudes on crime, the growth of a Russian notion of habeas corpus and as early as 1980 preliminary evidence that Soviet courts were providing evidence to American courts against Soviet war criminals. He also cites a comment in the Gorbachev period that the struggle against crime is a task of all states; everywhere it has the same criminological dimension. In the "nuclear equation" Twining notes ironically that the two former nuclear competitors have become "nuclear trusties." This need to cooperate would revitalize their relationship.

The foreign policy section indicates that Russia no longer plays the geopolitical role of the Soviet Union and a more unpredictable constellation of forces is emerging in the Far East, Europe, and the Middle East. Menon points out, for example, that China and the United States no longer need each other to balance the Soviet Union. This changes the political alignments in Asia and creates new indeterminacies for the United States. Smolansky on the Middle East and Belinsky on Germany show how the end of the old Soviet super power presence creates new needs for American presence and leadership for regional and global stability.

In the closing two chapters Rubinstein quotes George Kennan who argues that while Russian and American interests will not be identical the divergences are manageable by the normal means of compromise and adjustment. Trofimenko concludes in a striking essay that Americans should not accept the American conservative view that Russia is in a "malaise" and no longer an American security concern. Writing before the parliamentary "showdown" of October 1993, he does not accept the tacit assumption of the other contributors that Russia is proceeding in an irreversibly democratic direction. It could slip back to totalitarianism. Like Belyaeva he defends Russia's right to defend its borders as he says America has done in the past. Finally, he concludes by saying that "anyone who is really concerned with establishing a real democracy in Russia should be very careful in touching the raw nerve of Russian patriotic feeling. Especially so when quite a few foreigners in Russia by their very behavior, albeit often unwittingly, and through sheer negligence, clearly remind Russian citizens that their country is defeated, lying prone, and too ill to be reckoned with, despite all the diplomatic assurances to the contrary." (p. 330) Russia will want its own sphere. It is a warning for the future that even though limited