such a strategy in the Soviet context, but also the equally clear example of the success of the opposite strategy in post-Franco Spain.

And all of this begs the question of whether Gorbachev was a consistent reformer or an improviser. As many studies have shown, not least those which focus on perestroika as an economic policy, he was very much the latter. Pei regards Gorbachev's moves as those of a conscious reformer rather than simply a liberalizer. Does Gorbachev's inadvertent, halfhearted, and inadequately thought through reform merit comparison with other post-Communist states' experience? Were Gorbachev's stop-and-go economic policies "shock therapy"? Not likely. Perhaps Boris El'tsin's Russia would be better to match up against Deng's China, and perhaps El'tsin has absorbed the lessons of Pei's book by pressing ahead with economic reform while keeping a tight rein on political reform.

In any case, this is a stimulating book, with an original framework and thesis, which helps us to understand the transformation processes at work in China and the former Soviet Union even if it does not answer all of our questions. But who can be definitive in our field today?

Bohdan Harasymiw  
The University of Calgary


*National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* is the second of the Russian Littoral Project's projected ten-volume *International Politics of Eurasia*, an analysis of the determinants of the domestic and foreign politics of the republics that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. The book is in three parts: Russia, the Western, and the Southern Newly Independent States; each part includes a map and three articles. An article on the history and the causes of the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict is added to part three. The expected overlaps are justified by the additional data and the perspective they provide.

In his introductory remarks, Roman Szporluk correctly states that the Soviet period interrupted Russia's process of nation building, which had to be picked up after the fall of the USSR. Furthermore, the period itself was turbulent for the Russian nationalists who resented the Soviets' domination of their homeland. Growing Russian resistance to Soviet rule culminated in a showdown not between two individuals Gorbachev and El'tsin but between two political entities — the USSR and Russia.

From Elizabeth Teague's study of the center-periphery relations, the Russian Federation emerges as a federation in name only, in reality a redefined version of the former USSR controlled by Moscow. Losing the wealth that the natural resources of the former Union republics afford, Russia must increasingly rely on the resources of its federal republics and regions. The question is: For how long can the Russian military-industrial complex be fueled by the natural resources of unwilling contributors like the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug in exchange for a modicum of political power?

Teague's discussion leads into the book's dual foci: ethnonationalism and identity. Regarding ethnonationalism, Rudensky shows that Russian hegemony does not stop at the federal borders. Counting on the political power of the twenty-five million ethnic Russians in the "near abroad," Russian nationalists advocate the reinstatement of Russian authority at all costs; they insist that Russia must preserve the rights of its minorities. The point on identity, however, is
lost on Guroff and Guroff. There is a paradox in the current Russian identity, of course, but is not identity related to historical memory more than to the present and the future? Russian emperors and the Russian Orthodox Church were authoritarian. Albeit in modified form, they retained the substance of that authority during the Soviets' totalitarian rule. Rather than in ethnic pride, religious devotion, and literary genius, Russian identity rests with the Russian people's predisposition to and need for authority.

Part two deals with the domestic and international relations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine republics to the west of Russia. Except for Belarus whose military, culture, and territory are dominated by Russia, the independence of the other republics varies according to their economic dependence on Russia. Poland and the West stand to benefit from future ties with the region, but the gains are negligible.

Part three treats the domestic and international relations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan among themselves and to Russia. These Turkic and Iranian republics to the south of Russia do not have to exercise the mutual identity denial that distinguishes the states to Russia's west. They need, however, to undergo a more intensive program of derussification and desovietization. They must rise above petty ethnic squabbles and revive their Turkic, Iranian, and Islamic roots, the building blocks of their statehood.

The former Soviet republics shared many experiences. They accommodated large concentrations of Russians in their urban centers; afforded them exclusive rights and privileges in their military, technical, and managerial spheres; and could only at the expense of their native languages gain access to higher education and to Western scientific literature. They allowed the Russians to occupy their key administrative, economic, and political positions and remained complacent about human rights and self-assertion.

When the Soviet Union crumbled, the republics, especially those in Central Asia, were bewildered. They not only failed to demand their share of the "inheritance," but were uninformed about the extent of the "bequest" Furthermore, Russia abandoned them to fend for themselves knowing full well that, given the economic circumstances, they would return to her for security, fuel, spare parts, and trade. Even after the Union's fall, Sovietization and totalitarian rule continued to plague the republics. None of the new leaders, for instance, had foreign policy experience, spoke English, or could meaningfully negotiate with Western diplomats. Ukraine and Kazakhstan's nuclear capability worried the international community, but the concern was allayed. Russia administered the foreign affairs of its "near abroad."

Several configurations result from sifting through the wealth of information provided on employment patterns, foreign policy capabilities, border conflicts, security concerns, and the international rights of minorities as well as on territorial integrity and the degree of each country's identification with Russia. The most telling of these configurations is an economic spectrum on the one end of which appear Belarus and Tajikistan and on the other the post-Soviet Emirate of Turkmenistan. The other republics fall in between, depending on their current needs for Russian assistance.

In the West, we know precious little about ethnicity and its role in the former Soviet Union; we know even less about the tribal and clan structures of Central Asia. Conversely, the Russians are not only knowledgeable about ethnic divisions but use that knowledge advantageously. That knowledge, the Russian military, the economic spectrum outlined above, and the sizable Russian populations in the republics sustain Russia's hold for the present. It is plausible, however, that in the future the Western and the Southern republics, emulating Europe and the "Asian tigers" respectively, might build viable societies, achieve true statehood, and deny Russia