ness against him. She wanted to protest against the absolutization of power, the control of human minds, the total isolation, and torture of human beings. She discovered the language of the walls and was determined to bear witness to the heroism and solidarity of the women who suffered with her in silence and who, despite the inhuman conditions under which they were forced to live, remained deeply human.

She expressed profound anguish over the fate of her family and her friend, Harry Brauner, whom she married after her release, but she was heartened by their gestures of support. She was finally exonerated as the result of another power struggle by Nicolae Ceausescu who in turn was violently overthrown by his own people. Enduring vicious and brutal attempts to destroy her mind and her spirit, she experienced the dark night of the soul and at moments wanted to die; but she developed not only the desire but also the will to survive and refused to be dehumanized.

She was deeply troubled by the moral ambiguities of human nature and began to reflect on the basic existential questions of human existence which lie at the heart of all religions. She profoundly sensed her powerlessness, but she found strength in the Catholicism of her youth and the faith of her Uniate neighbor who through the wall taught her how to pray once again. She began to sense the power of even an impure love and was convinced that even in the nightmare world she had encountered the divine cosmic presence, which to some extent is incarnate in every human being. Deeply etched in her memory was a powerful mystical encounter with the divine which helped to sustain her "fragile inner spiritual freedom."

Her testimony is a devastating indictment of a totalitarian system which terrorized and enslaved an entire nation to do homage to its ideology under the threat of persecution, incarceration, or even death. She bore eloquent witness for the hundreds of thousands of human beings who died or had their lives destroyed by a ruthless inhumane dictatorship. Her story is a powerful and penetrating expose of the corruption, deception, and brutality of communist justice. This is a painful, yet necessary, reminder for those who may look with nostalgia to the past of the rule of terror, dehumanization, and radical subversion of the truth which had actually taken place.

Earl A. Pope


The authors of this book are both professional analysts—Zelikow at the Kennedy School of Government and Rice at Stanford—and participants in the events they describe; they were both attached to George Bush's National Security Council staff. Their participation gave them extraordinary access not only to the relevant documents but to the decision-makers themselves through their experience and numerous interviews. The result is a richly detailed, well written description of the reunification of Germany from multiple perspectives: American, Soviet, German, and allied. Anyone interested in the end of the Cold War, foreign policy decision-making, bureaucratic politics, or alliance politics and management will find the book useful and interesting.
The book is narrative history. If there is an argument, it is that the unification of Germany was by no means inevitable. Statecraft mattered. Following events generally in chronological order, the authors examine the decisions of Helmut Kohl, George Bush, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Each faced his own dilemmas. Kohl wanted desperately to reunify Germany. He saw a chance to go down in history as another Bismarck, and he leapt at it. But he faced the unique risk of alienating both his NATO allies, particularly the French and the British, and the Soviet Union. Kohl wanted Gorbachev to continue in power and recognized that the unification of Germany would not help the Soviet leader with hard-liners at home.

Bush pursued four goals that were in part contradictory. He too wanted to see a re-unified democratic Germany, but he wanted it to remain in NATO. In addition, he wanted to keep NATO together through all the changes that were occurring, and like Kohl, he knew that the alternatives to Gorbachev within the Soviet Union were not going to be nearly as accommodating in terms of American foreign policy goals. The problem was that encouraging Germany to reunify and to remain in NATO conflicted with the goal of keeping Gorbachev in power. Moreover, encouraging Germany to reunify risked damaging alliance relations.

Finally Gorbachev wanted to ease East-West tensions so that he would be free to pursue perestroika at home. But if he seemed too accommodating to the West in his diplomacy, he risked energizing hard-liners domestically. Germany was a very emotional issue, and Gorbachev could not lightly accept its "loss." Therefore, he had to walk the fine line between energizing his domestic opposition and destroying the new detente. Either way, he would lose perestroika.

While it is easy to accept the claim that statecraft mattered and that no event is strictly inevitable, the authors do exaggerate the role statecraft played in this drama. German reunification may not have been inevitable, but it was one of the most highly over-determined events in recent history. First, there existed the underlying desire on both sides of the iron curtain. The authors do a great deal to downplay this desire in order to credit Kohl with creating it. Their evidence, however (i.e., East German opinion polls and West German polls where the question was on beliefs about the possibility, rather than desirability of unification), is unconvincing. Moreover, the flood of people leaving East Germany and its subsequent democratization had more to do with the failure of the East German state than any policy of Helmut Kohl. The authors also downplay the diminished willingness and capacity of the Soviet state for action. Zelikow and Rice note repeatedly that Gorbachev stressed noninterference as a guiding principle. If this is so, then what causal significance did German and American diplomacy really have in Soviet acquiescence? Similarly, though the authors refer to the paralysis of Soviet diplomacy during the period from 1989 to 1991, they do not explain it. One reason was that the Soviet foreign policy bureaucratic process was thoroughly damaged by the institutional reorganizations and experiments of perestroika.

Finally, some Western diplomacy—the relative stinginess of the U.S. in response to Soviet aid requests—actually hindered an agreement with the Soviets on a unified Germany and endangered perestroika. Gorbachev requested Western credits as a way of demonstrating to his own hard-liners that the concessions to the West were bringing tangible benefits. Bush refused on the ground that the money would be wasted.