strategies toward Germany, but it was not until the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the post-Korean war remilitarization of Germany that the Soviet Union began vigorously to exclude or deny America's military presence in Europe. Even so, the author suggests that the division of Germany into spheres of Eastern and Western influence was a satisfactory outcome to the Soviet Union's European security concerns. US troops continued to provide, "in the Soviet leadership's eyes, a useful counterweight to German remilitarisation." (p. 7)

Kennedy-Pipe is correct to suggest a more complex relationship between Soviet foreign policy goals vis-a-vis Germany and the United States than is commonly assumed—her approach is novel and thoughtful. But by downplaying the theme of competition between the Soviet and American blocs, she misses an important dynamic element of Cold War history. The international crises of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s demonstrate that the Russians and Americans were less willing to accept the global status quo than her model, focused on Europe, would suggest.

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With the collapse of Hitler's Third Reich in 1945, Germany became a non-state. Its territory was divided into zones of occupation—American, British, French, and Russian. Germans faced an uncertain future. The occupying armies wielded absolute power over a German populace that had no rights and exercised no authority. Nowhere was that uncertainty, the absence of rights, and the immense coercive capacity of the conqueror more obvious than in the eastern or Russian zone of occupation. In this important and meticulously-researched reassessment of Soviet military rule—the first English-language work of any merit since the publication of J. P. Nettl's study in 1951—Norman M. Naimark discusses Soviet policymaking and administration from the end of the war until the creation of an independent East German state and evaluates the occupation experience on the local population. Relying on a wide range of archival material from East Berlin and Moscow that only became available a few years ago following the opening of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism, Naimark recounts in absorbing detail what Soviet policymakers did or intended to do, what assumptions guided their thinking and conduct, and what political realities determined their compromises. The Soviet Union's German policy, he argues, was more complex and varied than it has been portrayed in the conventional picture. He stresses the diverse groups, the plurality of interests, the absence of clear lines of responsibility, even the administrative rivalries with which Soviet military government had to contend and which prevented the development of a coherent and overall plan for the eastern zone. These overlapping competencies, to cite only the most obvious, ranged from the "confusing power structure of the USSR itself" (p. 24) to the independent initiatives of the Red Army commanders in each of the zone's five provincial military districts,
and from the autonomous agencies of Lavrentii Beria's secret police to the jurisdictional anomalies presented by uncoordinated teams of reparations specialists.

Not only did Soviet military government have to contend with competing administrative jurisdictions, but according to Naimark it also was handicapped by the absence of qualified and reliable personnel or cadres familiar with the German situation. It was precisely this problem, he contends, that led occupation authorities increasingly to rely on the advice and assistance of their German Communist acolytes, especially in economic, judicial, and cultural matters. These Moscow-experienced Germans—Walter Ulbricht, Anton Ackermann, Wilhelm Pieck, even the socialist turncoat Otto Grotewohl—together with their Soviet superiors, forged a new society, laid the foundations for the division of Germany, and by 1949 created a separate German state. All this, Naimark suggests, was the unintended yet inevitable outcome of Soviet administrative deficiencies and German Communist skill and determination in exploiting opportunities to aggrandize their authority.

From the onset, Naimark makes clear, the experience of Russian occupation imposed material deprivations and inflicted other hardships on the zone's German populace. German complaints were legion. They protested the dismantling and removal of factories and other economic infrastructure; the round up and deportation to the Soviet Union of skilled workers, technicians, scientists, and their families; the requisition of agricultural machinery, livestock, and foodstuffs; the imprisonment of (and high mortality among) the thousands of Stalin's German political opponents in the zone's eleven internment camps; the employment of forced labor under horrific conditions in the Erzgebirge's uranium mines; or even the eviction from and confiscation of scarce housing. But nothing, according to Naimark, was more dreadful and devastating than the Red Army's reign of rape.

Sexual assault was a common experience for women in the eastern zone over a prolonged period of time, and fear of rape was universal. A staggering number of German women, Naimark claims, were raped, ritually degraded, and publicly humiliated by Soviet soldiers, officers and enlisted men alike. Social consequences were severe—the doubling of the divorce rate, record numbers of abortions, alarming increases in illegitimacy, and skyrocketing rates of sexually transmitted disease.

The association of Red Army troops with looting and atrocities or the memory of Soviet direct control and interference, Naimark implies, forfeited the loyalty of the zone's inhabitants—women above all—and contributed to the eventual collapse of the regime in 1989. This is an important, albeit controversial, insight that demands more elaboration than Naimark provides. The centrality of the rape experience in his analysis, other evidence suggests, extends far beyond the physical and psychological trauma inflicted on the Soviet army's numerous victims. As Elizabeth Heineman makes abundantly clear in her pathbreaking article "The Hour of the Women: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," American Historical Review, Cl, 2 (April 1996), 354-95, rape and its recollection in postwar Germany was degendered and came to symbolize the degradation of the German nation itself. Thus the occupation experience in general, and rape in particular, doubtless cost the USSR and East Berlin the loyalty of a good part of the "zone's" population; at the same time, however, the memories of that experience became an important element of postwar