ods. Boris Gromov's *Ogranichennyj kontingent* makes the cut, for example, but Evgenii Shaposhnikov's *Vybora* does not.

Another difficulty is duplication of entries. Boris Shaposhnikov's memoirs appear twice (entries 150 and 553, mislabeled in the index), as does the 1985 *Velikaia Otechestvennaia voyna 1941-1945: Entsiklopediia* (201 and 597). Documentary collections difficult to classify are particularly prone to this. Successive volumes on Civil War *Partino-politicheskaia rabota v Krasnoi Armii* (327 and 1314, 334 and 1317) are repeated, and editions of *KPSS o Vooruzbennyth Silakh Sovetskogo Solaza* are listed separately (257 and 1320).

More serious, the indices (by name and subject) are not as complete and helpful as they might be. Those exploring the military role of Trotsky's Opposition and checking the index for I. T. Smilga would find his 1921 *Ocherednye voprosy stroitel'stva Krasnoi Armii* (505), but miss A. P. Nenarokov's short 1991 biography of him in *Revvoensovet Respubliki* (441).

Those criticisms should not detract from this work's essential value. Before venturing to the archives, any scholar can save time and money from a clear picture of what is available through Western research libraries, particularly on such well-published topics as the Civil War and the Great Fatherland War. This guide, through the monographs and bibliographies to which it leads, is the best place to begin.

The only drawback is the book's price, which will likely put it out of reach even of specialists in the field. Researchers are advised to appeal to their librarian.

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The Soviet Union dead still arouses as much interest and controversy among Western academics as when it was alive. Innumerable monographs, articles, and collaborative works have appeared to reassess what is known about the Soviet past and to argue about the meaning of the post-Soviet transition. One of these publications stands out, however, in its novelty and interest. This is the collection of essays edited by David Holloway and Norman Naimark of Stanford University to honor Alexander Dallin.

Recently retired from Stanford himself, Dallin has long been one of the pillars of the Soviet/Russian Studies establishment in the United States, and a voice of interpretive moderation. It is fitting that a group of his friends and colleagues, including former students of his, have undertaken to honor him with this series of innovative and eye-opening, though not uncontroversial, views of how the Russians have behaved, in their domestic as well as in their international politics.

The contributions here on external affairs all point to a common theme in the various periods they treat: Soviet Russia's intransigence was in part a response to Western (and above all American) inflexibility, with less single-minded revolutionary ambition
than has been commonly assumed either at the time or in retrospect. Bertrand Pataud of the Hoover Institution, writing on the American Relief Administration of 1920-22, contends that a critical opportunity to open Russia to the West was lost because the U.S. did not follow up the ARA, and chose the nonrecognition policy instead. In a later era, Alexander George, Stanford emeritus, argues that psychological sets and misperceptions on both sides aggravated the Cold War. George Breslauer of Berkeley, discussing Gorbachev's "New Thinking," blames his discomfort on Washington's failure to reciprocate and its penchant for global unilateralism; the same attitudes made Yeltsin revert to a "state-centric" stance. William Zimmerman of Michigan addresses post-Soviet changes among Russia's foreign policy elites, finding (not surprisingly) more pluralism and public input from the Gorbachev era on, and the isolation, for the moment, of the "socialist authoritarians."

Of special methodological interest is Naimark's own article, arising from his research on East Germany, about the utility of newly accessible Russian archives. Based on this sample, he finds that the archives only bear out with corroborating detail what was believed already—on atrocities by Soviet troops in 1945, on concentration camps in the GDR, and on the revolutionary role of the Soviet propaganda chief in Berlin, Col. Sergei Tiul'panov, amid the bureaucratic infighting of the Zhdanov era. For answers that are not known, the archives are not open.

The final contribution on an international theme is an inquiry by Holloway, deriving from his book Stalin and the Bomb, into one of the sensational charges made by Pavel Sudoplatov (Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—a Soviet Spymaster), that during World War II the eminent Danish physicist Niels Bohr channeled secret information to Moscow on the American atomic bomb project. Using Bohr's archive and the memoirs of the Soviet go-between lakov Terletskii as well as British and American records, Holloway meticulously refutes Sudoplatov's story about this episode, without judging the balance of the book.

The five contributions on domestic affairs in Reexamining the Soviet Experience pursue diverse arguments. Of them, two dwell on the historical politics of Soviet studies. Jonathan Haslam of Cambridge University weighs the negative impact of the Cold War on nascent Soviet studies in Britain, and the vicissitudes experienced by E. H. Carr over his pro-Soviet sympathies before he established himself as the preeminent Western historian of the early Soviet period. Ronald Suny of the University of Chicago revisits American historiography of 1917 and the controversy between conservative political historians and revisionist social historians (to whom Suny is more sympathetic, though he finds them outdated by the new cultural approach).

In a thought-provoking essay stemming from his recent book, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, Mark von Hagen of Columbia University advances the thesis of the militarization of the Soviet system, a "proletarian Sparta." Initiated under War Communism and consolidated by Stalin, militarization became the essence of the civil government, above and beyond actual military influence and interests. This was the system ultimately undermined by modernization and attacked by the Gorbachevian reformers, though some of its legacy persists even under Yeltsin.

Two essays, to round out the collection, get into the theoretical issues raised for political science by the collapse of Communism and the post-Soviet transition. M.