in Georgia. She convincingly arrays evidence of the hatred of the Russian military and other Russian nationalists for Shevardnadze and his perceived role in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union and of how this translated into their support for dismembering Georgia. Although this evidence is persuasive, the question of Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's role is less clear, since they seemed to support a negotiated settlement to the Abkhaz conflict and upheld the concept of Georgia's territorial integrity. She correctly concludes that Russia's role as a mediator of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict requires that it be trusted by both sides, a trust about which Shevardnadze and his legislature have had grave doubts.

Roy Allison and Pavel Baev argue in separate contributions that there is a growing gap between Russia's "peacekeeping" capabilities and its ambitions, particularly evident in Tajikistan. There is a split within the military over interventionism, with Afghan veterans cautioning against an intemperate policy. Baev notes that lagging Russian capabilities to shoulder the burden of "peacekeeping" may entice it to solicit greater international involvement. He predicts that if peacekeepers are able to implement "real peace" in Bosnia, it could positively influence Russian "peacekeeping" methods, raising the possibility that the example of NATO peacekeeping there will have this helpful effect. Finally, Alexander Pikayev presents a standard but useful discussion of the 1992-93 debate in Russia over policy toward the former Soviet republics. He argues that a Russian elite consensus is emerging that Russia should not accept involvement of international organizations in its sphere of interest, though this assessment appears incongruent with allowing the OSCE to mediate in Chechnia.

The volume is an extremely useful overview of Russian "peacekeeping" actions and policy debates for those trying to understand and recollect Russia's role in the complex events of the first years of independence of the new states. The lack of an index, however, mars its effectiveness as a desk reference.

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Both Nicolai Petro and Judith Devlin begin their respective analyses of current Russian politics by challenging Western assumptions of the Russians' unique affinity for collectivism and authoritarianism. Having made the case that the appearance of a multitude of independent social organizations in the 1980s definitively refutes the stereotype of Russians as politically passive, however, Devlin and Petro part ways on the prospects for democracy in Russia. Devlin argues both that the democratic movement per se has failed to establish deep popular roots in Russian society and that the political culture approach does not provide a satisfactory explanation for this failure. Petro, on the other hand, is optimistic about the future of civil society and the gradual
institutionalization of a democratic culture, and he identifies a deeply rooted "alternative political culture" as the main force behind such progress toward democracy.

Devlin examines the Russian democratic movement in depth, directing our attention in particular toward the considerable role of the liberal intelligentsia and the Communist Party elite in promoting political reform. She identifies three important trends within the loose anti-Communist social movement of the perestroika years: namely, anti-Stalinism, dissatisfaction with the current system, and an appreciation of Russian cultural and historic traditions. Devlin observes that the intelligentsia loses its leadership role over time to pragmatists from the managerial and bureaucratic elite, whose commitment to democracy is far less certain. She faults the leaders of the democratic movement for their lack of appreciation of voters' material priorities and for their frequently patronizing attitudes toward the masses. Devlin also offers an important reminder that the democratic movement never had broad geographic or social bases.

Devlin's story of the emergence and decline of the democratic movement often reads like a catalog of parties, programs and personalities; but it rests upon a wealth of published materials, archival documents and interviews with participants. The Rise of the Russian Democrats is an extremely well-researched and well-documented historical account, but it lacks theoretical rigor and innovation. After Petro's thorough and thought-provoking review of the use of the political culture by social scientists, Devlin's understanding of political culture as an explanatory variable seems quite superficial. Nevertheless, she demonstrates remarkable sensitivity to the nuances within the democratic movement, and her account perhaps benefits from the fact that the author does not attempt to force her findings into necessarily crude theoretical matrices.

Petro offers a much more controversial thesis and an intriguing interpretation of Russian history and political development. While not denying a strong statist tendency in Russian culture, he postulates the existence of a single alternative political culture present throughout Russian history, surviving during the Soviet period in such places as the Russian emigre community and the catacomb church. Petro characterizes this second culture as consisting of three important beliefs: support for a constrained autocracy, acceptance of the Russian Orthodox Church's symphonic ideal of church-state partnership, and profession of a non-chauvinistic Russian national identity. He finds evidence of such a set of beliefs stemming back to the distant days of Kievan Rus'.

No doubt Petro's sometimes idiosyncratic interpretation of Russian history will raise opposition from his audience at times. In particular, his account of the allegedly shared guiding principles of the White movement and of the Vlasovite army is likely to be criticized as somewhat idealistic or naive. Nevertheless, Petro reminds us of the wealth of evidence that Russian culture is diverse, if not divided into a clear dichotomy. Moreover, he raises interesting questions about how and in what form non-Communist values and ideas survived during the Soviet period.

Petro's analysis of current Russian politics occasionally suffers from his passionate belief in the presence of a well-grounded, enlightened, benevolent Russian patriotism. Having argued convincingly that Russian democrats would do well to search for a popular patriotism, Petro advocates neo-Slavophilism as their only choice. He does not, however, endeavor to explain why so often in recent years a form of Slavophile