lence of some of the presentations of the book, one still awaits a paradigm to concept-
tualize the entire tragedy of the Balkan War.

Francine Friedman
Ball State University


Yugoslavia's Disintegration and the Struggle for Truth is the latest in Alex N. Dragnich's long and varied publication career. The bulk of his publications has been about Yugoslavia. This book is a collection of many of his latest published articles and published and unpublished op ed pieces about the recent Balkan conflict.

This tome explicates the Serbian position in the post-Communist period and an intellectual Serb's view of Balkan politics. It is unrelievedly sympathetic to the Serbian belief that Serbia deserved a better deal than it received under Tito and was only seeking to redress inequities that the Serbs suffered under Communist tutelage when Serbian President Slobodan Milošević began to try to alter the relations among the republics within Yugoslavia in the late 1980s. Dragnich's articles are extremely critical of the Western contribution to the solution of the Balkan conflicts, as well as Western media reporting, which he censured as largely unsympathetic to Serbia. The book is useful for a better understanding of the Serbian attitude and posture on the events in the post-World War II period as well as in the post-Tito period.

Francine Friedman


The horrific violence that enveloped much of what was socialist Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, especially Bosnia, has led to the appearance of a growing number of books on this subject. Some authors point an accusing finger and seek out villains, while others poignantly call attention to what might have been in this multiethnic society. Whether an author wishes to explain, describe, or appeal to the reader, selecting an appropriate temporal and theoretical framework is an important matter. For there was a complex of forces that led to the tremendous physical and human destruction in Bosnia.

The author of this book, a political scientist, combines a mostly historical narrative with references to theoretical works on ethnicity. Between a short introduction defining terms and a concluding chapter on theoretical aspects of ethnonationalism and its relevance to the case of Bosnia, the author sketches the history of the peoples of this region from the Middle Ages to the conflict in the 1990s in chapters of roughly equal length.
foundation-funded democracy assistance programs can be gauged, albeit with difficulty, through methods that he is able to employ. Consequences of grantmaking, he suggests, can be assessed through the effects on individuals, institutions and society writ large.

But neither Quigley's focus on one region of post-Communist Europe nor his limited methods engender much confidence in his conclusions. Four very brief country-specific chapters, followed by a quick look at regional efforts (e.g., environmental and educational programs that reach into all the countries), are primarily a description of what has been done by whom and when; mild criticism and tangential explanation characterize these chapters. Nothing beyond a few interviews of democratic activists in each country and aggregate data from foundations tell the reader about what might explain who got what money, when and from whom. Quigley's enthusiasm for the Czech model (its "noteworthy political stability") seems premature given the last elections and Klaus' tentative leadership in 1997. In the Czech case, too, Quigley's rosy assessment ignores that country's violence against Roma, and a distinctly unenthusiastic sentiment about joining NATO in the population.

The decision-making processes of each foundation (save Soros) are probed minimally if at all. That regional projects had less of a chance for success when they were administered from outside the recipient country is both an unsurprising "finding" and one supported by little more than hearsay.

One chapter (7) on the Soros foundation differs from others because Quigley goes into greater detail about the Open Society Institute and its Polish branch, the Stefan Batory Foundation. Here, unlike anyplace else in the monograph, Quigley is more pointed in criticism (e.g., about opaque finances and difficulties that Soros and his organizations have with delegating authority), and somewhat more robust in his language.

At the end of the day, Quigley finds that supporting NGOs is not the same as building democracy, and that grantmaking foundations erred by underestimating the difficulty of sustainability—i.e., the viability of programs after external funding was reduced or withdrawn. Rather than develop links to public (state) and private (market) co-sponsors, foundations were biased towards their own vision of democracy.

These are sensible conclusions. But the evidence is painfully thin. Comparative indicators of democratic behaviors over time or across cases are absent, as are any other ways to gauge the "dependent variable" that Quigley and others assume is affected by democracy assistance grants. Do cases with more foundationsupported democracy assistance programs (in number, in amount per capita, in numbers of people involved) exhibit, over time, change in electoral or civil-society participation rates, attitudinal tolerance in public opinion surveys, trust in principal political institutions, or any number of other measures? Such a straightforward question is never posed by Quigley, which leaves his conclusions far too exposed.

To assess the effects of Western democracy assistance funding is essential, both to guide future policy and to temper future expectations among grantors or recipients. Quigley's monograph is a start, with important financial revelations and an insider's feel for what he and his colleagues did or did not accomplish and why. Others, how-