and socialist construction" (p. 162) appealed not only to many workers, but also to young production engineers eager to oust remnants of a pre-revolutionary engineering elite, to the huge strata of industrial managers whose original leadership experience dated back to the days of the civil war, and even to relatively elite engineering designers and managerial specialists. Shearer demonstrates convincingly that class alone does not account for the Stalinist coalition, which attracted many middle-level industrial managers and administrators, as well as many workers.

Shearer's important book leads not only to consideration of the means for rapid industrialization in the 1920s and 1930s, but more generally to the place and meaning of industrialization in Russian history. The adoption of the first five year plan marked the decisive conclusion of debate about Russia's future that was over one hundred years old. The agriculturalists and the balanced-investment advocates now ceased to be part of the discussion. Several themes from the 1880s and 1890s reemerge in the late twenties, raising questions about durable features of the Russian economy. Among these are pressures toward vertical integration that are embedded in the underdevelopment of market and distribution systems. Concerns among Vesenkha and Rabkrin leaders about the power of the "southern" bloc are an echo from the pre-war era, suggesting that southern coal and steel interests would continuously tend to dominate national economic policy and planning. Most important, the question of worker welfare refused to disappear, even though Soviet administrators clearly possessed options for addressing it that pre-revolutionary officials and managers had lacked. In lieu of effective government programs for supplying workers' basic needs at either the central or the regional level, factory managers found themselves ensnared in housing, police and social questions in the 1930s just as their predecessors had in the 1890s. Indeed, as Shearer's evidence demonstrates, despite enormous efforts to develop a centralized all-Union economy, at least through the mid-1930s much of economic life remained intensely local. His book raises a fundamental question for Russian history, that is, how can this gigantic country be bound together if not by "the market" or by a market-imitating distribution system? Scholars are indebted to Shearer, therefore, not only for the detailed description of critical institutional decisions, but also for the wider questions to which his analysis points.

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Anatolii Cherniaev worked in the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party for more than two decades. Later, he was recruited by Gorbachev and played an important role in the restructuring of Soviet foreign policy during the glasnost' and perestroika years. This is not Cherniaev's first book. Earlier, on the basis of his diaries, he published Шесть лет с Горбачевым, in which he described "the key events of perestroika." In this work, also using his diaries, Cherniaev examines the behavior, traditions and habits of Soviet political elites in the 1960s and 1970s. This book also contains anecdotal data concerning Brezhnev and other well-known Soviet figures. Cherniaev is a historian by profession. He taught world history at Moscow State University, and, later in
Prague he joined the editorial staff of an international journal Проблемы мира и социализма. His account of debates among Soviet scholars certainly deserves mention. In addition, Cherniaev openly talks about his personal life and shares his experience as a serviceman during World War II.

Cherniaev's description of Brezhnev's policies and his personal character is one of many merits of this book. The author points out that Brezhnev's foreign policy was informed by two contradictory motives: realpolitik versus ideological orthodoxy. The author considers himself together with such well-known Brezhnev advisors as Aleksandr Bovin, Georgii Arbatov, and Nikolai Inozemtsev as advocates of a common sense or realpolitik approach, whereas such notorious figures as Politburo members Suslov, Gromyko and Andropov were encouraging the Communist orthodoxy. Cherniaev produces an account of a complicated struggle among the Soviet establishment over this issue.

The author analyzed the problems of the world Communist movement and Soviet attempts to preserve the "unity" of the movement, particularly in the context of Eurocommunism, which advocated socialism combined with democracy, without dictatorship of the proletariat. Cherniaev notes how harshly the Soviet leadership lashed out at proponents of Eurocommunism, particularly Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carillo. Boris Ponomarev, the head of the Central Committee's International Department and the author's boss, unleashed a campaign to discredit Carillo after he published Eurocommunism and the State. Cherniaev noted with regret that people like him endorsed most of Eurocommunism's tenets, but had to uphold the Party line, although in a more intelligent fashion. Overall, the author calls Eurocommunism "the death knell for the world international movement." According to Cherniaev, already by the mid-1970s it forced a wedge between the members of the Warsaw Pact. They could not reach a common position on Eurocommunism and on how to deal with the tenth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Therefore, the author asserts, the world Communist movement was dead long before перестройка was under way.

The most impressive aspect of this book is its treatment of the problems of Soviet Jewry, Israel and Zionism. Cherniaev strongly condemns Antisemitism and expresses regret that the Soviet government "quarreled with the Jews." In his view, this was "an enormous historic miscalculation by our state." Cherniaev is particularly upset about this because he thinks that the Soviet Union could have easily established good contacts with international Jewish organizations after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Apparently, the author associates most outrageous outbursts of anti-Semitism with Stalin's rule after World War II and believes that after Stalin's death a better climate emerged for Jews within the Soviet Union and for better ties between the Soviet Union and Israel as well as for more understanding between Moscow and international Jewish organizations. However, the Soviets did not use this opportunity. The problem of anti-Semitism exists in Russia today. Under such circumstances Cherniaev's thoughts on this subject are of special interest. He points out that anti-Semitism penetrated Soviet society too deeply. Among young people it became so commonplace that it is no longer considered anything extraordinary. The author recalls his school and prewar university years when this very problem, in his view, did not exist. They did not regard it wrong to be Jewish. Moreover, there was no distinction in being Jewish. While explaining the phenomenon of anti-Semitism, Cherniaev indicates that it was necessary for Soviet nomenclature to assert its power. It used anti-Semitism to stir up "chauvinist patriotism."