over to the Ottomans during a battle. The Ottomans, for their part, made skillful use of Count Imre Thököly and his Hungarian rebels against the Habsburgs.

The book's only serious problems are the results of what seems to be a very sloppy proofreading job. There are large numbers of typographical and grammatical errors as well as stylistic flaws, sometimes several on a single page. While these mistakes are not necessarily Parvev's fault, they do have the unfortunate effect of distracting the reader from the book's narrative and arguments. Fortunately, the other aspects of this work are strong enough to make up for this shortcoming.

Peter Mentzel


More than forty years of scholarship have shaped the important academic career of David MacKenzie. Helping us through the intricacies of many aspects of both Serbian and Russian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, MacKenzie has also been intrigued by the changing and often complicated relationship between these two peoples. Since the 1960s he has written eight monographs and two textbooks. He is probably best known for his popular text, A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond (with Michael Curran), and for his detailed studies of two very colorful and controversial Serbs, Ilija Garašanin (Ilija Garašanin: Balkan Bismarck) and Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević (Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević). His other major works clearly demonstrate the range of his interests: The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism (1967); Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy (1994); From Messianism to Collapse: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991 (1994); and Violent Solutions: Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918 (1996). MacKenzie has also contributed to a number of journals including Slavic Review, Russian Review, Canadian Slavic Studies, East European Quarterly, Serbian Studies, and Istorički časopis (Belgrade). Several book chapters and numerous conference papers round out the scholarly work of his life's career.

Now MacKenzie has brought together eighteen of these articles, papers, and chapters in one publication. In his own words, "At a time when the relations between Serbs and Russians have once again come into focus during another severe Balkan crisis, it seemed appropriate to draw together in one volume articles and papers composed since the 1960s." As a well-chosen reflection of his dedicated work, they serve to remind us of the depth of his interests and understanding and the timelessness of his analysis.

MacKenzie suggests that the purpose of the collection is to "throw useful light on Serbian-Russian relations and the Serbian national movement." His lead article summarizes the history of Serbian-Russian relations over the centuries, and three articles in the collection give particular attention to Russian relations with Serbia during the critical years of war in the Balkans between 1875 and 1878. He takes a fresh look at the activities of the Russian General Mikhail Grigorevich Cherniaev in Serbia during the Serbo-Turkish war of 1876 and concludes that Cherniaev's "military and diplomatic failure . . . revealed the futility and bankruptcy of the Pan-Slav movement in action." Moreover, MacKenzie demon-
strates clearly how Russia's Balkan policies at this time of crisis did more harm than good for Serbia and its national interests. His research reminds us that much of the so-called traditional and historical friendship between Serbs and Russians is more myth than fact.

The real strength of MacKenzie's collection is its focus on the Serbian national movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His articles on Serbia are not only interesting in their own right, but they encourage us to think in more informed ways about Serbian perspectives in the current Balkan crisis. MacKenzie introduces his readers to some key issues in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Balkan history. Primary among them is one that continues to challenge contemporary scholars. Was Serbia seeking the liberation of all South Slavs in its role as Serbian Piedmont or were its objectives more narrowly focused on those Serbs living outside of Serbia proper? This issue is critical to understanding some of the chief architects and actors in Serbia's nineteenth-century drama of unification and national development. Seeing a relationship between the leaders of the Italian *Il Risorgimento* and the leaders of Serbia's national movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, MacKenzie examines four of these Serbian titans (Ilija Garasanić, Ljuba Jovanović-Čupa, Colonel Apis, and Nikola Pašić) in six articles which form a core part of this collection. As MacKenzie examines their lives and ideas, we discover that the relationship between Greater Serbian and Yugoslav objectives was much more complex and ever changing than many of today's critics of Serbia and Serbian history are willing to admit. Far from being responsible for all of the miseries of a united South Slavic state in the twentieth century, these were dedicated servants of a national Serbian movement whose objectives and perspectives were quite understandable in the context of the times. If they did not always identify "Yugoslav" unity as the ultimate goal of their struggle, none of them rejected its possibility one day. Their obvious and more immediate responsibility was for the liberation of those millions of Serbs still under foreign control. Once that was achieved, they could turn their attention to broader South Slav concerns.

The final section of the collection, entitled "Serbian Conspiracies, Conspirators, and Trials," focuses considerable attention on Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis and the Serbian nationalist organization, "Unification or Death"; the infamous trial in Thessalonika in June 1917, where Apis and two of his comrades were sentenced to death on charges of treason; and the retrial in Belgrade in 1953 which exonerated the conspirators. MacKenzie concludes that the objectives of "Unification or Death" were not unlike other nationalist organizations in Europe and Russia during the age of nationalism. The Serbian organization had the best interests of Serbia and its dynasty in mind during its relatively brief existence in the years immediately preceding World War I. Tragically, the trial of a few of the organization's leaders by the Serbian government in exile was clearly rigged. MacKenzie finds that there was absolutely no proof to the charge that the defendants had plotted to overthrow the Serbian dynasty or murder the Prince Regent. In MacKenzie's opinion the verdict amounted to "judicial murder" which was ultimately the goal of Prince Alexander and his circle. And while the retrial in 1953 was clearly motivated as well by raw political objectives, MacKenzie believes that the limited rehabilitation of the convicted defendants was clearly appropriate. That the Tito-era court did not offer full exoneration is also understandable. "Unification or Death" was initially inspired by individuals who believed in a federal Yugoslavia. As the Balkan Wars progressed, however, the organization became