dominated by "chauvinistic, aggressive Greater Serbian nationalist officers." In 1953 the ideology of Greater Serbia was still blamed for all of the sins of interwar Yugoslavia.

The title of this collection may be a bit misleading since only a small number of the articles deal explicitly with Serb-Russian relations. Nevertheless, this is a fine collection of representative articles from an important scholar's lifetime work, and it will remain a significant reference volume, particularly for students of Serbia and the Balkans.

Thomas A. Emmert


The central thesis of this book is that the genocide committed against Bosnian Muslims by Serbs and Croats was basically a "religious genocide." Muslims were killed because of their religious identity; those who killed them were sanctioned by Christian religious leaders who promulgated the view that Slavic Muslims were Christ-killers and race traitors; and all of this took place under the indifferent gaze of a Christian-dominated Western world. Sells argues that the war in Bosnia was a Holy War, another episode in a long-standing effort on the part of European Christians to cleanse Europe of its Muslims. These arguments are intriguing at first glance, but upon careful examination a number of problems emerge.

Sells does an excellent job explicating the role of religion as a legitimating ideology of nationalists in both Serbia and Croatia. What is less clear, though, is the extent to which religion played a direct, causal role in genocide. Throughout the book, Sells specifically refers to Franjo Tudjman, Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, Zeljko Raznatovic (a.k.a. Arkan) and other Croatian and Serbian leaders as "religious nationalists," thus implying that religion was the motive force which led them to do what they did. It is more accurate to see them as nationalists who used religion as a legitimating ideology or as leaders who created "civil religions" which resonated with populations searching for meaning in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Christianity was certainly a factor in creating what Sells calls the "masks of otherness" which facilitated genocide against Muslims and Western indifference toward that genocide. Yet Sells overestimates religious factors and fails to address adequately other variables that were perhaps more important or which operated in conjunction with religious factors. For instance, the events in Bosnia cannot be interpreted without some reference to social class differences: the brutality of rural Serbs against more highly educated, cosmopolitan Muslims and Croats surely could be seen as a function of class differences rather than religious ones. While those of the Serbian elite such as Vojislav Seselj and Radovan Karadzic were highly educated, they no doubt mobilized class sentiments as a means for achieving their political and material ambitions. Along this materialist line of interpretation, we should not neglect the role of political and economic motives: in considering the actions of, say Slobodan Milosevic, it is almost ludicrous to imagine that his motives had anything to do with religion at all. A more sophisticated theory must articulate the complex interplay of cultural/religious and political/economic forces that gave rise to genocide in Bosnia.
The most useful chapters in Sells' book deal with the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Western indifference toward the plight of Bosnian Muslims. Other chapters are characterized by some rather serious conceptual and empirical problems. The fundamental premise of Sells' book is that Croatian and Serbian actions in Bosnia are essentially homologous. Croats and Serbs represent a "Christoslavic" force that sought to extinguish Bosnian Muslims and their culture. While it is true that both Serbs and Croats constructed negative images of Muslims and used these to justify murder and ethnic cleansing, Sells' theory of Christoslavic unity is easily refuted by the degree of overt tension and hostility that existed between Croats and Serbs. Except for a brief mention of the Serbian strategy of viewing all Croats as Nazis, there is little mention of the stark cultural conflicts between Croats and Serbs. Sells sees Serbs and Croats as a unified force that aspires to rid Bosnia of its Muslims. While there is some evidence that this was the case—Franjo Tudjman did meet with Milosevic to discuss the partition of Bosnia—Sells glosses over a very real aspect of the history of the region, namely, the brutal attack on Croatia by the Serbian dominated JNA in 1991 and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of Croats. His only mention of this event is when he characterizes it as a "brutal conflict between the Yugoslav army with its allied Serb militias on the one side and the new Croat army on the other." This view masks the violent character of the Serbian invasion of Croatia, an invasion which set the pattern for the murder of defenseless civilians—both Muslim and Croat—by Serbian military and paramilitary forces for the next four years in Bosnia. Readers will come away from Sells' book completely unaware of the brutal occupation of Croatia by Serbs and of such events as the destruction of Vukovar.

It is to Franjo Tudjman's eternal discredit that he traded Croatia's legitimate status as victim for one of aggressor toward Bosnian Muslims. Yet this does not deny the fact that what happened in Bosnia was an extension on a larger scale of what happened in Croatia in 1991. Serbian aggression against Croats in Croatia and, later in Bosnia, had virtually nothing to do with religious differences because it was Christian Serbs killing Christian Croats. It often seems as if Sells willfully forgets this, as, for instance, when he discusses the infamous concentration camp at Omarska. He fails to note that a significant number of the victims of Omarska (and in other areas of Bosnia) were ethnic Croats and that the Serbian strategy of genocide was directed at all non-Serbs rather than Muslims alone. To be sure, Muslims were the principal victims of genocide. Yet once we recognize that Serbs murdered Muslims and Christians, it is hard to accept Sells' thesis of "Christoslavism" as the motive force behind genocide in Bosnia. He argues explicitly that religious identity was the central factor that determined who was to be killed. It was, rather, ethnic identity, which may or may not be related to religion or religiosity.

Sells' position is curious since he presents an admirable critique of the view prevalent in the West that "all sides were equally guilty." This equivocation was not only empirically wrong, but served as a convenient rationale for non-intervention by Western powers. Sells' chapter on Western appeasement of Serbian aggression is excellent, replete with a picture of UN General Michael Rose shaking hands and drinking with General Ratko Mladic just prior to the slaughter at Srebrenica. Yet, Sells himself engages in such equivocation throughout the book and fails to make distinctions between the crimes committed by Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian forces. This failure to make distinctions between who did what to whom and in what degree is a major problem in the writing of the history of the ex-Yugoslavia. At times, Sells seems to be able to make these distinctions, as, for in-