foreign policy, is the corruption that overwhelms business in Romania. It continues to keep foreign, especially U.S. investors at bay.

Good or bad competition laws and policies aside, the reality of post-Communist Romania is that contemporary business practices and processes are not fully understood or applied. The concept of the market was eradicated long ago and its reintroduction, briefly examined by Daria-Nicoleta Lascu et al., is as problematic as the introduction of democracy. Her contribution would be vastly improved by an addendum on the influence of foreign firms on Romanian firms. Three marketing giants that entered Romania come to mind: Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola, and McDonalds. Still, the article gives foreigners, in particular, a good sense of the specific shortcomings in marketing, at a time when consumers are anxiously waiting to be satisfied.

These heightened consumer desires are outlined in a mostly theoretical, think-piece by Russell W. Belk. The reader needs something more concrete than anecdotal evidence, and that is largely missing from this work. Nevertheless, the article illuminates a trend found in developing countries: rising expectations, followed by rising frustrations. Belk's contribution indicates the results of restricted and restrictive privatization, lagging economic development, and the absence of greater foreign investment: a situation that cannot satisfy the growing demands for well paying jobs and affordable consumer goods. He concludes with a statement that is puzzling: "... it is widely agreed that there is no going back in spite of the consumer recognition that things were better under communism." True, there is some nostalgia among a few elements of society for Communism, but it is not widespread as most opinion surveys have shown, and there is no talk whatsoever of things being "better under communism."

Unfortunately, the overall economic situation has not improved by mid-1998: neither have salaries, or the affordability of consumer goods. For instance, the reports of produce and other agricultural goods, that fewer and fewer can afford, rotting at the market, in fields, and in peasants' storage bins speak volumes about the unsolved problems in economic policy, its application, and the absence of a marketing concept. They also speak to continued political problems, ones in large measure assignable to the inability and/or unwillingness to change the political cultures of the new post-Communist institutions, and the latter's ineffectiveness in contributing to changing that culture. Thus, a more apt title to the book would be, Romania: Transition to What?

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This book is unique in many ways, one of which being that the author uses Finnish but not Russian sources except for the English language version of
International Affairs, published by the Russian foreign ministry; but this quibble in no way detracts from an excellent piece of work.

The author's subject transcends the relationship between the two countries, important as that may be for the history of Europe and the world. It is both a "traditional" geopolitical-realist view and one encompassing post-Cold War issues like trade, economic ties, and the environment. Russia increasingly abets Finnish ties with its northwest, out of design to connect to global markets and out of necessity given its currently reduced military state.

I will digress to discuss the "Winter War" of 1939/1940 that the author mentions to add some historical context because it will forever affect Finland's relations with its reduced but still large neighbor. Finland, according to Weinberg in A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, responded to a Soviet attack to secure its flank in the twilight era between the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 and the German assault on the U.S.S.R. of June 1941 by trying to get diplomatic support from Germany, its erstwhile ally; but the latter had promised Finland to the Soviet Union to repay Soviet favors in the war against Britain and wanted the swift Russian victory which Stalin assumed. The Germans did not like the fighting because it threatened to reduce the flow of Soviet supplies they received. The possibility of British and French intervention against the U.S.S.R. also made most unlikely what would have amounted to a German invasion to defend them against Moscow. Britain and France would strike indirectly against Hitler by helping Finland because such an action would reduce the aid that Moscow could give to Germany. The Finns lost territory but preserved their independence and sovereignty at a fearful cost.

But what does "independence" mean in relation to Russia, even in the latter's weakened state? The old Cold War term "Finlandization" comes to mind, a fate that Washington sought to prevent in Western Europe to avoid the pattern of East European vassalage to Moscow, a prime reason for the Marshall Plan and NATO. Speaking in the context of the developing Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy equated Cuba with Finland. According to Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy 1958-1963, Kennedy told Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law, that while he had "no intention" of invading Cuba he had told Allen Dulles that "You should learn from the Russians. When they did not like things in Finland, the president of that country goes to visit the Soviet premier in Siberia and all is worked out. But you, Dulles, have never been capable of doing that." He in effect told the Soviets to "back off" from supporting a country that was in the U.S. "sphere" as Finland was in Moscow's.

But what was "Finlandization"? In Austin's view the Finns were aware of Soviet security concerns on the western frontier, that "the continuation of its existence as an independent sovereign state depended primarily on the maintenance of friendly relations with the Soviet Union." (p. 1)

But Finland was not a vassal state. The Soviet ambassador in the Cold War years, Viktor Vladimirov, with the help of the KGB and the Soviet Communist Party assisted the process of misinformation and lies to influence presidential elections and destroy hostile coalitions that were regarded as