of Transnistria's industries were operating. Odessa even became a popular tourist destination for Romanians, "something like Nice," in the words of one Soviet novelist. Dallin is careful to note, however, that some of the relative prosperity resulted simply from the fact that the number of inhabitants in the region had declined substantially.

After news of Stalingrad filtered into the city, no one believed that Romanian rule could hold out indefinitely. Pro-Soviet nostalgia resurfaced, more in Odessa than in the countryside, Dallin believes. Even so, the absence of significant partisan activity in the region remained an embarrassment for the Soviet government once it restored its control.

Treatment of Transnistria's Jews is given relatively little attention in this study. Two-thirds of Odessa's 175,000 Jews had been evacuated before the Romanians arrived. About 20,000 Jews were slaughtered initially, and by 1943 only 54 Jews were living legally in the city. Bucharest sought to drive all of its Jews into Soviet territory, and the forced exit of 110,000 Jews from Bucovina and Bessarabia resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Gradually the Romanian government backed away from its genocidal mode and toward the end of 1943 permitted Jews to return to Romania. Dallin suggests that pressure from the Queen Mother and the Church had some impact here, but after Stalingrad Bucharest also sensed the importance of a good-will gesture toward the Allies.

Dallin apparently studied Romanian occupation policy while preparing his monograph, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1944, which appeared in 1957. Unfortunately, he did not have access to uncensored Soviet memoirs, Soviet archival materials, or to Romanian accounts, official or unofficial. Thus, although Odessa, 1941-1944 is published by the Center for Romanian Studies, it sheds little light on the motives and politics of the Romanians themselves. What it does provide is another chapter in the colorful history of Odessa, which has attracted more scholarly attention than any other provincial Imperial Russian or Soviet city. As Dallin points out in a brief preface to the 1998 edition, in its flourishing service sector, corruption and banditry, ambivalence about politics, and domination by a small elite of nouveaux riches, wartime Odessa "was a remarkable forerunner of what we would now characterize as the values and attitudes of post-Soviet urban life" (p. 11).

Michael F. Hamm


Elena Zubkova's detailed and compelling Russia After the War is a groundbreaking survey of the post-war period that focuses on the Soviet Union's failure to embrace reform at two key junctures: 1945-46 and 1956. Using newly accessible archival materials such as letters to the Central Committee and various editorial boards, and governmental surveys of public opinion, in addition to memoirs, interviews, and literature, Zubkova explores "the relationship of the public to the government and its
policies” (p. 5). She seeks to explain why the population accepted the repressive post-war policies of Stalin and his successors despite the hopes created by victory in World War II, and why the Soviet people did not construct an effective opposition that would have advanced reforms.

In each of the four sections of the book, Zubkova sets her analysis of the psychological mindset of the people against the backdrop of the specific social conditions and political trends of the period. Her first section considers the psychological origins of the hope for liberalization after the war and the profound material deprivation of the immediate post-war period. Zubkova explores how the state’s decision to reassert control over the collective farms led to the devastating famine of 1946-47 that took two million lives and how turmoil caused by the currency reform of 1947 inspired the population’s distrust of reform. In the second section of the book, Zubkova documents the dissatisfaction and alternative thinking of various groups in society including peasants, religious believers, and the intelligentsia. According to Zubkova, despite pockets of dissatisfaction among the generally patient and exhausted population, a social consensus was reached in the immediate post-war years because of “the government’s unwillingness to engage in bold reforms and the people’s willingness to temporize” (p. 98).

The third section of the book focuses on nascent post-war dissent in 1947-48, including the activities of anti-Stalinist youth groups and intellectual non-conformists, and how the government resorted to terror and repression in order to destroy it. Here Zubkova discusses all of the major ideological campaigns from the anti-cosmopolitan campaign to the Doctor’s Plot. In the last section, Zubkova shows how reformist and oppositional sentiments came out into the open after Stalin’s death. Zubkova argues that during the Thaw, a public opinion formed, articulated new ideas about the role of the individual and private life, and identified the failures of Soviet bureaucracy. She discusses how Khrushchev’s secret speech called forth not only reformist sentiments from the population but also opposition from those who were apprehensive about embarking on reforms. The author characterizes 1957 as a watershed year in which Khrushchev retreats from the possibilities of reform that he opened up in 1956. She believes that the government’s subsequent focus on improved material conditions instead of political and economic reform ultimately led to the downfall of the Soviet system.

Although Zubkova’s admirable and readable work sheds great light on the post-war era, it has some weaknesses. Much of Zubkova’s argument about the post-war period is an implicit comparison to the years before 1945, yet she often fails to provide sufficient context about the 1930s and the war years. For example, she dates the return to Russian national motifs to wartime rather than the late 1930s; and in her discussion of the dissatisfaction of collective farmers in the immediate post-war years, she fails to mention the government’s toleration of private agricultural markets during the war. Zubkova’s assertion that the social psychology of the war led to the formation of post-war dissent cannot be proven without a greater awareness of public opinion and dissent in the 1930s and during the war.

Zubkova’s commendable attempt to analyze public opinion is, of course, limited by her sources, which predominantly relate to the intelligentsia. Although Zubkova