In fact, Fish's argument could have benefited from the balanced approach that Hanson adopts in his chapter, in which he admits that the pull of a "return to Europe"—both in a contemporary institutional sense and in a cultural-historical sense—is a significant factor driving consolidation of democratic institutions in the post-communist states closer to the European Union. Although his chapter generally argues for a definition of consolidation based on elites' conformity with democratic institutions rather than on society-wide commitment to democratic norms, Hanson ultimately relies on this admission of an historical affinity between Central/ Eastern and Western Europe in order to explain the relative lack of consolidated democratic institutions in the states of the former Soviet Union, compared to the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Despite these areas of inconsistency, *Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy* is an excellent collection of work that is committed to bringing studies of post-communist regimes into the mainstream of social science discussion.

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Both of these books employ quantitative methodologies to address a topic of wide interest to social scientists: the interrelationship between economic conditions and political democracy in the post-communist world. Both also challenge the simplistic "Washington consensus" argument that democratic practices undermine economic reform efforts, demonstrating instead that economic, political, and cultural factors have interacted with each other in far more complicated ways in post-communist states. Nørgaard's book, however, is more theoretically and methodologically compelling than Broderick's.

Broderick's study asks "what are the effects of economic policy, economic conditions, and economic perceptions upon citizens' support for the new democracies?" (p. 2). She employs Easton's "general political system model" to synthesize what she calls "Culturalist" and "Policy Outputs" approaches. Through this model, she derives four general hypotheses about economic conditions and satisfaction with democracy. For example, the first hypothesis states: "If the level of economic reform increases, then satisfaction with democracy decreases" (pp. 24-25). She uses data from the Central and East European Eurobarometer survey, general economic indicators, and the EBRD economic reform index to test these hypotheses statistically. While she finds that, overall, "citizen perception of well-being [rather than actual economic conditions] is the most important element influencing political support" (p. 2), six countries exhibited either significantly higher or lower satisfaction with democracy than the model predicted. Broderick then attempts to explain this variation by devoting the bulk of the book to an examination of the varying
political cultures in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Russia. In doing so, she finds that "political culture can hinder or assist democratic consolidation" (p. 2).

While Broderick's book asks interesting questions, its attempts to answer them suffer from serious limitations. For instance, although the statistical analysis covers eighteen post-communist states, it does not take their varying initial economic conditions into account. Similarly, while the analysis purports to measure public satisfaction with "democracy," it fails to define democracy or recognize that the type and quality of democracy might vary among the states in question. Indeed, she states that "I assume that most democratic political institutions have been established . . . . it is reasonable to argue that these states are functioning democracies" (p. 28) without defending this claim. As a result, her decision to use political culture as a residual variable to explain her unexpected variance in public satisfaction with democracy seems premature. The data in this study also leave something to be desired. The statistical analysis ends with 1994 (six years before the book's publication date), while the four case study chapters on political culture employ neither field research nor foreign language sources.

In contrast, Nørgaard's book offers a more sophisticated and carefully designed quantitative investigation of the relationship between economic development and democracy in the post-communist world. He states that "the primary concern is to explain why some but not other countries have been able to establish economic institutions that are conducive to economic growth and welfare, while at the same time consolidating democracy" (p. 2). Using statistical data on twenty post-communist countries through 1997, Nørgaard examines how initial conditions, strategies of institutional change, social and economic costs, and political responses and institutions affected changes in economic institutions. He begins by looking at both first-order (communist-era) and second-order (pre-communist) initial conditions, finding that initial levels of economic modernization and economic distortion (e.g., repressed inflation or monopolization) significantly constrain possible institutional development strategies.

Nørgaard next examines how, given these initial constraints, specific reform strategies and other factors either aided or impeded economic progress. In doing so, he focuses especially on four "overachievers" (Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, and Mongolia) and two "underachievers" (Belarus and Turkmenistan) in economic reform as predicted by initial conditions. He gives much of the credit (or blame) to unusual popular support (or lack of it) for market institutions in these countries, and argues that when popular support for the market becomes "activated" through participatory democracy, it has a transformative capacity. In short, his ultimately devastating quantitative critique of the neo-liberal Washington consensus argues that initial conditions matter and that democracy helps rather than hinders reform efforts. Democratization and economic reform thus feed on each other in a virtuous circle that allows a country to break its bonds with the past. At the same time, however, he warns that reform policies must be both economically viable and democratically feasible in order to succeed.

Nørgaard's book excels in demonstrating the central role of initial conditions in setting the stage for reform. His careful elucidation and measurement of the various factors that comprise "initial conditions" should be emulated, and his conclusions about their role in reform efforts are both subtle and convincing. The book is somewhat less effective in explaining why some countries did unexpectedly better or worse than their initial con-