Kravchuk’s book has many strong points. First, Kravchuk has done the field a great service by assembling a considerable amount of data on various aspects of Ukraine’s economy in one place. For this reason alone, his book is likely to become the definitive source on Ukraine’s first decade of economic development. Second, as noted earlier, Kravchuk is to be commended for simultaneously analyzing so many dimensions of Ukraine’s economy. \textit{Ukrainian Political Economy} is a comprehensive piece of scholarship. Third, Kravchuk does a first-rate job of integrating political and economic factors to explain Ukraine’s current economic condition. Fourth, in spite of detailing lots of negative economic news, Kravchuk builds on recent signs of economic growth in Ukraine to offer hopeful prescriptions for the future. Ukrainian practitioners would be wise to review Kravchuk’s suggestions for addressing the many persistent symptoms of the flagging economy.

If \textit{Ukrainian Political Economy} has a flaw, it is the absence of substantial synthesis. Ukraine’s economy, like all of the economies of the post-Soviet nations, is complex, and the causes of its failings are complicated. Kravchuk does yeoman’s work in investigating so many aspects of the post-independence Ukrainian economy, but \textit{Ukrainian Political Economy} would be stronger if at various points – particularly the conclusion – Kravchuk stepped back and used his considerable scholarly acumen to provide a synthesis across his chapters, an explanation about how the various dimensions of the economy connect and are related. The trick for reformers and analysts is often abstracting from the minutiae first to identify where to begin the reform process (i.e., is it monetary stabilization? reducing the size of the state? addressing corruption?), and then to determine how steps taken in one area of the economy will likely affect other areas. However, the absence of such synthesis can be forgiven given the rigor of Kravchuk’s analysis. Each separate chapter and relate.\textup{'} appendixes is a concise yet thorough piece of analytical scholarship on what ails a particular dimension of Ukraine’s economy. In sum, \textit{Ukrainian Political Economy: The First Ten Years} is a must read for those who hope to understand Ukraine’s economic freefall over the last decade, as well as to identify the prospects for future reform and growth.


Abetted by their in-depth knowledge of Ukrainian society and politics, the ten contributing authors of this book employ an eclectic range of international relations theories to explain Ukraine’s foreign and security policy since 1991. Ukraine as it emerges from their collaborative analysis is a country driven by forces somewhat unique among states in the twenty-first century but very similar to those influencing the foreign and security policies of other post-Soviet countries since 1991. For the authors, Ukraine exemplifies a new reality affecting the foreign and security policy of the post-
Soviet countries and requiring a revision of conventional wisdom and paradigms about the normal foreign-policy behavior and motivations of states.

A common underlying theme in all twelve chapters in this book is the conundrum of Ukraine's foreign and security policy since 1991, bedeviled by oscillating, inconsistent, and even contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the political leadership and Ukrainian economic-political elites spanning the presidencies of Kravchuk and Kuchma have consistently pursued a linkage of the country's identity and future with Western Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures. Ukraine's foreign-policy goals from this tendency are clearly evident through its special-status membership in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, annual joint military exercises with the United States, military participation with the US-led occupation force in Iraq, and aspirations to obtain full NATO and European Union membership. Classic realism as a paradigm in international relations theory would dictate that a weaker state like Ukraine must form alliances in countering an imminent threat to its national security from a powerful neighboring state like Russia. Classic idealism as a paradigm in international relations theory would anticipate a natural tendency for Ukraine to seek an identity and alliance with a democratic West to promote those same democratic values and institutions within Ukraine since independence. This European orientation derives more from Ukraine's national identity crisis and fear of Russia than from any real commitment on the part of the corrupt and authoritarian leadership of the country to model itself as an emerging European democracy. Russia's inability psychologically to accept Ukraine's independence (Ukraine as Russia's "Little Brother" syndrome) also fuels this pro-European realism of the Ukrainian leadership. [only illustrated by the 2003 conflict over a dam construction by Russia in the entrance to the Azov Sea bordering both countries and claimed to various degrees by both countries as their waterway.]

On the other hand, the very same Ukrainian political leadership has also pursued a pro-Slavic Eurasianist policy and rhetorically claimed its special "strategic partnership" with Russia. This orientation is evident in Ukraine's selective participation in various programs of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (chaired in 2003 by Ukraine's President Kuchma). It is a pro-Slavic common thrust in Ukrainian foreign policy grounded in the large percentage of the Ukrainian population with strong cultural and historical feelings of commonality with Russia, promoted by self-interested Ukrainian political-economic oligarchs benefiting from their ties to Russian oligarchs, and necessitated by Ukraine's continuing heavy energy, trade, and debt dependency on Russia.

In their attempts to explain this duality and almost inherent schizophrenia in Ukraine's foreign and security policy, the authors scan a wide range of issue-areas and levels of analysis: civil-military relations in Ukraine (James Sherr, Stacy Closson); political parties, left-right divisions, and public opinion (Taras Kuzio, Mikhail Molchanov, Victor Chudowsky); Ukraine's participation in the anti-Russian GUUAM alliance among CIS countries (Jennifer Moroney and Sergei Konoplyov); integration and cooperation with Poland (Joshua Spero); the influence of economic oligarchs on fluctuations in pro-European or pro-Eurasianist tendencies (Tor Bukkvoll); and high-level political corruption (Kuchmagate) and the counterpart of a more assertive Russian leadership under President Putin (Mikhail Molchanov). The pro-European orient-