chapter—by Marjorie Mandelstam Blazer, Nicolia N. Petro, and Lawrence Robertson—argues that significant fragmentation has occurred in Russia over the politics of culture. Language policy in particular has been handled quite differently in the thirty-five non-Russian-based subekty (the republics and okrugi) than within the Russian-based units. There are also marked differences that the authors attribute to variations in elite politics. The final chapter, on globalization, analyzes both the component governments' varied participation in global affairs and their attempts to influence national Russian foreign policy. Its authors also consider the impact on Russia’s regions of three sets of foreign actors: private actors (including multinational corporations), foreign governments, and multilateral organization. The authors then differentiate between those regions that are greatly affected by globalization and those that are less affected. They then conclude that while globalization can partially emancipate regions from the center, it also entails a loss of local control. Their final warning is that while globalization can be an opportunity to attract foreign interest and investment, it has also provided a means to move assets abroad.

The main strength of this study is the consistency of its authors’ emphasis on the factors that have caused the fragmentation of Russia. This leads to the most comprehensive consideration of Russia’s fragmentation and the clearest understanding of the depth and breadth of the fragmenting processes of any volume yet published. Ironically, however, the book was published simultaneous with the early stages of President Putin’s initial attempts to reverse the fragmentation of Russia. Thus unfortunately, it cannot deal with some of his more serious subsequent attempts to reverse fragmentation, such as the introduction of a law restricting Russia’s languages to Cyrillic alphabets and his proposal to replace locally elected governors with those appointed by the federal government. Whether these, and a plethora of other developments, can slow or even reverse the fragmentation of space in the Russian Federation will undoubtedly be the focus of numerous future studies. Yet the depth of fragmentation documented in this volume raises the possibility that Russia’s fragmentation is too advanced to be completely reversed even by Putin’s efforts to reassert central control of Russia.

Daniel R. Kempton
Northern Illinois University


As the Soviet Union was collapsing, weakened central control created new opportunities for political contention within Russia’s regions. There was great variation across Russia in the success of the challenges to local governing elites. According to Gorenburg, this variation cannot be adequately explained by focusing solely on elite talent for manipulating popular support. Rather it was long extant institutions that shaped which elites could step forward, how they could get their message out to potential activists and what types of appeals would motivate individuals to participate in a social movement. Where the requisite institutional base was lacking, as was the case
for pro-democracy advocates, there was greatly reduced capacity to build and sustain a movement. The nationalists, in contrast, drew their strength from a Soviet legacy that afforded them ample organizational resources as well as a unifying sense of collective identity. After the pro-democracy movement had helped foster a climate more conducive to political activism, nationalists entered the stage to make demands by using the resources at their disposal in novel ways. During perestroika, they "sought to create a state that was socialist in form, but nationalist in content, turning the old Soviet slogan on its head" (p. 77; emphasis in the original).

The institutional base also explains variation in the strength of different nationalist movements: "[T]he number and density of ethnic institutions in a region determines the strength of nationalist sentiment in the region" (p. 18). Administrative status was of crucial importance. Ethnic groups that had a titular autonomous republic within Russia had far more developed ethnic institutions than those with autonomous provinces. The book tests this explanation of movement strength by a close and systematic study of the institutions, movement participation and public opinion in Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Bashkoroston, and Khakassia. Gorenburg examines the period from the emergence of nationalist movements in 1987, through the 1989-91 peak of protests and electoral victories, to the near total loss of support by 1994.

An important contribution of the book is the application of sociological theory of social movements to the case of Russia. This theory can explain the incidence of movement activity and how the political climate contributes to success or failure. The theory also concerns the processes by which leadership is formed and participants are recruited. Based on their exposure to Soviet ethnic institutions, Gorenburg argues that the titular ethnic group members most likely to support nationalist goals were migrants, rural inhabitants and intellectuals. He uses multiple regression analysis of public opinion survey data to confirm this, not only in the four regions that are the focus of the book but also in an additional dozen other ethnic regions. The problem here, however, is that equations explain very little (at most only 11 percent, and often far less) of the variation in support for nationalism among those of titular ethnicity. When Gorenburg adds variables to represent ethnicity (as a series of dummy variables), explained variation jumps to nearly 35 percent. This suggests that ethnicity is of great importance, contrary to what he appears to be arguing. There is also a problem of causal direction. Gorenburg assumes that titular language training led to support for nationalism, but to what degree would those who were more nationalist have sought to enter schools where such language training was provided?

The four case studies do show variation in institutional support for ethnic identity, but it is difficult to separate this factor from others that may be shaping nationalism. For example, not only is Khakassia an autonomous province, but it also had an exceedingly low percentage of titular ethnicity. Yet Gorenburg shows that percentage of titular ethnicity was a very important determinant of the likelihood that nationalist goals would ultimately be adopted by local governments. It is also difficult to weigh how much of change and movement organization was due to the diffusion of ideas from one region to another as opposed to similarity in institutions that carried over from the Soviet period. Both Chuvashia and Bashkoristan literally border on Tatarstan. Ideas such as those regarding the legitimacy of a group's exclusive control over