prosecutors, people’s judges and professional jurists and chapter 4 focusing in particular on the crime of denunciation. The in-depth analysis of a showpiece denunciation trial provides some links to the Holocaust, since relations with Jews or intermarried Gentiles was one of the transgressions for which Czechs denounced their fellow-citizens. Chapters 5 and 6 place nationality in the center of the discussion, the former by analyzing “crimes against national honor,” and the latter by relating the process of retribution to the expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s Germans. The “Small Decree” No. 138/1945, establishing the crime of “offenses against national honor,” collapsed citizenship and ethnic identity and retroactively criminalized relationships between Czech and German citizens. The analysis of the expulsion of the Germans shows how, although trials of Germans were used to justify the mass removal of the German population, the “Transfer” itself undermined retributive justice since the government chose to expel thousands of accused Germans rather than risk their remaining in Czechoslovakia after their trials. The seventh chapter discusses the National Court, created to try members of the Protectorate government and other prominent citizens. This court disappointed the communists, because it adopted the domestic resistance’s more lenient interpretation of the wartime situation and refused to accuse the Czech “bourgeoisie” en masse of collaboration. The final chapter follows the story of retribution to and beyond the February coup of 1948, when the communist regime renewed retribution trials, with mixed results.

Frommer’s book is impeccably researched, well organized and argued, and written in a style that is readable without oversimplifying. The subtitle promises more than it delivers, as Frommer’s study is limited only to the Czech provinces, but it should nevertheless benefit not only specialists in Czechoslovakia’s history but also anyone concerned with postwar retribution; and its conclusions may also offer insights into contemporary instances of post-conflict retributive justice.

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*The First Domino* is the first English-language study of the decision-making process concerning the Hungarian crisis of 1956 that has utilized newly available archival collections in the former Eastern-bloc countries. Johanna Granville, a Campbell National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University during the 2003-2004 academic year, has received numerous prestigious fellowships in order to spend many years conducting research in Russian, Hungarian, Polish, Austrian, East German, and U.S. archives. Her thorough and insightful research has resulted in a volume that will be welcomed by scholars, policymakers, and students of Hungarian, Eastern European, and Cold War history.

The main audience of this book is U.S. policymakers and representatives, as the focus of the narrative is on decision making. Granville points out at the beginning that the Hungarian revolution of 1956 is a central event for Hungarian history, somewhat equivalent to the American Revolution, Civil War, or Vietnam War for Americans. Therefore, a basic understanding of what happened in 1956 is necessary for U.S. policymakers and diplomats in order to build rapport with Hungarian officials.
Granville has written a book on the decision-making process of political elites by focusing on the crisis of 1956 in Hungary as a case study. The underlying model of the book is the work of Robert Jervis mainly concerning misperceptions in the decision-making process. Granville spells out the four most common misperceptions in the preface and again in the conclusion, such as the decision maker’s desire to see a coherent pattern and therefore assumes that the behavior of others is more centralized, planned, and coordinated than it actually is. The rest of the book provides evidence within Jervis’s model.

Another aspect of Granville’s methodology that makes her work unique is her ability to focus on both internal and external factors in policy decisions. She admits that foreign policy analysts often oscillate between these two orientations when explaining foreign policy, yet she is able to provide evidence of both, allowing her to overcome the common divide between adherents of a “macroanalytic approach” and a “microanalytic approach.” The story is not just about Hungary or about the Soviet Union’s influence on Hungary, but rather it includes discussions of the actions of other Warsaw Pact countries as well as the United States.

The first chapter is a study about the roots of the conflict, a focus on the internal factors. Granville points out that Hungary had a distinctly anti-Soviet, or for that matter an anti-Russian past. Hungary had been invaded by the Russians in 1848 and had been a historical rival of the Russians over the Balkans. Hungary’s former alliance with Nazi Germany, its monarchical past, and the belated influence of communism in the interwar year, as well as its very different culture and language, also distanced it from the Soviet Union and other neighboring Slavic states. In this context Granville argues, “Hungary’s historic hostility influenced its [the Soviet leadership’s] decision to apply force in response to the 1956 revolution.” (p. 10)

Before discussing the two Soviet invasions in the autumn of 1956, Granville also describes various external factors. She admits that before the opening of the communist bloc archives in the early 1990s most scholars analyzed the Hungarian, as well as the Polish, crises of 1956 from the Soviet point of view. This usually resulted in a focus on the internal factors in one specific satellite and its relationship with the Soviet Union. Granville has enhanced this picture by also looking at the relation of external factors coming from countries such as Poland and Yugoslavia to Hungary in 1956. In this context she also argues that the problems in Hungary had been festering over a longer period than those in Poland that led to the Poznan uprising in that country. The biggest problem for Hungary was Rákosi’s tenacious hold on power.

In her description of the decisions that led to, resulted in, and accompanied the crisis of 1956 in Hungary, Granville also finds room for the United States. Again, unlike most accounts of 1956, which do not give much attention to the United States, Granville provides a separate chapter. The United States’ psychological warfare and covert activities in Eastern Europe in the 1950s, which may have blinded the Kremlin leaders, may have indirectly caused the 1956 uprising. This refers to the activity by Radio Free Europe as well as of American leaders. Dulles’s speech a day before the crucial October 28 Presidium in the Soviet Union, which assured Khrushchev that the U.S. did not consider Eastern European countries as potential military allies, may explain some of Khrushchev’s waverings regarding using military force or not. Granville argues, however, that “had the United States issued a convincing military, perhaps even nuclear, threat at that critical moment of hesitation in the Soviet Presidium, the Soviet decision makers might have been deterred from intervening.” (p. 214)

This thorough and well-written book will be of use not only for policymakers and diplomats interested in one of the major events of modern Hungarian history; it will appeal