Unmasking several interesting counterfactuals and inconsistencies in the moral economy thesis, Wegren makes the case for rural adaptation based on empirical analysis of a wealth of agricultural data as well as surveys of rural residents. These data demonstrate that a significant element of the Russian countryside has been able to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the reform policies. Not surprisingly, farm managers have been the most adept at doing so. Possessing greater cognitive skills, they have become among the most successful in the post-communist period, particularly following the 1998 Ruble Crisis, which had the effect of making Russian cities more dependent on rural Russia for food supplies. Rural households and private farmers have also done fairly well as a group. However, they lack the advantages of economy of scale enjoyed by large farms. Hence, they have gravitated away from food production and toward the provision of rural and agricultural services. Since the advent of the Putin Administration in particular and the state’s subsequent re-engagement in rural Russia, large farms have become increasingly more productive and profitable. However, the advances have not been across the board. Those that are better managed do better.

Wegren’s arguments are very much in line with a new wave of scholarship that takes a more balanced view of the impact of the reform period. Instead of addressing Russian society as a mass, studies such as Wegren’s disaggregate it. The result is a much more nuanced and accurate view of Russian politics, the country’s economy, and Russian society. These studies recognize that while there are those who have not been able to keep up with the pace of reform, many have. As a result, Russia has experienced the emergence of social stratification, economic differentiation, and a class system. While all of this is reflected in a more vibrant society and economy, it has not produced a healthy party system under-girded by a civil society. Putin’s manipulation of the Yeltsin era constitution has retarded the emergence of these institutions. The social and economic base for democracy is in place, but it will take a leader less intent on managing democracy before democracy emerges.

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Steven Rosefielde. *Russia in the 21st Century: The Prodigal Superpower*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xxi, 244 pp. $70.00 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).

This book revisits some old issues and addresses some current questions. Rosefielde reviews his earlier arguments with Abram Bergson and the CIA concerning the rate of economic growth in the Soviet Union and the magnitude of Soviet military expenditures. He contends that the growth of the Soviet economy from the mid-1930s onward was slower than estimated by most economists in the West and that the economy was characterized by “structural militarization,” which was reflected in the commitment of an exceptional share of the country’s resources to the military. Rosefielde believes that the CIA underestimated Soviet military spending for many years and that most Western economists of the post-Stalin decades were overly optimistic about the Soviet system’s
capacity to raise living standards while restraining the demands of the military-industrial complex. He goes so far as to assert that "the only economic success the Kremlin ever achieved was mass weapons production" (p. 55). That is a bit of an exaggeration, though the general direction of his analysis of the Soviet economy is well grounded.

Rosefielde acknowledges that Russia’s economy has experienced "a profound metamorphosis" (p. 68) in the postcommunist period, but cautions that the appearance of a market system in contemporary Russia is deceiving. He argues that elements of a market economy have been synthesized with distinctive Russian features that represent the legacy of "the Muscovite model" (p. 68), which is characterized by autocratic political control, patrimonialism, and rent granting. His analysis of the distortions that emerged during Boris Yeltsin’s "shock therapy" is one of the strong points of the book. Thus he concludes that widespread reports of the transformation of Russia’s economy into a competitive market system, which were accepted by the "Washington consensus" (p. 83), were based on wishful thinking. This reviewer agrees with Rosefielde’s assessment that in terms of economic efficiency, productivity, and technological advancement, the potential of the "Muscovite model" that prevails in Russia is “inherently inferior” (p. 105). Yet recently, there have been signs that the Putin administration is intensifying the government’s control over major enterprises in strategic sectors of the economy.

More dubious, however, is Rosefielde’s assertion that the government of Russia will attempt to rebuild its military forces to regain the superpower status achieved by the USSR, and is likely to have considerable success in competing with the USA in that effort. He expects that Russia “will gradually devote more and more resources to building a full-spectrum, fifth-generation arsenal that will provide a credible challenge to the West” (p. 116). That scarcely seems like a realistic prospect in view of Russia’s relatively modest economic base, which in 2003 yielded a gross domestic production less than one-eighth of that of the USA, and smaller than that of Italy, or for that matter less than the gross product of the state of California (according to data from The World Almanac for 2005). The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual publication, The Military Balance, 2004-2005, estimates Russian military spending in 2003 to have been about 16 percent of that of the USA. Leaders of the Russian military-industrial complex such as Iurii Koptev have continued to complain that the decline in funding of their country’s military after the disintegration of the USSR has led to a sharp decrease in the number of people employed in the defense industry and has forced the military to rely on technology largely inherited from the Soviet Union. Many Western experts, including Dale Herspring, describe the general condition of the Russian military services in negative, if not alarming, terms. Rosefielde himself admits that in the early 1990s Russian arms production dropped about 90 percent in “a couple of years” (p. 64), and that there was a “negligible rate of new arms acquisitions in the period 1991-2002” in Russia (p. 96). Most crucially, as Rosefielde recognizes (p. 100), the persistence of the “Muscovite model” will restrict the potential for Russian economic development in such a way as to make it very unlikely that the Russian Federation will be able to compete in technology well enough to keep up with the USA in revolutions in military affairs. Though Russia’s economic growth has improved substantially during the last several years, and funding for the military is gradually recovering, that country at best