analysis of the end of the Cold War that might help both analysts and policymakers, as they attempt to understand complex future international developments. He notes that, in order to do more than draw upon history to reinforce stereotypes, on must first develop a clear and careful strategy for learning from history that accounts for sequencing, variation, and the possibility of falsification.

In conclusion, the editors and authors of Ending the Cold War are to be commended for providing us with a theoretically-grounded and empirically rich examination of the most important set of developments in the final years of the twentieth century, but developments that were virtually unforeseen by those engaged in international politics and diplomacy and those committed to interpreting and understanding the international system. Scholars and students of international relations, as well as those involved in the policy process, who (as the reviewer until quite recently) have not examined this important book will profit from reading it.

Roger E. Kanet
University of Miami


Russia’s failure to develop strong political parties leading to a consolidated democracy constitutes the focus of two superb and sophisticated studies written respectively by Henry Hale and Regina Smyth. These works are immersed in the theoretical party literature in political science, and they utilize empirical evidence and sophisticated statistical techniques, while drawing on an in-depth understanding of Russia. Interestingly, they reach different conclusions. Citing the creation of United Russia as a presidential party, Hale sees this as an important step in the creation of party dominated elections with the prospect of future democratic development. Smyth finds little party development during the 1990s, a finding with which Hale is in general agreement, but views the emergence of United Russia as part of an “authoritarian infrastructure . . . a dominant state party” (p. 70) offering little solace for those hoping for further democratic consolidation.

These two excellent studies reach such different conclusions because they frame their research differently. This is not a matter of viewing the same glass – half empty or half full. Rather, it depends heavily upon whether Hale’s analysis based on electoral evidence and mass surveys can draw in-
ferences which are more convincing than those found by Smyth based upon candidate surveys supplemented by mass opinion surveys.

Both authors adopt a soft rational choice approach with its attention to collective action and social choice. Hale and Smyth to a large extent agree on what needs to be explained. Each notes that for a democratic system to emerge there must be cooperation and coordination between political groups and candidates, widespread information, and resources. They also agree that the legacy of communism and the nature of the transition affected political outcomes, particularly through influencing the political context and the distribution of resources. However, they view the actual results of these processes somewhat differently. What really distinguishes the two studies is how their authors explain the failure of a party system to emerge in the 1990s and whether it is likely to develop in the future. To address these issues Hale and Smyth offer different arguments focused on different actors – political parties and candidates – and employ different types of evidence to support their conclusions.

Hale views the parties' choices of campaign strategy as critical. He employs the logic of the market with supply and demand determining whether parties or party substitutes, such as financial-industrial-groups (FIGs) or Governor's (or Republic President's) political machines, can fulfill the needs of candidates to get elected. His research examines electoral evidence from the national legislative, presidential, and provincial (oblast and republic) level elections. At the national level parties, although weak through the 1990s, begin to gain strength under Putin. At the provincial level, only intervention by the Kremlin in changing the electoral rules undermines the strength and independence of FIGs and Governors' and Republican Presidential political machines.

For Smyth, the heart of the puzzle is explained directly by candidates' choices. Smyth analyzes the choices made by candidates based on her own 1995 and 1999 surveys of them. She explores this directly by analyzing the candidates' own perceptions and explanations of why they chose to run, to associate themselves with a party, to run on a party list for the Duma or in a Single Member District, and to stand for election in a particular region. She finds that candidates emphasized their personal attributes and independence in order to maximize their own interests. According to her, electoral infrastructure such as parties failed to emerge because of individual candidate choice, not a failure in party campaign strategy. In the end, she concludes that what was rational for individual candidates was not conducive to party formation. This leads us to the core differences in how the two authors use evidence to support their arguments.

Hale believes that strategic choices are essential, but these choices are made by parties or party leaders. As background for his statistical analysis, he provides a very useful synopsis of political parties in Russia and their campaign strategies. To test his market theory of elections, he analyzes elec-