Paul D’Anieri (ed.)

Orange Revolution and Its Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine.

Massive street protests in 2004 in Ukraine that became known as the Orange Revolution led to the overturning of fraudulent presidential election results, accession of pro-western Viktor Yushchenko to presidency, and widespread expectations of rapid democratization, westernization, and socio-economic advances of the country. As these hopes failed to materialize, the growing body of literature developed to explain massive mobilization in 2004 and its immediate success, as well as failure of the expectations spurred by the Orange Revolution. This volume, edited by one of the leading scholars of post-Soviet Ukrainian politics, brings together an impressive group of international scholars of Ukraine writing from multidisciplinary perspectives who explore the rise and decline of civil society mobilization in Ukraine and the apparent failure of civil society to reinvigorate Ukrainian democracy after 2004. Theoretical introduction by D’Anieri, plus ten chapters, bring primary empirical research and innovative theoretical arguments to bear on three broad questions outlined in the introductory chapter. Why did Ukrainians rebel in 2004? What is the relationship between citizens, groups, elites, and the state? What role does identity have in influencing civil society and protest? The book is divided in two parts, with six chapters looking at social mobilization before and during the Orange Revolution, and four chapters exploring questions about civil society after 2004.

Theoretical introduction by D’Anieri hones in on the puzzle of why Ukrainian civil society, widely considered weak prior to 2004, showed massive resurgence in 2004, and afterwards again subsided quickly. The chapter contains useful summary of several traditional theoretical approaches to civil society in political science, and outlines aims, structure, and empirical and theoretical contributions of the book and of each of the chapters. Even though the book, as D’Anieri states, “stresses debate over consensus” (p. 4), and chapter authors at times reach competing conclusions, the editor’s introduction effectively pulls together common strands and questions explored in individual chapters.

The six chapters comprising the first part of the book explore causes of social mobilization during the Orange Revolution. Some chapters put emphasis on the importance of elites, some see the societal processes as centrally important, and all explore the interaction between the two. In the first chapter, Joshua Tucker argues that massive participation in protests challenging an abusive regime was enabled by large electoral fraud which helped solve col-
lective action problem that prevents protests at other times. Electoral fraud, Tucker argues, changes the cost/benefit calculation of individual protesters, reducing the fear of participation and raising the likelihood of success. If Tucker focuses on the motivations of individual protesters, the following two chapters by Tammy Lynch and Ioulia Shukan explain the success of 2004 protests by highlighting the role of opposition elites and the actions of these elites in the years and months preceding the Orange Revolution. Lynch shows how opposition elites' strategies, tactics, and lessons learned from earlier protests during 2000–2004 “played an essential role in preparing society for the presidential elections and ensuing protests.” (p. 48) Shukan similarly concludes that to understand the success of the 2004 mobilization we have to look at protest mobilization strategies developed and honed by Yushchenko's campaign team in the months preceding the elections. Shukan also finds that the strategies employed were elaborated domestically and not “based on exported technologies.” (p. 79) The chapter by Anna Fournier shifts the focus from the elites back to the society. Drawing on thirty-two interviews with participants in the Orange Revolution protests, the chapter inquires into individual motivations of the protesters. If Tucker sees the people rising because massive electoral fraud reduced the costs and increased the likelihood of success of such participation, Fournier finds that protesters were primarily motivated by desires to restore “order.” The definitions of this “order” as understood by the protesters, according to Fournier, included elements of both Soviet past and visions of Western modernity, and were strongly tied to economic stability and welfare expectations. The state-society, or mass-elite interaction is explicitly explored in the following two chapters. Lucan Way explores the puzzle of much stronger mobilization against authoritarian rule in Ukraine than in neighboring Belarus that shares many historical, cultural, economic, and institutional similarities with Ukraine. Way argues that divisions over national identity which are stronger in Ukraine make authoritarian control more difficult to establish in Ukraine and facilitate popular mobilization against the incumbent power. Way's chapter examines regime development in Belarus and Ukraine since 1991 and shows how national identity can both undermine and strengthen authoritarian rule. In the chapter that concludes the first part of the book, Serhiy Kudelia analyzes the strategies of the regime and opposition elites to explain when political rivals may compromise and agree on new institutional rules, such as the constitutional reform weakening presidency negotiated during the Orange Revolution. Elite strategies, Kudelia posits, depend on perceptions of each side's relative strength, and this perception can be affected by the strength of societal mobilization. Surveying political conflicts in Ukraine from 2000 to 2004, the chapter identifies “major” and “minor”