munist Party endorsed Lysenko and thereby the controversial theory of heredity by acquired characteristics. In February, 1965, Lysenko lost his position as director of the Institute of Genetics, thus bringing, for the time being, an end to Lysenkoism. It is this period and the twenty years preceding 1948 that Dr. Joravsky treats in his work.

Since 1948 writers on the Lysenko controversy have emphasized the role of Marxist philosophy and its impact upon the science of genetics. But Joravsky discerns another cause beneath the ideological rhetoric. "In the West, Marxist theory has usually been considered the chief source of Lysenkoism, even though the most well-known Lysenkoite writing lay overwhelming stress on agricultural practice as the chief source." This is the central thesis of the book and it is a most controversial one.

The genetics controversy has been linked to two important aspects of Soviet history, the terror and the Zhdanovshchina. The role of A. A. Zhdanov is only mentioned briefly by Joravsky because of the non-ideological emphasis of the work. However, the terror of 1936-39 is treated in depth. A most valuable appendix lists the scientists repressed and their position, pro or con, regarding Lysenkoism. The considerable research of this most scholarly work is evident in its text.

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This is an incisive analysis of twenty-two leading American academic authorities in regard to their evaluative image of Soviet foreign policy. Its model is restricted largely to one important work published between 1959 and 1967 by each specialist. The approach is basically, but not oppressively, quantitative; for in the author's words, he is "half-traditionalist, half-behaviorist." The twenty-two scholars are categorized into archetypal designations, labelled "ultra-hard," "hard" and "mixed," terms which with respect to images of Soviet external conduct speak for themselves. They are given additional picturesque sub-titles: the first is a vision of "the great apocalyptic beast" (egoistic, limitlessly expansionist, militant, militaristic and immoral), the second is called "the mellowing tiger" (expansionist, but limited and changing, intermittent and defensive), and the third is dubbed "the neurotic bear" (withdrawn, reactive, defensive but capable of neurotic response if provoked). Cogent and comprehensible reasons are stated for the specific choice of the twenty-two specialists from a much larger possible number. The author feels those selected have produced the best scholarly American work.

For his own purposes, he has further reduced the number to nine major figures, whose books he subjects to a rather detailed narrative review about equally balanced between exposition and criticism. Three from each category apparently exemplify most vividly each of the three major orientations.

As prototypes of the ultra-hard image he dissects Elliot R. Goodman's, *The Soviet Design for a World State*, Robert Strausz-Hupe's, *Protracted Conflict* and Bertram D. Wolfe's, *Communist Totalitarianism: Keys to the Soviet System*. The "hards" chosen are George Kennan's, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*, Marshall D. Shulman's, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised and
Robert C. Tucker's, *The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change*. The partisans of the "mixed image" (hard and soft) are represented by Michael Gheilen's, *The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods and Motives*, Louis J. Halle's, *The Cold War as History* and Frederick L. Schuman's, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*. These studies are rated on a scale of one to ten with respect to degree of hardness. There are some interesting variables and controls included in the charts as evaluative criteria, i.e., basic dimensions (in terms of types of expansionism, types of militancy and degree of immorality), contextual dimensions (character of initiative, offensiveness of motive and malignancy of impact), and above all, allowance for significant change in the direction of Soviet foreign policy over a long secular period.

The work contains much to recommend it, even for those frightened off by the mere suggestion of jargon involved in data processing as applied to political science. It is generally careful, sophisticated, refined and sensible. Occasionally, it displays a cogent insight into the studies specifically selected for detailed analysis. In evaluating Kennan's *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*, the author observes quite properly that Kennan's ambivalence may be attributed to his contradictory roles as a government consultant and as a mature and objective scholar. One may applaud Professor Welch's caveats with respect to the need for a more precise methodology, a better defined semantic concurrence and fuller factual data for the confirmation of images in this most tendentious area of Sovietology. Through his own efforts to apply rigorous standards of evaluation, he has effectively disposed of such time-honored stereotypes as "the Soviet government seldom adheres to treaties" or that "Soviet external behavior is ineluctably expansionist, intransigent and subversive." He raises interesting questions, such as whether ideology is a reliable indicator of Soviet conduct in every circumstance, or if Soviet propaganda constitutes a legitimate barometer for the judgment and extrapolation of actual policy. He concedes the connection between American academic orthodoxy and the official policy of Washington and is inclined to view long range Russian strategy as pluritoned or multitoned rather than Manichean, conditioned mainly by the traditional exigencies of national interests rather than messianism.

The title of the book is somewhat misleading. Unlike Filene's, *American Views of Soviet Russia*, it is not a sampling of the broad American spectrum, but a narrower concentration on the perspectives of certain members of the academic establishment. The selection is further restricted to one major work of each author, though allowance is made for prior and subsequent variations in attitude. One might question why some works were included and others excluded. We are assured that the works were selected mainly because they represent the best of scholastic probity and what has been generally acceptable. Even if this were true it would mean inclusion of the extent as the proper, or "what is, is right." Furthermore, within the range of studies reflective of general consensus and official American policy, there is a surprising omission of works which have had a more substantive effect in shaping American diplomacy, for example, those of Brzezinski, Rostow, Kissinger and Rush.

On the other side of the ledger, considering the date of publication, the study appears somewhat anachronistic. The academic atmosphere has been so altered in recent years that one finds it difficult not to acknowledge the appearance of many relevant studies embodying a mixed-soft or even soft image. It is true that most of the revisionist analyses stress the deficiencies and alleged culpabilities of American commission, rather than a scrutiny of the Kremlin's.