Mme. Kourilsky reveals the major delays in preparing the federal fundamentals of family law promulgated in 1968 to have been caused by bitter dispute over three issues: the recognition to be given unregistered marriage, the ease with which divorce was to be obtained, and the rights to be given children born out of wedlock. The author finds that many citizens hoped to return to the permissiveness of the 1926 family code which recognized unregistered marriage and unregistered divorce, but a policy of encouraging stability in the family won out, but not wholly. A concession had to be made to the liberalizers on the rights of children of unregistered marriages, in that they were to be recognized as equal to those born of registered marriages if the parents maintained a common home and conducted themselves as man and wife. This means that they once again, as before the revisions of 1944 in the 1926 code, enjoy use of the father's surname, maintenance and inheritance from him. While divorce procedures were simplified, this was done only for childless couples, and a restraining feature was introduced. They could register a divorce without a court proceeding but only after a three month period for reconsideration.

M. Bouremeyster presents the problems raised by an ever increasing number of intellectuals in a society committed to advanced education for all. He finds grave disaffection among peasant youth, one third of whom find little use for their education in a system of agriculture not yet greatly mechanized, and notable dissatisfaction among worker youths where the jobs available seem to the incumbents far inferior to what they have been trained to do. The author concludes that the majority of Soviet youths now possess a level of education higher than required for performance of the tasks assigned them. Even those who obtain jobs classed as "scientific" are displeased, for they find that half their time is consumed by performance of lowly tasks unrelated to their specialization. This is due partly to the shortage of technicians and laboratory assistants, and partly to enforced inactivity caused by the incredible red tape involved in obtaining the consent of superiors to development of the programs on which they are working.

French scholarship on the Soviet Union has sometimes been accused of lagging behind that of the Germans, the English and the North Americans. This volume suggests that such criticism is unjustified, but there is cause for alarm. With the transfer to Paris of Professor and Mme. Lavigne the Strasbourg Institute which produced this volume and led all research in France on the U.S.S.R. could fade away. Scholars outside of France will hope that a way will be found to continue this important series of annuals, for they stimulate French scholarship and provide to the rest of the world a great deal of valuable information and analysis.

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This volume is a revision of a work in Russian written on the R.S.F.S.R. and the U.S.S.R., which was published in 1967. It replaces an outdated handbook
published in German in 1952. The writers of the present German text have modified and updated the 1967 Russian edition through 1968. The present edition may prove acceptable to an East German reading public well versed in the routine of a Stalinist political and economic system.

The achievements of Stalin dominate the entire work, although the leader himself is kept in the background. References to Nikita Khrushchev are conspicuously absent; this reviewer found no mention of Stalin's successor in his reading. Although Ilia Ehrenburg is cited (p. 600) as a talented writer, neither his influential novel The Thaw nor his contributions to the relaxation of tensions in the late 1950's receive the mention and recognition they deserve.

Every effort is made to impress the reader with the "federative" characteristics of the present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (The writers employ both "federation" and "confederation" on page 46, leaving the readers confused.) Thus, several multi-colored charts emphasize the relationships of standing committees and nationalities to the Supreme Soviet. As for the all-important Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it is the Party Congress, not the Politburo, which legislates and executes policy, according to the writers. In fact, while the congresses receive considerable attention, the history, organization, and functions of the far more powerful Politburo receive no attention at all. To avoid the Politburo is to fail to come to grips with political reality; however, to have analyzed this organizational unit would scarcely have added to the "federative" aspects of the U.S.S.R., which the writers wish to convey.

Most of the text is concerned with the general characteristics of the U.S.S.R.; a final third of the work discusses the various regions one by one. Government, history, geology, economics, and culture comprise the main subjects for discussion. Throughout, there are no conclusions which are really new. Within the years of Stalin's major achievements, statistics appear to have more reliability than those cited after 1953.

Statistics for heavy industry, which form the basis for economic discussions in the book, indicate the debt to Stalin and the problems of analyzing industrial output since his death. For example, the listing on page 324 of 48.3 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in 1940 coincides with the statistic given by American economist Harry Schwartz in his Studies on Business Economics. After 1953, however, differences may appear between Soviet goals and economic realities. For instance, the claim in 1958 of 235.3 billion electric kilowatt hours may be exaggerated. Schwartz used the previous year of 1957 to show that output was only 209.5 billion kilowatt hours, 21 billion kilowatt hours under the original target.

Statistics after 1957 may merit careful additional documentation owing to the scrapping of the Sixth Five Year Plan in mid-stage in 1959, with two more years to go, and the substitution of the more ambitious Seven Year Plan. Desired goals were not always able to equal grim results. As for consumer output and the rise in consumer demand since Khrushchev, the work provides no data at all. Consistent with the stress on heavy industry, the authors depict pre-revolutionary Russia (pages 344-54) as having already experienced the transition to industrialization before 1917. Therefore, the Bolsheviks emerge after 1917 at the head of an economically advanced if somewhat war weary nation prepared to lead all other lands in world revolution. This thesis of a highly developed nation before 1917 is accompanied by a de-emphasis of the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1921 through 1927. During NEP, the Bolsheviks were obliged to seek aid from capitalistic Western European nations in order to survive. As for Leon