ARTICLES

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Administering Development and Developing Administration: Organizational Conflict in Tsarist Bureaucracy, 1906-1914

Replies to the query "what makes administration a force for development" vary as varied, complex, and frequently irrelevant to the concrete problems societies confront as have inquiries into the nature of political development more generally.\(^1\) Nevertheless, the past decade has witnessed real progress in successfully marrying cro-theory and micro-applications in studies of political development. Equally significant, a consensus has been reached on a working definition. What distinguishes developing from the non-developing polity is the growing capacity of the former to manage and absorb demands for change via institutional channels; to respond to the range of rising levels of participation; and by means of transforming values to create stores of political capital (legitimacy) against which it will draw in the future.\(^2\)

But once we turn to the issue of what might make public administration within a society either facilitator or obstacle for political development, the waters again become cloudy. Discussions of the administrative component of the development process continue to be plagued by the kinds of difficulties which once hampered the study of political development generally. "Development administration" is still defined by cant but non-operational typologies, by models in which everything appears func-

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tional, or in terms of excessively abstract theories. It is for these reasons that case-study of what makes public administration developmental or non-developmental in a specific historical setting promises refinements in the concept of development administration as well as new historical insights into the situation itself. And it is for these same reasons that the study which follows, dealing as it does with certain facets of administrative behavior in the final years of the Russian autocracy (1906-1917) will also be used to reflect on the nature of development administration more generally.

The backdrop for such a study is provided by two competing models of the kinds of intra-administrative relationships which foster administrative problem solving. Competing models admittedly have a place in illuminating different facets of the same historical experience. But two models seldom prove equally useful in providing insights into a single facet of any case. In studies of state administration and its role in development, this observation takes on particular meaning with regard to the significance attributed to intradministrative conflict.

According to one model of development administration (Model I), the elements in an administrative staff which promote development are precisely those which most closely approximate the rational-bureaucratic ideal-type. From this perspective, state administration promotes development to the extent that it is able to minimize conflict within its staff or to eliminate it altogether. "Good" administration is defined as simulating the modern machine (or factory) in its operations; the emphasis falls on creating hierarchical chains of command, vertical channels of communication, rational planning in the name of systemic goals, and a centralized process of administrat

3. For a discussion of this issue, see Warren Ilichman and Norman Uphoff, The Polit Economy of Change (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 7-25; J. LaPalombara, "Public Administration and Political Change," Empathy and Ideology, ed. Charles Press and Alan Arian (Chicago, 1966), 74-78, 87-95. Ilichman in particular criticizes the major theoretical work on development administration on the following grounds: for kinds of inquiry that fail to factor out either critical variables in linkages or concrete measures which permit the practitioner to think in terms of thresholds; for insufficient attention to methods and ideas which would economize scarce resources as choices are made; and for an inability to relate any critical variables to the quest of increasing organizational productivity in ways which challenge or contravene conventional wisdom. See Comparative Public Administration and "Conventional Wisdom" (Beverly H Calif., 1971), pp. 1-14, 37-45.

4. For the kinds of criteria which case-studies must meet in order to contribute theory construction, see Harry Eckstein, "Case-Study and Theory in Macro-Politics," (Univer of Chicago, Dept. of Pol. Sci., mimeograph); James B. Christoph and Bernard E. Brown, e Cases in Comparative Politics, 2d ed. (Boston, 1969), pp. 3-34; H. Stein, "The Preparation Case Studies," American Political Science Review, XLV (June 1951), 479-480.

5. The formulation which follows draws heavily on the administrative-choice decision-making models Lewis Gawthrop advances in Administrative Politics and Social Cha (New York, 1971), pp. 41-77 and on Clark's discussion of rational-choice versus incremen change development strategies, pp. 201-244.