

## BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTEs RENDUS

Luise Dornemann, *Clara Zetkin: Leben und Wirken*, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1973. 562 pp. M 11, 50.

By the author's own admission, *Clara Zetkin: Leben und Wirken* is neither a definitive nor, in the strictest sense, a scholarly work. Rather, Dornemann has written a popular biography in an effort to make Zetkin better known to a wider circle. This somewhat limits the value of her work for scholars, who, outside the German-speaking world, will primarily compose her readership.

Zetkin is unquestionably a sympathetic and important figure in the history of the German socialist and Communist movements. The daughter of a socially conscious, devoutly Protestant schoolmaster and a feminist mother, she early became interested in women's rights and in the plight of the working classes. She trained as a teacher, then an unusual occupation for middle-class women, under the distinguished and influential Auguste Schmidt. Disappointed, however, by the inability of bourgeois feminists to deal with social issues, she was increasingly drawn to the SPD, losing Schmidt's favor and considerably decreasing the possibility of well-paid employment. In 1882 she followed Ossip Zetkin, a Russian emigre whom she met through the SPD, into exile in Switzerland and France, living with him until his death in 1889 and bearing him two sons. In exile, Clara remained active in the international socialist movement and served as a delegate to the Congress of the Second International in 1889. Returning to Germany, she quickly became a leader of the working-class women's movement. In 1891, Zetkin became editor of the socialist women's paper, *Die Gleichheit*, a post which she held until May, 1917, when her consistently radical position brought her into conflict with the centrist leadership of the USPD. Under Zetkin, *Die Gleichheit* became an influential organ dedicated to building proletarian class consciousness and to achieving the full political, legal, and economic equality for women demanded in the 1891 Erfurt program. At the 1907 International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart at which Zetkin was named Secretary of the International Women's Secretariat, *Die Gleichheit* was made the international organ of the socialist women's movement.

As the struggle over revisionism increasingly occupied the SPD after the turn of the century, *Die Gleichheit* became more and more the voice of the revolutionary socialists. Although tied to many revisionists by friendship, Zetkin became increasingly a figure of the left, which somewhat undercut her position and, as in the case of Rosa Luxemburg, left her relatively isolated within the Party leadership. Although she had been a member of the SPD control commission since 1893, at the 1908 Nürnberg Party Congress Zetkin was passed over for the Party executive, and the German socialist women's movement came under the official control of Luise Zietz.

With the coming of war, Zetkin's opposition to revisionism deepened. Although she feared the effects of a break with the SPD moderates, in 1917 she joined the newly formed USPD. As the war continued, Zetkin was frequently at odds with the more cautious USPD leadership and consequently lost control of *Die Gleichheit*, although remaining a member of the Party executive. In November, 1918, she joined the *Spartakusbund*, forerunner of the KPD, and publicly broke in March, 1919 with the USPD. She now sat in the Württemberg Landtag as a Communist and, after 1920, in the Reichstag, where she attacked the Locarno agreements and demanded an offensive-defensive alliance with the USSR, insisting that Germany's future lay in a close relationship with that power.

Formerly active in the international socialist movement, Zetkin was now equally active in international Communist affairs. She participated in the Congress of Tours, which saw the foundation of the French Communist Party in 1920, the Congresses of the Communist International, and in the creation of the Western European Bureau of the Women's Secretariat of the Communist International, which she headed until its dissolution. Although active in the KPD executive until 1929 and even later in German politics, Zetkin's last years were spent in Russia where, despite increasingly poor health, she helped to direct international policy toward women until her death in 1933.

Despite Dornemann's insistence that Zetkin was thoroughly grounded in Marxist theory, Zetkin possessed neither the intellectual independence nor the brilliance of her close friend,

Rosa Luxemburg; she often succumbed to visionary mysticism about the socialist future or to black, paralyzing despair. Although Dornemann rightly emphasizes the strong personal friendship between Zetkin and Luxemburg, she ignores the fact that Zetkin's emotional, often almost maudlin, political judgment offended Luxemburg, thus spoiling *Die Gleichheit* for her. Only Zetkin's unquestioning acceptance of Luxemburg's intellectual primacy and her unwavering support led the latter to put up with her political sentimentality and personal obstinacies. Despite her access to Luxemburg's correspondence, Dornemann does not mention this nor that Zetkin's subservience to Lenin, whose apologist she became after the November revolution, and her subsequent criticisms of Luxemburg's theories earned her the contempt of Luxemburg's friends, Luise Kautsky and Henriette Roland-Horst. At times even Lenin found Zetkin's emotionalism trying, and he was justifiably angered by her quixotic resignation from the KPD central committee in 1920.

That Dornemann was able to interview Zetkin's son Maxim and a number of her colleagues is one of the strengths of this book. For the most part, this work is interestingly written and competently researched, although it ignores recent Western European studies of German socialism and socialists. The scholarly value of this study would have been greatly increased by a more critical examination of Zetkin's work and ideas and by a less obvious intrusion of Dornemann's own political views. A minor criticism is the lack of annotated citations, which would have assisted the scholar. As Dornemann admits, this is not a definitive study; but the reader will find it useful for a general, if somewhat uncritical, appraisal of Zetkin, her work, and the German socialist movement.

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Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 467 pp. \$18.95.

Carl von Clausewitz occupied a unique position among the reformers who sought to rescue Prussia from the defeat and humiliation of 1806. A scholar in uniform, Clausewitz applied his formidable analytical powers to numerous studies of the changed conditions of warfare created by Napoleon Bonaparte. He combined battlefield experience with intellectual detachment to produce superb critiques not only of individual campaigns, but also of the relationship between war and politics. His masterpiece was the renowned treatise *On War*, in which he demonstrated that "war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." With his ability to stand above the tumults of revolutionary Europe and his determination to understand their impact on society and politics, Clausewitz became the first philosopher of modern warfare. Arguing from the standpoint of a staff officer with experience in the line, he asserted the unity of theory and practice and maintained that Prussia's survival depended on the timely modernization of both her military and political institutions. In association with Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Neidhardt von Gneisenau, Hermann von Boyen and others, he strove to give substance to his ideas during the Reform Era. Although the reformers' efforts eventually proved fruitless, as did Clausewitz' personal hopes for glory under fire, the scholarly general left behind in his writings an ample claim to immortality: insights into the nature of modern warfare which have retained much of their validity for a century and a half.

In *Clausewitz and the State*, Peter Paret links his protagonist to the social, intellectual and psychological currents of the revolutionary period. Alone among his contemporaries Clausewitz added war to the study of political power and "subject[ed] their interaction to systematic and historical inquiry." (p. 97) Profoundly shaken by the outcome of the Battle of Jena, he concluded that power was the basic political concept and that military strength was its concrete manifestation. He was also convinced that the nature, aims and methods of warfare rightly belonged to the study of statecraft. Over the course of forty years in military service, he worked out a synthesis which made it possible to treat war as an integral part of political activity. In the process he became an advocate of gradual modernization, but found that his views often irritated the court conservatives who controlled his professional advancement after 1815.

Having finally disposed of Napoleon, the Prussian government once again came to regard the army merely as the instrument of its political will, not as a potential source of new administra-