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ratus fontium for Adelard's treatises, the relevant references are mixed in with explanatory notes and follows the English translation, which is a good hermeneutic guide and gives access to the text even for those readers who are less familiar with subject and content. Nonetheless, relating these references to the Latin text and putting separate explanatory notes underneath the English translation would have been a better solution. At the end of the book one can find an (again) integrated index of names, places and subjects—partly in English, partly in Latin (pp. 280-287). But these critical remarks are marginal.

The present edition of the three dialogues of Adelard of Bath with his nephew opens up a striking insight—even to a wider audience—into an important development in the history of natural philosophy and natural science in the twelfth century, which can be seen as the point of departure for the modern understanding of natural science and finally led to the reception of the Aristotelian libri naturales.

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Taking its origin in an effort to understand the metaphysical background to Scotus’s doctrine of the hypostatic union, this book aims to cover the main natural philosophical or "scientific" topics (matter, form, substance, accident, quantity, continuity, quality, place, space, and time) that might be useful more widely in understanding late medieval theology. The core sources for the investigation are John Duns Scotus’s various commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: the Lectura (given at Oxford, Books 1 and 2 before 1300), the Ordinatio (the edited version of the Lectura, begun before 1300 and incomplete at Scotus’s death in 1308), and the Reportatio Parisiensis (student notes of Scotus’s Paris lectures, perhaps reflecting his views about 1305). Where relevant, Cross indicates, mainly in footnotes, the theories of Scotus’s contemporary opponents and predecessors. He also refers to and sometimes disagrees with previous historical work on various subjects (for instance the work of Anneliese Maier and Norman Kretzmann), but most of the book is devoted to a philosophical analysis of Scotus’s views. As philosophical analysis, the book admirably achieves its intended goal.

Cross believes that many of Scotus’s ideas are of more than antiquarian interest, for instance his theories of individuation, of contra-causal freedom and logical possibility, and of religious language. Cross finds Scotus’s nuanced analysis of the various possible sorts of unity particularly suggestive and fruitful. Because he believes that the relevance of Scotus’s thought transcends the concerns of historians of ideas, Cross is at pains to point out what he sees as Scotus’s argumentative mistakes—after granting him the presuppositions generally accepted by his contemporaries. The format of each of Cross’s chapters is to set out the theories of Scotus and his opponents, labelling them with numbers and letters, and then—using the labels he has chosen—to describe and critique Scotus’s arguments against his opponents and in favor of his own views. The theories and arguments
are most frequently given in barebones paraphrases without extensive quotations from Scotus either in Latin or in English translation. The result is that the reader has frequently to flip back to figure out the meaning of a sentence like "Accepting (11) allows Scotus to block a potentially damaging objection to his claim (7)." Even when he is not sure of Scotus's meaning, Cross does not often provide a Latin text or probe alternative interpretations. Occasionally, there are minor editing errors, as when a letter label is used before it has been defined (e.g. in note 31 on page 43).

In his introductory assessment of the relations of Scotus's theology and physics, Cross says (pp. 5-6):

... a number of his theological theories—divine timelessness, angels and the human soul, grace, the Incarnation, the Immaculate Conception, transsubstantiation—cannot be properly understood without a grasp of Scotus's physics. I shall not discuss any of these issues in detail in what follows. But the choice of the word 'context' in the subtitle of the book is deliberate. I hope that, by the end of my study of Scotus's physics, the dynamic of Scotus's view of the connectedness of physics and theology will be clear. Scotus never allows his theology to drive or determine his physics. He provides philosophical arguments—sound or unsound irrespective of any information derived from divine revelation—for all the positions discussed here. It is true that he also provides theological arguments in favour of some of his physical theories. But he never defends any theory merely by invoking theological arguments, and there are several theories he defends by invoking only non-theological arguments. This is not to say that the motivation behind Scotus's discussion of these scientific matters may not have been theological. There is no obvious way of telling about this. But the structure and basic thrust of his arguments, as he presents them, are clear: physics, as discovered independently of theology, is wholly consistent with theology. So Scotus can allow his views on physics to determine at least in part the way in which he spells out his account of Christian orthodoxy.

I agree with Cross if his point is that Scotus does not, on the basis of theology, make claims that contradict what he considered scientific truth or necessity. A presupposition of the sort of philosophical theology engaged in by Scotus and most fourteenth-century commentators on Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences* is that true physics and true theology will be consistent with one another. On the other hand, around the year 1300 there was no discipline that fit the description "physics, as discovered independently of theology." Although Cross severs Scotus's arguments from their theological contexts within commentaries on the *Sentences*, the questions that Scotus addresses do affect the nature of the physics he develops in the course of answering them. It is not irrelevant that Scotus develops his theory of the intension and remission of forms in the course of asking about the increase of grace or charity in a human soul, and it is not irrelevant that Scotus develops his theories of place and motion in the course of answering questions about the place and motion of angels. It is true that Scotus's commentaries on the *Sentences* influenced the later course of physics as represented in commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics*: for instance, the theories of John Buridan and later Parisian natural philosophers on the cause of the natural motion of heavy bodies developed out of Scotus's discussions of the motions of angels, where accepted truths about angels—for instance, that they are quantitatively indivisible—influenced Scotus's theories of their place and motion.