The works of Alexius Meinong, thankfully, have been published as a unified set—they have, until now, generally been available only in widely scattered publications, long out of print and to which it is extremely difficult to obtain access. The publication of the complete works has been accomplished in a set of handsome strong volumes by the Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, of Graz, Austria, under the fine editorship of the late Hofrat Rudolf Kindinger, Professor Rudolf Haller, Professor Roderick Chisholm and Dr. Reinhard Fabian. Having Meinong's most significant works available in a single set of volumes is of both systematic and historical importance. In the more philosophical comments I make I will tend to concentrate on his theory of objects, since this has been the source of most attention in recent philosophy.*

1. Perhaps, except for Hegel, no philosopher of such major importance, writing in the last 200 years, has been so unjustly misrepresented, ridiculed and so often simply overlooked, as has Alexius Meinong. No disrespect to Russell intended, nonetheless his influence has had and still has in part a blinding effect. Russell was and is a philosopher of the first rank. It was easy for Russell himself, and equally easy or easier for those positively influenced by him, at worst to mistake Russell for Meinong, at best vastly to oversimplify the latter's views, or, perhaps, simply to think of Meinong in terms of round-squares. Nonetheless, 20th century Anglo-Saxon philosophy, to a significant extent, could be understood best as a commentary on, and debate over, issues articulated and analysed by Brentano and Meinong. It would appear, further, that contemporary philosophy is in fact returning to Meinong and has come full circle round to a

*The publishers of the Gesamtausgabe kindly extended help without which research on Meinong would have been considerably limited. I thank them deeply for their assistance.
re-evaluation of the success and status of the very philosophical tool invented in criticism of Meinong (Russell's theory of descriptions), and which some would say is the paradigm of 20th century 'analytic' philosophy. In so far as this is true, contemporary philosophy must deal once again with Meinong's own analyses. To make the latter remark is not to attempt to undercut the philosophical usefulness of Russell's theory of descriptions. It is merely to suggest that it is not at all clear that this theory accomplished what Russell took it to accomplish vis a vis Meinong, and what many philosophers influenced by Russell have taken it to accomplish vis a vis Meinong. In any case, the question of the nature of and the value of Meinong's "Gegenstandsstheorie" remains open in spite of Russell's critique and certainly also in view of contemporary arguments to the effect that intentional discourse is irreducible, quite apart from the direction in which much recent semantics finds itself moving.

But, so far, mention has only been made of Meinong in connection with his theory of objects. This, of course, is largely the Meinong passed along to us via the history of philosophy — the writing of which, at least with regard to Meinong, has been largely in terms of Russell's view of Meinong's ontology. Meinong was, in fact, not only a metaphysician, but also an epistemologist, ethicist and value theorist. He may even be seen, finally, as the philosopher of logic that he is. Further, there is some indication that, at long last, he may be admitted, though only grudgingly, into the phenomenological establishment so long dominated by Husserl and Heidegger, as the phenomenologist that he is. Meinong is without question as helpful and suggestive a philosopher as is Husserl, the latter's greater influence on the continent notwithstanding. It is important, however, to recognize the fact that Meinong's philosophical temperament is vastly different than Husserl's and never leads him into the programmatic intuitionistic neo-Kantianism characteristic of Husserl's post-Logische Untersuchungen period. I think Professor Chisholm is correct in saying that Meinong, while having definite ties with both phenomenology and the Anglo-Saxon tradition that begins with Russell and Moore (though given the extent of Meinong's very 'analytic' influence on both the younger Russell and on the younger Moore, one wonders if Meinong should not be mentioned equally with the latter two figures), is subtle and sensitive enough to avoid the narrowness (or, if you wish, the excess) of either movement. One can only hope that such descriptions of Meinong's work will be increasingly accepted. If