
According to its author, this is a new book, replacing rather than continuing its predecessor, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (ISTC), which Wiggins acknowledges in the Preface to have contained "error, gratuitous compression and obscurity" (v), which self-confessed shortcomings the new book sets out to repair. The result is a much more fully-rounded account of Wiggins' theory of identity and individuation, together with the ramifications, than before. The original was a challenging but often undoubtedly obscure work, which for both reasons prompted a large literature. Many of the minor adjustments here result from a strenuous attempt to take this literature into account, to accept or confront criticisms and correct misunderstandings. As a result, the new book is more than twice as long as ISTC, and makes even more demands on the reader. Wiggins' overriding aim was to prevent a second crop of misunderstandings, to which "every aspiration to grace, expedition or economy" (viii) is sacrificed. Certainly by dint of familiarity, amplification and repetition, the main thrust of argument is not hard to grasp. But Wiggins expresses perhaps justified forebodings that his message is still insufficiently clear, and craves the reader's charity. His somewhat heavy and involved prose style is not in itself an insurmountable obstacle. What will irritate more readers is the frequency of oblique throwaway asides, countless "cf."-references to other works which, while they admirably show indebtedness and help supplement the bibliography, threaten to undermine the work's self-containedness, and lastly the format, which is unnecessarily complicated. I shall comment briefly on this first.

Three grades of textual importance are signalled by format: crucial argument in the main text in large type, less crucial passages in small type, and then the notes. These were already long and distracting in ISTC, but have here grown in both length and number. On many pages they make up more than half of the text, while 26 "Longer Notes" are banished to the back of the book, where they appear, like philosophical vignettes, complete with contents page. Some footnotes are longer than some "longer" notes, some straggle untidily across pages, and one (pp. 117-8, n.24) is even on the wrong page. Nearly (but not quite) all footnotes and endnotes are supplementary or polemical. So the book will not be beloved of those who like a clean linear sweep. Even given Wiggins' conviction that philosophy has no "single master thread" (3) which unravels all problems, one could have wished for a simpler format. Nevertheless the author attempts to chart us through, with tips on how to proceed, a methodological preamble, and numerous internal cross-references. Despite the complications, the book is well
worth the extra effort required to read it, since it is never dull, always suggestive, and with a good instinct for philosophical importance.

The main argument of *ISTC* is restated and still maintained, but set in a wider context, embracing questions of essentialism and conceptualism which were either suppressed or not fully developed in *ISTC*. In particular Wiggins defends essences and *de re* modality, and draws the consequences of his theory of individuation for the realism/conceptualism debate. The most central novel aspect is however the seamless sewing of the Putnam-Kripke theory of the semantics of natural kinds into Wiggins' Aristotelian theory of substances. The two accounts appear to be made for each other (85). As forebear for the Putnam theory, as indeed for very much else, Wiggins cites Leibniz, who is quoted, often at length, more than anyone else.

The basic tenet of the book is that identity is absolute or Leibnizian. Wiggins protests at many points against the smudging of this absoluteness (and hence of the world) by relative identity theorists. Not that he pretends to have any independent arguments for Leibniz's Law: the arguments of Chapter 1, familiar from *ISTC*, against all manner of purported counterexamples, are not intended to establish it: it could hardly be established any more than the Law of Non-Contradiction (21), Rather his concern is that of "exploring the consequences and prospects of the Leibnizian view" (73n.) Opposing relativist views are found to be instable, indeterminate or arbitrary (22), unsuccessful even in their own terms (193), and insufficiently developed to stand comparison with the Leibnizian view (4), which Wiggins claims to correspond to our actual individuative and identificatory practices.

The second and equally important aspect of Wiggins' theory is that while identity is not, individuation is, sortal-relative (Thesis D). There is logical equivalence between 'x = y' and ' (∃f) (x = y f)', where 'x' and 'y' range over continuants and 'f' over sortal concepts. So while Leibniz's Law can be given in the form ' (x) (y) ((x = y) ⊃ (φx ≡ φy))' it also has various 'same f' equivalents. Wiggins declines to decide whether '=' or '≡ f' is the more basic form, though perhaps his sympathies lie with the latter.

The restrictions on the variables 'x', 'y' and 'f' are crucial. The theory of Leibnizian identity is defended only for material substances, three-dimensional Aristotelian continuants. Questions of identity in other categories: accidents, abstract objects, events, properties and relations, social and institutional entities and so on — all of them live philosophical issues — are simply left aside in favour of the single case. The lack of more discussion of events, which seem as much part of our ontology as continuants, is particularly disappointing. Wiggins holds with Aristotle that every substance is a *this-such*, and that there is no reducing of either the demonstrative or the conceptual component of this scheme to the other: here he parts company with Leibniz. Like Aristotle, he sees a clear distinction between those predicates of substances which answer the question "What