ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PARTIAL JUDGMENT

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0. Introduction
The question of the phenomenology of partial judgment is, roughly put, the question how a man thinks, or in what ways he is aware, when he judges partially or makes a partial judgment. Phenomenology is not, however, as this formulation may suggest, restricted to reflection upon the contents of naive awareness. Phenomenological investigation of a sort of awareness, such as judgment, appetite, imagination, or emotion, starts with critical reflection upon the awareness, but continued application of the method should let us see intentional structures and presuppositions which, though essentially involved in the awareness, may not be evident in initial reflection upon it. To give or to try for a phenomenology of partial judgment is to give or to try for an account of partial judgment as a sort of awareness. The account may, however, reveal more than is intended in the judgment itself.2

Questions of this sort are notoriously difficult, and are also precarious, since in many cases they ought not be asked and cannot be answered. There are some intentional attitudes which are not ways of thinking or being aware, and which have thus no phenomenology in the present sense. Some sorts of belief or conviction are of this sort; there may be nothing isolable or indicative about the thought or awareness of a man who believes the earth to be roughly spherical, for he may never entertain this proposition, and his conviction is probably best understood as a tendency which relates and constrains his other beliefs and his thought without necessarily becoming itself an object of thought. Other examples are easy to

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come by: The convictions which are expressed in myths have no apparent phenomenology on the pre-reflective level, and they resemble in function both freudian unconscious beliefs and kantian transcendental principles. Preferences, engagement, and even volitions may also be of this sort; better understood as dispositions or tendencies to do with the person's relation to the world in general and diffuse ways, and not as ways in which one may be aware of propositions or particulars.

We have thus always the question whether there is a phenomenology to be done, and we cannot presume that every intentional character or relation has its own phenomenology on the pre-reflective level.

In the case of judgment our intuitions are that there is a phenomenology to be done, that there is a form of character of awareness which is judgment, and that the question of its nature can sensibly be asked. We may in this respect distinguish judgment, a moment of cognitive awareness, from what we may call belief, which is also cognitive, but which is related to awareness in less specific ways. Whether judgment and belief share all their possible contents or objects is not easy to say, though it seems evident that they share some of these, since a man may bring to consciousness something which he has believed for some time without having previously made a judgment about it.

By partial judgments I mean judgments of less than full assertoric force, such as are sometimes expressed comparatively ("A is more likely than B.") and perhaps also numerically ("He has one chance in three of succeeding.")

The initial intuition that judgment admits of a direct phenomenological study is not of course conclusive, and such a study might find its eventual place in a more comprehensive account of cognitive attitudes. This reservation applies to the consideration of partial

3. Cf. Levi-Strauss, Le Cru et le cuit, Ouverture, and Anthropologie structurale, esp. chapt. IX.

4. This is of course not to say that there is no phenomenological study of, for example, the mythical consciousness, only that such a consciousness is not to be understood as a specific sort of intending toward mythical objects. The original substantives in our mythical thought turn out upon analysis to be syncategorematic. (Cf. Husserl, LU, Investigation IV, and section 126 of Ideen). One might say that the mythical objects "fall in the epoche" (Sartre, La transcendance de l'Ego, II A). Nor is it to say that in the case of a phenomenological study the transcendental structures will always be objectively revealed.