The relations between phenomenology and science have always aroused a great deal of controversy. Husserl was anxious that his own phenomenological efforts should be seen as a strictly scientific exercise. The positivist Moritz Schlick and his friends, however, did not take Husserl’s scientific aspirations very seriously and not much love was lost between the members of the two schools. In the early twenties Husserl’s rise to fame and influence could hardly have escaped notice of Ludwig Wittgenstein who was in Vienna at the time. It is not unreasonable to assume that Wittgenstein read at least some of Husserl’s writings. (Gilbert Ryle suggested to me that he may have borrowed the term “logical grammar” from Husserl.) Yet, as far as I know, Wittgenstein never even mentions him. What is more, Husserl was completely ignored by Russell. Strangely enough, Husserl’s influence was strongest among those who were rather less than enthusiastic about science and who viewed the science-oriented philosophy with suspicion, even distaste. Heidegger — the most renowned of Husserl’s pupils — had some unkind things to say about “scientific intelligence”. It was, of course, to Husserl that Heidegger dedicated his *Being and Time*.

For this reason alone, if for no other, a collection of papers like this one, entitled somewhat provocatively “Phenomenology and the Sciences”, is bound to arouse considerable curiosity; all the more so since the current wave of interest in Phenomenology is accompanied with a certain feeling of disenchantment with natural science and its technological offshoots and the increasing popularity of the “social sciences”, particularly sociology. Surprisingly, however, in this collection there is not a single paper on sociology. Nor does any of the papers in it deal explicitly with the problem of the distinction between natural science and the social sciences. This certainly is a very serious omission.

The papers included in the volume (the editor tells us in his Intro-
duction) fall into three groups. The first group is concerned with logic and language-analysis, the second with psychology and the third with the problem of historicity and hermeneutics. The contributors include Robert Sokolowski, Lothar Eley, Thomas M. Seebohm, Elmar Holenstein, Hermann Ulrich Asemissen, Bernhard Waldenfels, Joseph J. Kockelmans and Theodore Kisiel. The papers are of very unequal quality, the weakest being the two papers in the third group (Kockelmans' *Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Science of History* and Kisiel's *Hermeneutic Models for Natural Science*), both bearing impressive titles but both equally shallow and unoriginal. Kockelman's paper, in particular, is a rambling jargon-cluttered re-statement of some familiar views espoused by Heidegger and Gadamer. At the other end of the scale, the paper by Waldenfels entitled *Die Verschränkung von Innen und Aussen im Verhalten* offers some interesting ideas relating to the phenomenology of behaviour and has the merit of being clear and intelligently argued. But more about this later.

First, a few words of comment on some of the papers from the first group. The American phenomenologist Sokolowski in his contribution, obliquely entitled *The Presence of Judgement*, defends the view that judgement is not an exclusively linguistic phenomenon. To phrase a sentence is not yet to judge. When a parrot says "It's a fine day", he is not judging, even though he utters a grammatically correct sentence. Or, to quote Sokolowski: "We can form sentences when we have learned to speak a language; we frame judgements when we have become able to think in a language." (p. 24) Nevertheless, as he himself admits, "even though judgement goes beyond expression, it cannot exist without it"; moreover it is only when a judgement is made fully explicit that we can see clearly whether certain rules of consistency and coherence have been observed. Consequently we are faced with the following problem: that although judgement is not reducible to linguistic expression, it is only by examining the linguistic expression that we can examine the logicality of a judgement, and indeed decide whether a judgement has been made at all. However, Sokolowski has little to say about all this. Nor does he explain what he means by "thinking". Yet this is crucial to his argument.

Seebohm's discussion of formalised languages in his *Zur Phänomenologie kognitiver Leistungen im Umgang mit formalen Sprachen* has some bearing on this problem. Seebohm is defending symbolic logic