
Whereas Husserl's Logik Vorlesung 1896 (henceforth V1) precedes his Logische Untersuchungen, the Logik Vorlesung 1902/03 (henceforth V2) follows Husserl's opus magnum. Hence, independently of the value of V1 and V2 as such, the question arises how these two sources are mutually related as far as the development of Husserlian thought is concerned. Although Husserl considered his lectures as basically directed at beginners, he still wanted to discuss some advanced topics in them. This is clearly explained in the opening words of V2 (p. 3) that also apply to V1:


How advanced was Husserl’s antipsychologism circa 1896? How far was his complex idea of logic—as elaborated in Logische Untersuchungen—perhaps already present in V1 and continued in V2? How much did he know the mathematical logic of the time? How did he evaluate new tendencies in logic? One can expect to find at least partial answers to these and other questions in the present volumes. V1 is divided into four parts; each part, except the first one, consists of brief sections. I give the detailed survey of the content of V1, because it seems instructive for Husserl’s understanding of the scope of logic (the structure of V2 is much more general). The first part is introductory and discusses the concept of logic. The next three sections are grouped together (yet this part has no name) and concern acts of thinking and their content, objective presentations and truth as well as presentations of objects (in the narrow sense) and propositions (names and sentences). The next part is called “Concepts in the Widest Understanding”. It has the following sections: matter and the object of concepts (concept-content and object); simple and complex presentations; parts of presentations and parts of concepts; singular presentations, something (Etwas), individual presentations, abstract and concrete presentations; abstractum and property; external and internal properties; properties of properties, absolute subjects; properties and predicates; concepts of concepts; the object of a concept; attributes; the content of concepts; the scope of concepts; the object of a concept; attributes; the content of concepts; the scope of concepts; direct and indirect presentations; attributive presentations; purely conceptual presentations and individual presentations; presentations of covering concepts; properties of singular objects and properties of multitudes; connections and relations (two sections); symmetric and non-symmetric relations, series, ordinal numbers; presentations of classes and distributive presentations; cardinal numbers, multitudes and generality; negative presentations; presentations of presentations; identity and equality of presentations; relations between presentations according to their content; comparison
of presentations according to their length; comparison of concepts according to their content and according to their scope; relations between scopes; the classification of concepts, kinds and sorts; relations between objects according to their concepts, propria; subsumption and subordination (of an object to its concept and of a concept to its concept); Aristotelian kinds and sorts.

Part II is about propositions and covers the following topics: simple and complex propositions; propositions and their negations and affirmations; the most general connections between propositions: (1) copulative; (2) disjunctive; (3) hypothetical; elementary forms of propositions; categorical form and its interpretation (with respect to content, with respect to scope); negative categorical propositions and the meaning of negation; common distinctions among categorical sentences: quantity; Sigwart’s analysis of the general negative form; the existence of the subject in the general negative form; Brentano’s interpretation of the general negative form; particular negative formulas; negative propositions; various forms of categorical sentences determined by the form of their matters; the logical content of general sentences; the controversy over impersonal and existential sentences; existence and truth; the meaning of existential sentences; the existence of the subject in categorical sentences; existential and categorical sentences as types of simple forms of propositions.

The next part considers inferences. Its sections are: causal propositions; the concept of inference; the principle of inference as regards non-causal hypothetical truths; logical and alogical principles of inference and the relative division of hypothetical proofs; different classes of logical principles of inference and theories; introductory remarks to the constitution of the a priori theory of propositional principles of inference; some basic principles to be assumed by all theories; tasks of a propositional theory; the theory of propositional inferences; the theory of conceptual inferences. There is also an appendix taken from the lecture “On the new investigations in the field of deductive logic” delivered by Husserl in 1895. The extract begins with remarks on logic as a theoretical discipline, followed by an analysis of logical ideas of William Rowan Hamilton, Augustus de Morgan and George Boole.

As mentioned above, V2 has a much simpler organization. The content is divided into the following chapters: Introduction; The Controversies concerning Logic; The Concept of Logic; Pure Logic; Practical Logic; A Grammatical-logical Introduction: The Purely Logical in the Sphere of Linguistic Thinking; An Outline of a Theory of Logical Forms; Modifications; The Theory of Judgments; Negation; The Relation of Quantity and Quality; Modality; Relations; Hypothetical Propositions and Inferences; The Theory of Inferences in Traditional Logic; On Pure Modalities; On Probability. There is also an Appendix consisting of the introductory fragment of a course “Logic and Theory of Knowledge”, delivered by Husserl in 1901/02.

Both volumes have introductions in which the editor describes various details related to the manuscripts of Husserl’s lecture-notes. One very interesting remark explains an error of Husserl (occurring at least twice) when he claims that the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (the first volume of Logische Untersuchungen) resulted from reworking of the series of lectures delivered by him in summer and autumn of 1896. However, as Elisabeth Schumann notes, Husserl had no course in autumn 1896 related to logic and the issues of the Prolegomena. On the other hand, the first part of V1 outlines much of Husserl’s arguments against psychologism. In particular, Husserl says (p. 20) that all principles of logical justification do not concern psychical phenomena, but objective relations between propositions. Hence, Husserl concludes, logic is independent of psychology. However, it is difficult to find in V1 an explicit formulation of Husserl’s core objection against psychologism pointing out that psychology has nothing to do with the justification of logical laws. V2 presents a much more advanced treatment of psychologism and antipsychologism. This shows that the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen was only anticipated by V1, and the same goes for Husserl’s views on the nature...