
Though theories of judgment are not among the most hotly disputed items in contemporary philosophy, they most certainly were so for long stretches of the philosophy’s past. This book is of considerable value insofar as it provides us with discussions of such theories and may be of great service in drawing attention to the unsettled issues under consideration as ones worthy of attention in future philosophical investigations.

In the introduction the author maintains that the range of phenomena to be treated in theories of judgment may be identified by means of “some tautologies and examples”, namely “Judgment is what judges do”, “A judge is a figure of authority and responsibility”, “Some judgments are snap judgments”, and “Judgment occupies a place in both theory and practice” (1 f.). The phenomena that are thereby identified, according to Martin, have been examined from three points of view, called “faces of judgment”. The first of these faces is psychology, which is concerned with “the explanation of the behavior of intelligent organisms” (3). The second one is logic, which is concerned with inferential structure. In this context Martin significantly remarks, “The centrality of the theory of judgment has been somewhat submerged in modern mathematical logic, but we shall see that debates in the logical theory of judgment were at the heart of the revolution that gave rise to the modern logical tradition” (4).

The third face of judgment is phenomenology, which Martin characterizes as “the study of the structure of experience, particularly of the way in which things (entities, objects) manifest themselves in experience” (4). In this review I will restrict myself to comments on Martin’s considerations regarding the history of philosophy and will not concern myself with the fifth and final chapter that deals with the depiction of judgment in art, which is a topic beyond the scope of my expertise.

The first chapter is concerned with theories of judgment from a psychological point view and is specifically focused on three experimental approaches. Two of these are contemporary, whereas the other one is found in David Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature*. Martin is here particularly concerned with Hume’s attempt to identify the characteristic of belief which distinguishes it from mere conception. While Hume’s result, namely that belief is characterized in terms of “force and vivacity” and by “feeling”, is found wanting, the author nonetheless finds Hume’s experiment instructive as both phenomenological and logical considerations come into play therein. According to Martin, Hume is engaged in phenomenology insofar as he inspects his consciousness in order to isolate the distinguishing characteristic of belief. The logical aspect of Hume’s approach is found in his assertion that we do not add the idea of existence to another idea whenever we think that something exists, e.g. that we do not add the idea of existence to the idea of God when we think that God exists. Martin also discerns phenomenological and logical factors at work with regard to the contemporary experimental approaches which he discusses.

The second chapter is concerned with Kant’s theory of judgment as synthesis and is especially focused on the logical aspects thereof. In this regard Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments and his table of judgments are discussed. The great challenge for a defender of Kant is to determine where existential judgments are to be identified by means of applying the former distinction and the latter table (thus to classify existential judgments in terms of quality, quantity, relation, and modality). In his endeavor to elaborate on this challenge he draws from both the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* and Kant’s lectures on logic, though he finds the possible solutions unsatisfactory for various reasons. It is a great credit to Martin that, in view of this shortcoming on Kant’s part, he devotes some discussion of the logic that arose
in the Herbartian school, specifically that of Moritz Drobisch. While Herbart and his students made a sharp distinction between existential (or "thetic") judgments and categorical (or "synthetic") ones, Martin still finds in the logical work of Drobisch a strong tendency to characterize judgments in terms of the subject-copula-predicate model, which is only appropriate for categorical judgments.

At the end of the nineteenth century Franz Brentano stands out as a towering figure who attempted to solve the problem of assimilation of existential judgments into logic by rejecting the subject-copula-model altogether and thus by characterizing all judgments as existential. The second chapter accordingly ends with a discussion of this strategy in the theory of judgment. Unfortunately, however, Martin's chronology is inaccurate, for he says, "Brentano's calculus main logical doctrines were first set out in 1874, and his calculus was elaborated in detail by 1877" (65). In Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (the work of 1874 to which Martin refers) Brentano explicitly says that his logical doctrines and particularly the relevant theory of judgment were already expounded upon in his Würzburg lecture course given in the winter semester of 1870/71.1

Here mention should of course be made of the fact that logic for Brentano is a practical discipline which draws upon various theoretical ones, especially upon "descriptive psychology", also called "descriptive phenomenology" (beschreibende Phänomenologie).2 The three faces of judgment accordingly make up a unity in Brentano's theory. While Martin shows some appreciation of the connection between logic and phenomenology for Brentano, insofar as he is well aware of the fact that for Brentano both affirmative and negative judgments are to be discerned and distinguished from other acts of consciousness simply on the basis of inner perception, Martin is nonetheless off the mark when he characterizes such perception as "attentive introspection" (73), for Brentano in fact takes great pains to distinguish inner perception from any sort of attentive directedness to mental states, so-called "inner observation" (innere Beobachtung).3 If indeed phenomenology would require such observation, as Martin seems to think it does, it would be an impossible endeavor from Brentano's perspective. Certainly Martin is to be commended for giving Brentano his due as one of the most outstanding judgment-theorists. However, his account of Brentano's contribution in this regard is not free of inaccuracy.

In the third chapter Martin attempts to make good his promise to show the relevance of the theory of judgment to the origins of modern mathematical logic by discussing Frege's introduction of the judgment stroke. Though contemporary logicians work with propositions, formalized by single letters such as p and q, in Frege's Begriffsschrift we find these prefaced by a turnstile (→), which symbolizes judgments rather than mere propositions. Consideration is given by Martin to various criticisms of this aspect of Fregean logic and also to various defenses thereof. While he does not recommend assimilating the judgment stroke into the logical calculus, he emphasizes that Frege's logic was indeed meant to be a logic of judgment and not merely a logic of judgment-contents ("propositions") and points out that this is particularly a problem for Frege, who wanted to dispel all psychological considerations from logic. Since judgments are presumably mental acts, they should have no place in logic as Frege conceives of it. At the same time Martin thinks that Frege insisted upon using the judgment stroke in logic, because logic was, according to Frege, first and foremost concerned with truth. This is to be seen in Frege's suggestion that the judgment stroke can be seen as equivalent to such predications as "The violent death of Archimedes at Syracuse is a fact" instead of "Archimedes died a violent death at Syracuse".

In the fourth chapter Martin comes to consider the phenomenological face of judgment as this is elaborated on in Martin Heidegger's dissertation. In view of the failures of Hume, Kant, and presumably Brentano as well, to develop a phenomenology of judgment, Martin finds in this early and usually neglected work of Heidegger the key to such an endeavor. According to Martin, Heidegger establishes that there are logical objects, namely judgments as not identical with the mental states in which one judges,