In editing the book *Franz Brentano’s Metaphysics and Psychology*, Ion Tănăsescu had the complex network of Brentano’s philosophical interests in mind. He compiled a volume that gives the reader an acute view of Brentano’s historical background, of the debates he entered during his career, of his main metaphysical and psychological theses, but also of some of the manifold influences he had on his pupils and his time. The book, mainly concerned with metaphysics and psychology, consists of fourteen essays, all containing original investigations. Unfortunately, I cannot discuss all these essays in detail. I will briefly present their content, in order to guide the reader who seeks information on the volume, and I will then examine one point about Brentano’s theory of intentionality on the basis of two of the essays.

One part of Tănăsescu’s book is dedicated to the historical context in which Brentano’s thought was evolving. E. Fugali presents the general intellectual situation of the XIXth century, and the revival of Aristotle due to the critical edition of E. Bekker and the works of H. Bonitz, K. Prantl and Brentano’s master F. Trendelenburg. Fugali shows how Trendelenburg, after the accusations of rhapsody raised against Aristotle by Kant, attempted to prove the coherence of Aristotle’s theory of categories on the grounds of grammatical motives, whereas Brentano’s *Dissertation* on the senses of being defends Aristotle’s categories on the basis of ontological arguments. K. Hedwig analyses the *Dissertation* with original historical material. He provides an informative study concerning the influences of Aquinas on the young Brentano. By investigating the Brentanian Nachlass, Hedwig reveals how much Aquinas was present in the background and the preparation of Brentano’s *Dissertation*, even if he is rarely quoted in the final text. Now, the essay of Hedwig also insists on the “divergence” between Aquinas and Brentano, and on the fact that Brentano uses Aquinas as an authority to justify a “derivation” ([*Ableitung*]) and “deduction” ([*Deduction*]) of the categories that cannot be found in Aquinas itself. S. Krantz Gabriel, in her essay about the Heideggerian reception of Brentano’s *Dissertation*, explains how Heidegger rejected the Brentanian focus on “Being according to the figures of the categories”, more specifically on the primary substance as the central and first ontological item, and how he replaced it by “Being” as such, founded on “Being in the sense of truth” understood as “*alêtheia*” (unconcealment). Krantz Gabriel concludes with a general criticism of Heidegger’s philosophical choices and provides a defence of “the metaphysical primacy of the individual”, which is a Brentanian concern. D. Jacquette’s essay about Brentano’s *Dissertation* on the senses of being brackets historical questions to focus on the systematic content of the Brentanian and Aristotelian theory of categories. Jacquette studies the principles ruling the theory of both thinkers, such as the principle of mutual conceptual irreducibility of the categories, and provides logical formulas to express these principles. This attempt at clarification leads him to evaluate the coherence of Brentano’s reading of Aristotle. R. Poli presents some aspects of the Brentanian reistic ontology, mainly founded on information given in the posthumous volume *Theory of Categories* ([*Kategorienlehre*]). After a presentation of mereological considerations in Aristotle, and having introduced the main concept of reism, namely “thing” (Ding, res), Poli analyses the Brentanian theories of time and space, substance and accident, boundaries, and continua, and concludes with a brief sketch of the later Brentanian theory of categories. F. Boccaccini’s essay studies Brentano’s concept of truth. The main argument of Boccaccini is that Brentano’s notion of the evident, which is central to his late theory of truth, could be considered as a non-primitive concept and thus analysed. Boccaccini undertakes to demonstrate that this notion is founded on the one of “*Übereinstimmung*” understood as “harmony” rather than “cor-
respondence”. In the final analysis, Boccaccini suggests that Brentano’s theory of the evident resembles a theory of performativity and thus comes close to pragmatism. C. Ierna asks if there is a philosophy of mathematics in Brentano. He explains how the concepts of improper and symbolic presentations in Brentano have been used in philosophy of mathematics, and how Brentano discusses some mathematical topics in texts concerning magnitudes, continua, and boundaries. Ierna tries to identify not only a “Brentanian” philosophy of mathematics, but also a “Brentanist” one, by revealing how pupils of Brentano, such as C. Stumpf, E. Husserl or C. von Ehrenfels, could have been inspired by the work of their master. Ierna indicates that other information about mathematics could be found in the Brentanian Nachlass. Tănăsescu’s volume includes two texts on God. The first one, by J. Seifert, focuses on the traditional problem of the ontological argument and its treatment by Brentano. Seifert’s essay is deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition, starting its inquiry with the Proslogion of Anselm of Canterbury, it proceeds to analyse the way Descartes, Leibniz and Kant discussed the ontological argument, and the way Brentano himself evaluated this tradition. The text of P. Janssen chooses another temporal scale, mentioning contemporary scientific theories, so that Brentano’s considerations on God are examined in the light of R. Dawkins’ The God Delusion and S. Hawking and L. Mlodinow’s The Grand Design. Finally, the volume also contains several essays on Brentano’s psychology. D. Seron’s article is about the debate between Brentano and G. Fechner concerning sensory intensity. He presents the main points of opposition between the two psychologists. Above all, the essay by Seron reminds us that, even if Brentano insisted on the distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology, he was not hostile to psychophysics. R. Rollinger, after having studied numerous manuscripts of Brentano’s Nachlass, provides interesting information about the genesis of Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and about the continuation of this work. He quotes an entire plan of the rest of the book, found in the Nachlass, and he mentions some unpublished manuscripts about Brentano’s opinion on the mind-body problem. The contributions by Hedwig, Ierna and Rollinger are appeals to go forth in publishing Brentano’s Nachlass. Thus, the last text, written by T. Binder, is a sort of natural conclusion of this stimulating volume, since it concerns the Nachlass. It provides precious information on the history of the manuscripts and points out that the Brentano Studien are far from complete: a lot of work still has to be done on the posthumous manuscripts, in order to get a more detailed picture of what Brentano’s philosophy is.

As announced, I would now like to discuss a particular point concerning psychology, more precisely intentionality. G. Fréchette’s text about intentionality contributes to what is currently the most animated debate in Brentano studies, the debate on the concept of “intentional object”. A classical, discontinuist interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, initiated by O. Kraus and A. Kastil, and perpetuated by R. Chisholm, B. Smith and A. Chrudzimski, take it that reism in Brentano entails the abandonment of intentional objects. These objects were understood as intermediary mind-dependent means leading to the knowledge of extra-mental entities; they also would have been used to provide a “half-existent” or “intentionally existent” relatum to the intentional relation when that upon which the mind is directed is non-existent: when I think of the square circle, a “thought-about square circle” would stand in for the square circle and be the relatum of my intentional relation. This well known interpretation had a great influence in the XXth century, so that almost nobody had anything substantially different to say about Brentano’s “intentional object”. However, recently, some scholars, mainly Antonelli, Sauer and Fréchette, have contested it. These interpreters support a continuist reading of Brentano. According to them, Brentano maintained intentional objects during reism; not because he admitted mind-dependent means or substitute objects in his reistic theory of intentionality, but because he never defended a theory of intentional objects as means or substitutes. The intentional object, in Brentano, would never have been a “half-existent” or “intentionally exist-