The Security Model discussion and its importance for the evolution of the European security architecture

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Introduction
One of the main items on the agenda of the OSCE Lisbon Summit will be the European Security Model for the 21st Century. Since this discussion was placed on the OSCE’s agenda during the Budapest Summit of December 1994, little has become known about the progress made and about the possible results of the discussion. Will the Security Model discussion fulfil its potential as the first OSCE-wide dialogue on the new European security architecture, trying to create common ground among the OSCE participating states for the further shaping of this security architecture? Or will it become bogged down in a repetition of words which only affects the credibility of the OSCE as a security organization in a negative way? In this article I will try to trace the main elements of the discussion so far and explore the possible contribution it can make to strengthening security in Europe.

History of the Security Model proposal
In order to understand the potential role of the discussion on the Security Model it is important to recall how it came to be placed on the OSCE’s agenda. In the following pages it will become clear that the history of the proposal probably tells us more about the outcome than the course of the discussion since the Budapest Summit.

The Budapest Summit of 5 and 6 December 1994 was preceded by the first OSCE review conference. As the successor to the ‘follow-up’ conferences (of which ‘Helsinki II’ in 1992 was the last one) the so-called ‘review’ conferences were supposed to provide an opportunity to review the body of norms and values of the OSCE and its implementation by the participating states, as well as to evaluate all the OSCE’s activities. At the same time they should provide sufficient input to the Summit meeting. Important items on the agenda of the Budapest review conference were the possibility of a peacekeeping operation in Nagorny-Karabakh, the document on Third Party peacekeeping (meant to curtail CIS/Russian peacekeeping by defining a set of rules with which third countries engaging in a peacekeeping operation should comply) and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military aspects of Security, a document setting, inter alia, rules and norms for the democratic control of the armed forces and the behaviour of the military in armed conflict. It turned out, however, that the formal preparations for the Summit by the review

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conference only partly determined the Summit’s agenda. With regard to the Russian proposal on the Security Model, perceptions of developments in NATO and in the former Yugoslavia were just as important.

As the preparation for the NATO Ministerial Council of 1 December 1994 progressed it became clear that this meeting was going to take important decisions. The NATO Summit of January 1994 had decided, in principle, on NATO enlargement. Moreover, it launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme. Many people thought that the objective of the PFP programme was to postpone the discussion on NATO enlargement. The countries which considered themselves potential NATO members were initially disappointed with the PFP programme. However, during the course of 1994, when the PFP programme took shape, this feeling of disappointment made way for a degree of enthusiasm. At the same time the success of the PFP programme to a certain extent undermined the importance of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a multilateral body focusing on dialogue between NATO and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact that was established in 1991.

Whether or not the PFP programme was to be seen as a means by which to postpone the discussion on NATO enlargement, it is a fact that by July 1994 the mood in the U.S. administration began to change in favour of a more rapid process of enlargement. The preparations of the NATO Ministerial Council therefore focused on taking a decision to undertake a study on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of NATO enlargement, leaving aside the questions of ‘who’ and ‘when’ for the time being. The perspective of NATO enlargement worried the Russian Federation considerably. Russia feared that, having withdrawn its troops from the former Warsaw Pact countries, it would soon be faced with NATO troops close to its borders, without being able to do much about it.

Moreover, Moscow was unhappy about the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). While the implementation of the obligations of the CFE Treaty progressed, Russia increasingly expressed its dissatisfaction with the Treaty’s block-to-block approach. Russia aimed to commence discussion on a new arms control agreement on a different basis even before November 1995, the date on which the obligations of the CFE Treaty would have to be fulfilled. The third factor influencing Russian behaviour at the time of the NATO Ministerial Council and the OSCE Summit were developments in the former Yugoslavia. The shelling of Bihac by Bosnian Serbs was stopped by NATO attacks on the airport of Udbina. Although acting on the request of the United Nations Security Council the NATO operation made the Russians feel that they were not involved as closely as the other members of the Contact Group in decision making on the former Yugoslavia, which increased their feeling of being excluded from major decisions on European security.

The three factors mentioned above were the driving force behind the presentation by Russia of a proposal on the ‘elaboration of a general and comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century’. This presentation took place only two weeks before the OSCE Summit. The central element of the proposal was ‘to launch a substantive and all-round discussion of a