A REVIEW ARTICLE*

1. This new volume of the veteran *Nirukta* scholar contains eleven numbered notes (X — XX) and one article which carries no number. All of them had been, or were about to be, published elsewhere. Together they contain interesting new points of view on quite a number of the problems connected with the *Nirukta*. I shall briefly describe them, with comments where necessary.

Note X ('Anūpa') argues convincingly that Yāska knew the derivation of *prācīna* (< *pra-cīṇa* < *pra-ac-īṇa*; in the *Nirukta* parallel to *anūpa* < *anu-pa* < *anu-āp*) also found in Pāṇini's *Āśādhyāyī*. (Cf. § 4, below.)

Note XI ('Ardhanāman') shows that *ardhanāman* (Nir. 1.7) does not mean "synonym of 'half'" (Sarup) but is rather a technical grammatical term which was used by 'some', apparently not for long, to designate the few words which share with *nāmans* the property of declension, but not accentuation.

Note XII ('Vibhakti') attempts to clarify the hitherto obscure sentence *yathārtham vibhaktih samnamayet* (Nir. 2.1). The solution lies in the word *vibhakti* which must not here mean 'case termination' but 'division'. The sentence now comes to say that "They [i.e., the divisions of a word into syllables or letters] (vibhaktī) ... should be interpreted [?] (sarhnamayet) according to the sense (yathārtham) of the words to be derived'.'

Note XIII ('Brahman') deals with the meaning of *brahman* in Nir. 4.6: *tatra brahmētiḥśāsamīrām* *rāmūmśrām gāthāmśrām bhavati*. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (33.6) contains a similar sentence at the end of the Śunāḥṣeṇa story: *tad etat pararkatāgaśṭham saunaḥṣeṇam ākhyānam*. Mehendale concludes that here *brahman* = *ākhyāna*. He does not seem to be aware that the same two episodes had been compared by Oldenberg (1883: 79–80 (466–67)) in an article dedicated to 'das altindische Ākhyāna', who did not however go to the extent of saying that *brahman* and *ākhyāna* are synonymous here. Geldner's (1889: 285 n. 2; cf. Thieme, 1952: 119 (128)) suggestion to take *brahman = brāhmaṇa*, seems more acceptable than Mehendale’s proposal. Another recent interpretation of the *Nirukta* sentence has been given by Horsch (1966: 314): "Dieser Hymnus ist vermischt mit Gebet (brahman) und Erzählung (ītīhāṣa), er besteht (nämlich) aus Rk- und Liedstrophe."


Note XIV (‘Jāmi and ajāmi in the Nirukta 4.20’) gives a plausible new interpretation of the line jāmy attirekanāma bāliśasya vāsamānajātiyasya vopajanaḥ (Nir. 4.20).

Note XV (‘Aikapadika in the Nirukta 1.14’) tries to find the meaning of aikapadika in saṃty alpaprayogāḥ kṛto ‘py aikapadikā yathā vratatir 5ā damānā jātya āṭnāro jāgarāko darvihomīti (Nir. 1.14). Mehendale argues that of all the words here enumerated “either the prakṛti or the pratyaya turns out to be of unique occurrence”. These words therefore “are aikapadika in this sense”. This proposal, I think, is not acceptable because it confronts us with insuperable difficulties. The most serious one is no doubt that the word aikapadika — which occurs twice in the Nirukta (1.14 and 4.1) and further nowhere in Sanskrit literature, it seems — cannot in Mehendale’s interpretation both times be given the same, or similar, meanings. Also the related word ekapada is given two meanings in two of its contexts by Mehendale (p. 29 n. 20). Another difficulty is that Mehendale cannot substantiate his claim that either the prakṛti or the pratyaya of the enumerated words are of unique occurrence. Since Yāska presents these words as being of known derivation, we are entitled to look for them in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī and in the Unādi Sūtra, where we find several of them. damānas is indeed derived (Un 4.234) 6 with a pratyaya (ūnasī) which is not used anywhere else. The same may be true of homin 7 which seems to get the unique pratyaya min in Un 3.84. 8 But āgarāka shares the ending āka with yāyājāka, jaṅjapāka and dandaśūka according to P. 3.2.165–66, 9 and with marāka, kāṇūka, valūka, ulūka, sālūka, maṇḍūka and other words according to Un 4.40–43. darvi 10 shares the ending viN with varvi according to Un 4.53. We must conclude that another interpretation of aikapadika is called for. See § 2, below.

In Note XVI (‘Sattvaanāman and karmanāman’) an attempt is made to show that sattvaanāman and karmanāman are two sub-classes of nāman. Examples of sattvaanāman are vrajyā (‘a going’) and pakti (‘a cooking’); examples of karmanāman are said to be puruṣa, āśva and trṇa. I must confess that I am not convinced by Mehendale’s argument. The two passages which must support his contentions can be more satisfactorily explained without the assumption that sattvaanāman and karmanāman are technical terms. What is meant by sattva, Yāska informs us, includes cows, horses, people and elephants (gaur āśvaḥ puruṣo hastī): these words are therefore certainly sattvaanāman. 11 The word karmanāman, Mehendale admits, does not by itself occur as a grammatical term in the Nirukta. Its derivative kārmanāmika occurs once (Nir. 1.13). But this passage, and the word kārmanāmika in it, does not deal with the words puruṣa, āśva, trṇa, etc., as Mehendale thinks; it rather is about the artificial words *purisaya, *aśtr, * tardana, etc., which should be used instead of puruṣa etc. These artificial words are nouns expressive of the action inherent in the objects denoted, and therefore the word kārmanāmika