(hence the limitations on a woman's attentions to her spouse and children). Mandelbaum suggests that the gender hierarchy arose as the plow increased the value of cultivable land. In order to consolidate inheritance rights, men increased their control over women's sexuality and emphasized their reproductive capacities. In northern India a woman does not work in the fields unless her family is desperate for her labor, and stringent purdah is the ideal which keeps her at home.

For Mandelbaum, these restrictions and meanings are culturally specific responses to general human concerns. We can see how Indians use purdah and izzat to express and negotiate status, thus mitigating social tensions: "endless streams of respect signals" (p. 12) reassure each party to an interaction that the others are not trying to raise their positions.

For readers from several fields this book will suggest lines of further investigation. For psychological anthropologists and Indianists, here is an interpretation of the family incorporating new research while identifying topics on which information is lacking. Scholars of gender find substance for current debates. For instance, the author suggests that women's roles in production are closely related to their restrictions; differences between typical male and female personalities are partly a result of young boys being raised by the opposite-sex parent and young girls being raised by the same-sex parent; and an economy increasingly based on cash and capitalist relations increases female dependence on males. Mandelbaum states that the gender system of the northern subcontinent is "quite congruent with all the features of gender and prestige which Ortner and Whitehead (Sexual Meanings, 1981) find to be universal among humankind" (p. 101). In this vein he demonstrates how men undervalue women at the same time as they depend on them for prestige. He does not, however, attempt to describe the psychological process suggested by Ortner and Whitehead whereby men undervalue the women precisely because the women represent a threat in their ability to withhold the means to prestige.

As a survey, unlike an ethnography, the volume cannot present the precise interweaving of gender behavior and ideology in a particular locale. Its strength, rather, lies in the fact that it is a recognized expert's clear explication of the intricate pattern of gender and other aspects of life across the region.

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In a notorious passage of *The Prince*, Machiavelli urges a new prince who wishes to be successful in establishing his state to make use of cruelty but to use it wisely, by which he means all at once, at the beginning. The act will be excused by good results, and the results of cruelty well-used will be good. People do not quickly forget spectacular executions; nor have we quickly forgotten Machiavelli's spectacular advice. Shocking words like shocking deeds carry lasting effects.

Mansfield, who puts Machiavelli at the intellectual and physical center of his new book, begins his own work with words if not quite shocking at least surprising: the secret of the success of modern republics like the United States is the executive power,
whose invention Mansfield traces back to Machiavelli. Executive power has been a secret, and has been deliberately kept a secret, because to know it adequately is frightening. It has been successful largely because the secret has been so well kept. Mansfield aims to expose its success and to betray its secret; in effect he wishes to unmask the modern executive by showing that behind the mask is Machiavelli's shocking prince, only tamed and domesticated by constitutional republicans like Locke, Montesquieu and the authors of the Federalist. If we are shocked by this revelation, Mansfield's words too may have permanent and salutary effects. But to be shocked we must first be convinced, and I doubt that many readers will pass this first hurdle.

By executive power Mansfield means a power approximately equivalent to that exercised by chief executive officers of modern liberal democracies like the United States. Such states need strong executives to protect their liberties. Yet at the same time this power poses the greatest potential threat to liberty, even when it is embedded in a constitutional separation of powers. It is a threat because the adequate protection of liberty requires that the executive be able to rule swiftly, secretly and tyrannically: some taint of injustice and fear must accompany the successful executive. But tyranny is incompatible with republican sensibilities; hence the need for a disguise. So, while agreeing to the need for a "strong executive" on the one hand, we conceal the true nature of this power by using a name which implies its subordination: the executive only "carries out" something else (the law) or the wishes of someone else (the people). As a consequence executive power is paradoxically both strong and weak, both controlling and subordinate, both independent and dependent. In a word, it is ambivalent. The author's hypothesis is that this ambivalence was deliberately contrived precisely to enable it to be effective in a world suspicious of untamed power.

But there is more. While the weak sense of the word suggests the neutrality of the executive (it only "carries out", it does not initiate or decide), its "effectual truth" is its strong sense, its power to "execute" not only laws but people, and large numbers of them, in the name of liberty. Even a tame prince must at times be wicked, and so a not-too-great distance separates the modern republican executive from its totalitarian counterpart both in theory and practice. When the executive stands unclothed, we are struck by nothing so much as his naked power to compel. A certain "evil cunning" clings to the neutrality which permits the prince to be appropriated in the liberal constitution.

The unmasking then is to be taken as a remedy of sorts. It is not, however, a remedy achieved at the expense of the strong sense of "executive": Mansfield envisions no diminishment of the executive's power and would regard such encroachments as dangerous to liberty. On this question he stands with Hamilton. It is a remedy that he calls Aristotelian—recalling the executive to his sense of responsibility for protecting republican liberty or, put differently, fostering in the executive the idea that a good ruler must also be a good man. The constitutionalists only put Machiavelli's human beast in a cage, but they have not changed the beast; Mansfield is working for a transformation.

One hears unmistakable echoes of Leo Strauss, for whose peculiar reading of Machiavelli Mansfield shows obvious admiration, and for whose opponents he has in the past shown barely disguised contempt (Political Theory 3, 1975). Pocock and Skinner continue to "get it wrong", and other interpretations are similarly brushed aside or ignored. Straussian habits infect the rest of the work: there is the shocking hypothesis (already mentioned) placing Machiavelli at the intellectual center of