competition. Finally, democratic principles have "roots" independent of moral principles. As becomes clear through a discourse theory approach to the question, the communicative liberties of a democracy make possible the "presumptively rational opinion- and will-formation" of citizens. Democratic procedures themselves supply legitimacy.

Habermas cautions that "law can be preserved as legitimate only if enfranchised citizens switch from the role of private legal subjects and take the perspective of participants who are engaged in the process of reaching understanding about the rules for their life in common" (147). There is richness and depth in this volume of essays, and each reader will be engaged by a different aspect of the discussion. For me, this last reminder of the abiding responsibilities of democratic citizenship will linger in the mind of both a political scientist and a citizen.

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This latest collection of essays and papers of Michael Polanyi by Polanyi scholar R.T. Allen, is a republication of articles on non-scientific topics, not readily available in other collections, and which canvas Polanyi's ever lucid excursions into the realms of politics, economics and society.

Part I on Political Questions and Part II on Economic and Social Theory, each reinforced by some overlap on standard themes, constitute the most cohesive sections of this anthology. Part III encompasses what many will recognize as vintage Polanyi writings on ontological and epistemological aspects of scientific discovery. Part IV, the shortest section, ranges from cybernetics to aesthetics and religion.

The selections on politics trace Polanyi's search for practical wisdom on political questions from World War I up to 1970. The cataclysmic wars of the first half of this century and the Bolshevik revolution have clearly left their mark on Polanyi's political theory. What the early writing reveals is a young man chagrined with the "cult of the State" and in despair as well about the irrationality of mass passions. His own passionate voice calls for analysis of the "originating conditions of political illusions" and the need for refutation of beliefs in political authority. Soviet "illusions," particularly, are decried by Polanyi as all too obvious cases of government authority "stampeding people into the Good Life" and sacrificing truth and intellect to a misplaced passion for human welfare.

The irony for Polanyi is that Marx's moral indignation and fervent hopes for human progress so typical of the Enlightenment and embodied in his theory of history, are derailed into a doctrine of violence and oppression of intellectual liberty. Such passion, displaced and deformed, he calls "moral inversion."

Could a well-ordered liberal state and society prevent a moral inversion such as Marxism in the Soviet Union came to represent? The selections persistently reveal a
Polanyi committed to liberal arrangements in a society where independent realms of thought (including freedom of the press, religion and, of course, science) make possible reasonable approximations of truth and justice within the context of the rule of law in a multi-cultural society. (Polanyi’s understanding of “nation” is the classical liberal one of inclusion. As a Jew, he envisioned the Jews as part of a cosmopolitan, unified Europe.)

Polanyi’s stalwart commitment to “traditional ideals of liberalism” is not unqualified, however. Fierce inquiry and freedom to question may lead to progress without moral guidance, or it may result in “excessive doubt,” thus despair and nihilism. Even the modern scientific outlook has become a danger to the spiritual conception of man and a destroyer of liberal societies. Such liberalism out of balance requires adjustment, Polanyi argues. Indeed, the “modern mind must reach a vision of itself capable of limiting itself.” The problem of modernity is to restore “balance between critical powers and moral demands.”

Polanyi’s nuanced liberalism and his call for a liberal reformation is also quite evident in the readings on economic and social theory. He does not so much argue against central economic planning (as do von Mises and Hayek) as he discounts it completely. Such planning is pretence and myth — essentially impossible. Indeed, the young Soviet regime soon abandoned it for a state capitalism based on “conspicuous production” encouraged by “central pressure” on enterprises.

The appropriate relationship between government and economy for Polanyi, however, is not the laissez-faire approach of classical liberalism. What he calls supervision of “widely dispersed sources of initiative” is a “positive, ancient and fundamental responsibility of Society which it must accept.”

What the political and economic selections reveal as the reader proceeds, then, are judiciously revised liberal views that are always sensibly balanced. It is a liberal polity with a “supervised” economic system, guided by rational principles of fairness and justice, grounded in personal, scientific and institutional autonomy, embodied in a social culture wary of the notion that public authority holds all the answers. It is this combination that Polanyi advocates as a cure for the morally inverted political illusions of the twentieth century. Polanyi’s liberalism is clearly not of the libertarian type; “private individualism” is not his touchstone. Liberty requires a Burkian injection of civility and a communitarian ethic. This hybrid communitarian and liberal society more than likely embodies his call for a “balance between critical powers and moral demands.”

Beyond politics and economics, this collection also includes readings on his philosophy of science. Part III is surely an excellent primer on Polanyi’s distinctive understanding of the process of scientific discovery and his arguments against radical empiricism. Part IV includes other writings dealing with mind, art, and religion. Among them is a clear, concise exposition of his philosophy of personal knowledge and a wonderfully suggestive penultimate piece where he offers his theory of natural knowing as the “pursuit of hidden meanings” as a paradigm for knowing the supernatural.

This collection has its prime value, however, as an introduction to the “other” Michael Polanyi as political and economic analyst, and its strength is clearly the substantial set of readings in these areas. Of course indelible traces of Polanyi’s philosophy of science remain in his political and economic theory. Both scientific and political authority need amending for Polanyi. Science, like statecraft, is inexact and relies on intangible practices,