a manipulative system of patronage politics, and reliance on coercion to suppress dissent and exclude progressives from political power in order to entrench a shrewd ruling bureaucracy that lacks the will and ability to transform economic structures to improve the distribution of resources and opportunities.

Leys avoids prescriptive advice, closing with a disclaimer that the most academic studies, such as his, can do is "to try not to obscure the structures of exploitation and oppression which underdevelopment produces, and which in turn sustain it" (p. 275). Without a transfer of power and radically alternative developmental strategies that aim to alter the pattern of wealth-holding, change the way the government taxes and spends, and generate a different pattern of income flow, the social and economic needs of the population will not be met in a country saddled with a mortgaged independence.

Nowadays, along Nairobi's River Road, on minuscule farms in nearby Kiambu district, or in conversations with workers in the tourist-related "service sector" (e.g., handicraft carvers, waiters, taxi drivers) one perceives the unmistakable signs of frustration, disillusion, and disgust—plus an uneasy mixture of envy and fear—with such structural inequities. Others meanwhile apparently remain oblivious: a sign outside G.M.'s Nairobi plant proclaims the firm has "Full Confidence in the Economic Future of Kenya". After reading Underdevelopment in Kenya such optimism seems more miscalculated and untenable than ever.

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The authors found it difficult to present their findings comprehensively in the single chapter. "Economic Growth and its Sources", in Asia's New Giant. Consequently, this present work should be looked upon as the original work, including statistical appendices, on which the summary chapter in Giant was based.

The authors set out to answer the questions posed by their title and discover that the answers are to be found in the fact that post World War II economic growth in Japan, which was far ahead that experienced by any other advanced country, was based on almost all important determinants of economic growth changing in favorable directions, with none changing unfavorably. The period studied was 1953 to 1971 and comparisons were made with ten other advanced countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States. The analyses were not for the identical time periods in each case, which turns out not to be a serious handicap. Seven groups of growth determinants are investigated: more capital, advances in knowledge, economics of scale, more work done, less labor misallocation, increased education per worker, reduced international trade barriers. The first five determinants made a larger contribution to growth in Japan than to growth in any of the other ten countries (expect Italy in the case of only one determinant). The remaining two determinants, increased education of the labor force and the relaxation of barriers to international trade, contributed average and less than average amounts respectively. Japan's growth rate exceeded the others by a very wide margin because the other countries tended to have mixed rankings in terms of their positions in the major determinants, while Japan stood first in most of the important growth sources.

The largest single contribution to growth was made by capital. The increase in the stock of private capital contributed an estimated 2.10 percentage points to the growth rate of national income from 1953 to 1971. This was made possible by the increase in the total annual national output, a rise in the proportion of income saved, and a decline in the relative price of capital goods. The next largest contribution was made by advances in knowledge and miscellaneous determinants. There was a major element of Japan's catching up here in the sense of moving closer to the technological and managerial frontier of the West via improvements in the techniques of production, distribution and business organization. Traditional Japanese attitudes and practices have been receptive to the rapid and effective induction of new and foreign know-how. (Some commentators refer to this situation as the Japanese being free of the "NIH" (Not Invented Here) syndrome). This contributed 1.97 percentage points to the growth rate of national income. Economies of scale made possible by expanding markets were the third largest source of growth. There were two reasons for their being large. First, the growth of total output was very rapid and second, market expansion in the consumer goods sector was particularly large for durables that afforded big opportunities for production scale economies. This contributed 1.94 percentage points to the growth rate of national income. Labor is the fourth largest growth source, looking at all components of labor input except education. Employment grew at the high annual rate of 1.5% from 1953 to 1971. Total man hours worked in the whole economy also increased at the high annual rate of 1.5%. Compositional shifts of total hours worked in the business sector were away from females and teenagers of both sexes and toward adult males in the prime working ages. This age-sex group has the highest earnings and presumptively the highest marginal product. Overall contribution was 1.49% to the 1953-71 growth rate of national income in the economy as a whole. For an advanced country, Japan allocates an unusually large percentage of employment to agriculture. Furthermore, within non-agricultural employment, the percentage of self-employed and unpaid family workers is also high. From 1953-1971 both agricultural employment and non-farm self-employment declined substantially relative to total employment, leading to a large gain in the non-farm wage and salary worker proportion. This was the fifth largest source of growth and contributed 0.94% to the growth of national income. The increase in the education of employed persons was of intermediate size in comparison with other advanced countries as was its contribution to the growth rate at 0.34 percentage points. There was little change in international trade barriers from 1953-1971. Throughout the period, imports of both raw materials and machinery were unrestricted or restrained only by the availability of foreign exchange. The market for rice was a protected preserve of domestic farmers and imports of manufactured consumer goods were forbidden or subjected to prohibitive tariffs. Export restrictions changed little relative to the size of the economy. There was a slight easing in the 1960's, especially after 1968, but it had little effect on trade until after the period studied. The implied contribution to growth rate of national income, 1953-1971, amounts to only 0.01 percentage points.

Overall, the percentage distribution of growth by source in Japan was not very different than the U.S. which had a far lower growth rate. Estimates of the sources of growth of national income per person employed are also provided and for most output determinants, contributions are the same as to total national income.

The study ends with the question, "Can the growth rate be sustained?" The popular optimism of the 60's projected real GNP growth to the point where Japan would be number one in per capita GNP in the late 1980's and in total output not much later, even allowing for the costs of controlling pollution.