tration of monks and educational institutions than any other place in Thailand, yet secularization rather than tradition, consumer satisfaction rather than merit making, and decline in monastic support by community groups seems to prevail. The role of traditional religious institutions in an urban, impersonal and technological society of course is not only a Thai or Asian problem. The Theravada Wat functions well in a more passive role in stable rural society, but whether that model can survive in the cities will be interesting to discern.

The chapters on "The Wat and Its Social Matrix" and "The Role of the Buddhist Layman" are valuable descriptions of the patterns of groups and their contribution to and participation in the ongoing functioning of the monasteries. Bunnag provides detail accounting of formal and informal groupings that relate to the rituals, financial support, governance, and community role of the Wats. The reader cannot but be impressed with the interdependent reciprocity that seems to exist between lay and monk roles. The laymen on a Wat committee come from those who have been former monks and have considerable Buddhist interest as well as those who might be expected to add prestige because of social position as well as non-Buddhists of community standing. The great diversity of types of support and community interaction also is interestingly outlined by the author. It is a capable work recommended especially for those with interest in contemporary Theravada and its institutional aspects and social roles of participants. It does not explore the philosophic or doctrinal changes that might be taking place nor penetrate to the religious questions of the motivation of the monk in relation to the layman and world. Those are topics related but not central to the purpose of this study which is well accomplished.

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The central thesis of this book is that after the Civil War in China which ended in a victory for the Communists, China became America’s principal enemy. Conditioned to think anti-Chinese LBJ saw an advantage in the turn of events in Indonesia after the October coup which resulted in the decimation of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia)—and triggered the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China and a further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. In this context the President of the United States escalated the war in Vietnam. In sum, the opportunities blinded Johnson to the realities of America’s ability to win the Vietnam War, the desires of the people of Southeast Asia, the attitudes of America’s allies, and the feelings of the U.S. populace.

More specifically, Woo argues that the Korean War, added to the embarrassment of supporting the losing side in China’s Civil War, fostered ill feelings toward China in Washington, while it influenced American decisions in Indochina and toward Indonesia. The anti-colonial sentiment in Indonesia and America’s favoritism toward the Dutch and NATO caused Djakarta to tilt toward China. The author notes, however, that the growth of the PKI engendered anti-Communist attitudes in the Indonesian military and that Sukarno promoted an anti-imperialist foreign policy in order to unite the nation and divert attention from serious problems at home, especially economic stagnation which he did not have the ability to cope with. The “crush Malaysia”
campaign suddenly announced by Sukarno in 1963, according to Woo, was the quintessence of this.

This, from the point of view of the author's research, was the prelude to the October coup in 1965 which was apparently initiated by the PKI, but resulted in an Army-led counter-coup and the destruction of Communism in Indonesia. Sukarno was then eased out and the Army ruled. This defeat for China—Indonesia was China's most important ally and the key to gaining control over Southeast Asia—was followed, according to Woo, by an internal debate in China and direct confrontation between Mao Tse-tung and his heir apparent Liu Shao-ch'i. In order to dislodge Liu, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, which wrought havoc in mainland China for four years. In this context LBP felt confident he could win in Vietnam.

Although Woo's thesis is an interesting one, it is difficult to see how events prove it. First, the cooling of U.S.-Indonesian relations was as much a factor of U.S. indifference and Indonesian nationalism, plus Soviet cajoling, as it was a result of America's efforts to contain China. In fact, many U.S. decision makers felt that Indonesia, because of its size and distance from China, should not be figured into the domino theory. Second, why should Washington necessarily try to exploit China's failures in Indonesia by escalating the Vietnam War? LBJ might just as well have assumed that the monumentum was on his side, thus adopting another approach. In this connection it is interesting to note that the author does not suggest that the U.S. was responsible for the 1965 coup in Indonesia as some scholars have argued. He apparently felt this would be contradictory in the sense that it would be seen as a very successful U.S. maneuver, while the Vietnam War was just the opposite.

Another defect in the theory, not to mention that it depends upon connecting U.S. policy in Indochina and the war in Vietnam to a coup in Indonesia which few Americans knew about, is that events in Indonesia are seen as the cause for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. Woo argues that it evoked a feud between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i. Yet this feud may be seen to have stemmed from the late 1950s, when Mao was forced to abdicate his position of Chief-of-State after the Great Leap debacle and Liu arrogated this job. Further the Cultural Revolution is seen by most scholars to find its origins in an ideological struggle and a serious problem of bureaucratism that was anathema to Mao. In any case, the failure of Chinese foreign policy in Indonesia would be blame that would fall on the shoulders of Chou En-lai and Chen Yi, who did not become enemies of Mao, more than Liu Shao-ch'i.

Some other questions also arise: If it was the goal of containing China that impelled Johnson to escalate the war, couldn't he have just waited for the Soviet Union to help—since the Kremlin also sought to isolate China at this time? And if Johnson realized the import of the schism in Indonesian-Chinese relations and trouble in the Communist camp in 1964 as the author says, why didn't he have the prescience to see what his policy in Vietnam would lead to?

Another criticism of this book is that it is written in clumsy grammar and contains numerous spelling, punctuation and typing errors. It is immediately obvious to the reader that the book was a PhD dissertation that was not carefully proofread and published without editing. This careless men is not just vexing to the reader; it is sometimes confusing. For example, the author is sympathetic to Peking, yet throughout refers to China as Communist China rather than using its correct name the People's Republic of China. Another example is his reference to a U.S. declaration of war in Vietnam. Admittedly the U.S. was fighting a war, but an official declaration of war by the U.S. Congress would have made a significant difference.